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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to determine standards or criteria to be used
when deciding on the optimal use of the criminal sanction and to evaluate the
efficacy of such criteria by applying them to an existing crime, namely incest.
Since criminal punishment necessarily impacts negatively on the human
rights of those subject to it, it is submitted that it should only be used as a last
resort where it is absolutely necessary to do so. Relevant constitutional
provisions and other legal sources are examined and used as the basis for
expounding a test for determining the circumstances under which it is
appropriate to criminalise. It is argued that the decision to utilise the criminal
sanction may be tested against certain guidelines: the state bears the burden
of showing, firstly, that the rationale of the crime in question is theoretically
justifiable in that criminalisation serves a worthy state purpose; and secondly,
that criminalisation is reasonable, being both practically desirable and
effective in achieving legitimate state goals in the least restrictive manner
possible.
In the second part of the thesis, the proposed criteria are applied to the
common law crime of incest. An initial discussion of the crime indicates that a
wide range of conduct is punishable as incest, including both extremely
harmful conduct, such as the rape of a child by her father, and completely
innocuous behaviour, for instance private sexual intercourse between
consenting adults who are merely related by marriage.
Next, an attempt is made to ascertain the true rationale for criminalising
incest and then to establish whether such rationale is justifiable. The
conclusion is reached that despite there being good grounds for punishing
certain manifestations of incest, the only reason for imposing criminal
punishment that is valid in all instances, is the unconvincing contention that
the state is justified in prohibiting incest merely because incest is regarded as
morally abhorrent.
And even assuming that targeting and preventing undesirable forms of
harmful or offensive conduct is a justifiable purpose of the incest prohibition, it
is nevertheless submitted that criminalising incest is unreasonable, since the
iii
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crime as it is presently formulated is both over- and under-inclusive for the
effective realisation of any praiseworthy aims.
After testing incest against the criteria developed, the recommendation is
made that incest be decriminalised. It is contended that there are sufficient
alternative criminal prohibitions available that would adequately punish
harmful incestuous conduct without simultaneously unreasonably limiting the
rights of consenting adults to choose their sexual (or marriage) partner without
state interference. Decriminalisation would not only prevent potential
violations of human rights, but the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as
a whole would be considerably enhanced if it were apparent that the criminal
sanction was reserved for conduct truly deserving of punishment.
OPSOMMING
Die oogmerk van hierdie studie is om standaarde of riglyne daar te stel ter
aanwending waar besluit word oor die optimale benutting van die strafsanksie,
asook om die doeltreffendheid van sulke riglyne vas te stel deur die
toepassing daarvan op 'n bestaande misdaad, naamlik bloedskande.
Aangesien straf altyd 'n nadelige uitwerking op die menseregte van dié
wat daaraan onderhewig is, het, word aan die hand gedoen dat dit slegs as 'n
laaste uitweg aangewend moet word indien absoluut noodsaaklik. Ondersoek
word ingestel na toepaslike grondwetlike bepalings en ander regsbronne, wat
gebruik word as grondslag vir 'n toets ten einde te bepaalonder welke
omstandighede kriminalisasie gepas is. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat
die besluit om gebruik te maak van 'n strafsanksie teen sekere riglyne getoets
kan word. Die staat dra die bewyslas om aan te toon, eerstens, dat die
bestaansrede vir die betrokke misdaad teoreties regverdigbaar is aangesien
krimininalisasie 'n waardige staatsdoel dien; en tweedens, dat kriminalisasie
redelik is, aangesien dit prakties wenslik is, asook die staat se legitieme
doelwitte dien op effektiewe wyse op die mees onbeperkende wyse moontlik.
In die tweede gedeelte van die verhandeling word die voorgestelde
riglyne op die gemeenregtelike misdaad bloedskande toegepas. 'n
IV
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Aanvanklike bespreking van die misdaad dui daarop dat die trefwydte van
bloedskande sodanig is dat dit gedrag insluit wat uiters benadelend is, soos
byvoorbeeld die verkragting van 'n kind deur haar vader, maar ook heeltemal
onskadelike optrede soos byvoorbeeld geslagsverkeer tussen toestemmende
volwassenes wat bloot aanverwante is.
Die volgende stap is om die ware bestaansrede vir die verbod op
bloedskande vas te stel en daarna te oorweeg of sodanige bestaansrede
regverdigbaar is. Die gevolgtrekking is dat alhoewel daar goeie gronde vir die
bestrawwing van sekere verskyningsvorme van bloedskande is, die enigste
altyd-geldende rede vir strafoplegging in hierdie verband die onoortuigende
bewering dat bloedskande moreelonverdraaglik beskou word, is.
Selfs al word daar aanvaar dat die identifikasie en voorkoming van
onwenslike verskyningsvorme van skadelike of aanstootlike gedrag 'n
regverdigbare doel vir die bloedskandeverbod is, voer die skrywer nie te min
aan dat die kriminalisasie van bloedskande onredelik is omrede die huidige
misdaadomskrywing tegelykertyd beide oor- en onder- inklusief is om einge
moontlike goeie doelwitte effektief te bereik.
Nadat bloedskande getoets word teen die riglyne wat ontwikkel is, word
aanbeveel dat bloedskande gedekriminaliseer word. Daar word aan die hand
gedoen dat daar genoegsame alternatiewe strafbepalings is wat aangewend
kan word om skadelike gedrag wat onder die misdaad bloedskande resorteer
te bestraf sonder dat die regte van toestemmende volwassenes om sonder
staatsinmenging hul seksuele- (of huweliks-) maat te kies onredelik ingeperk
word. Dekriminalisasie sal nie slegs moontlike menseregteskendings
voorkom nie, maar ook die legitimiteit van die strafregstelsel as geheel
bevorder deurdat dit duidelik blyk dat die strafsankie reserveer word vir
optrede wat werklik straf verdien.
v
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1 OVERVIEW OF STUDY
1 1 Introduction
What is a crime? The only answer that is always valid is: "A crime is any
conduct which is defined by law to be a crime and for which punishment is
prescri bed." 1
However, this reply is unsatisfactory in that is says nothing about "what
the content of a law of crimes is or ought to be." Such a formal or procedural
definition of crime also leaves one in the dark about whether the lawmaker
has to use any particular standards or criteria in making the decision to
criminalise conduct, or whether the conclusion to impose or remove the
criminal sanction" may be reached on completely arbitrary grounds. The
consequences of declaring conduct to be a crime are extremely far-reaching
and potentially prejudicial. It would therefore be useful to be able to identify,
at the very least, criteria that would indicate when it would be inappropriate to
make use of the criminal sanction. Ideally, a reliable test could be developed
and applied to each particular practical case to determine whether the conduct
concerned should be subject to criminal punishment.
The aim of the present study is precisely that: to determine criteria (and
so doing also a test) according to which a decision can be made about
whether or not conduct should be criminalised. Initially, the Consfitution," the
views of legal scholars" and case law will be examined to identify criteria that
may be employed to make this determination. The next stage will be to
develop a comprehensive test to be used when making the criminalisation
declsron." The focus will then shift to an examination of the common law
crime of incest, and to the application of the criteria and test to this crime." An
1 Burchell J South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume I: General Principles of Criminal Law
3 ed (Burchell EM & Hunt PMA 1 ed) (1997) 1.
2 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 18.
J According to Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 3, the criminal sanction is a device aimed at
addressing "the problem of trying to control anti-social behaviour by imposing punishment on people
found guilty of violating rules of conduct called criminal statutes".
4 Act 108 of 1996, hereafter "the Constitution". See § 2 2 infra.
5 See discussion of Feinberg, Packer and Rabie §§ 2 3-2 5 infra.
6 See ch 3 infra.
7 Ch 4 and eh 5 infra.
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attempt will be made to determine whether it is both justified and reasonable
to reinforce the prohibition on sexual relations between persons closely
related by blood, marriage or adoption, by declaring incest" to be a crime. It is
hoped, however, that the conclusions reached in this regard may be applied
more generally to other crimes in the quest to determine when the criminal
sanction may be removed without undermining important societal values or
frustrating significant state goals.
1 2 Dangers of indiscriminate utilisation of the criminal sanction"
The decision to criminalise conduct is not one that should be taken
lightly. While it is sometimes apparent that the only way to adequately convey
society's disapproval of harmful conduct is by declaring the conduct
concerned a crime." "the law's ultimate threat'!' has unfortunately often been
resorted to in other situations where the conduct concerned does not warrant
such drastic and severe measures. This study will show that incest is a good
example of the latter category of crimes.
It is also clear that the legislature's strategy of indiscriminately resorting
to the criminal sanction as a way of regulating human conduct by compelling
public obedience, has been largely unsuccessful in achieving the aim of
decreasing the incidence of crime." Indeed, the legislature has recognised
the need for decriminalisation in the context of certain regulatory statutory
offences." It is submitted that this tendency needs to be extended to other
crimes that have outlived their usefulness, including common law crimes such
as incest.
8 See §§ 4 1 and 42 infra for a detailed definition of the crime incest.
9 To read more about the problem of over-criminalisation, see LAWSA VI Criminal Law § 9; Morris
"The Overreach of the Criminal Law" in Law, Crime and Community (1975) 40-53; and Van der
Vyver "The Overreach of the Criminal Law" in Law, Crime and Community (1975) 53-58.
10 In such clear-cut cases, the benefits to society outweigh any interests the guilty individual may have
in not being prosecuted and convicted. Although the rights of the accused are limited to a certain
extent (see § 3 2 infra), such limitation may easily be justified.
" Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250.
12 One of the reasons most frequently favoured to justify the imposition of criminal punishment on
those who have been convicted of a crime, is general deterrence - that those threatened with
punishment will abstain from committing crimes. See Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law
2 ed (1997) 44 and the authorities cited there.
13 For instance, the Decriminalization Act 107 of 1991 provides for the replacement of criminal
offences with administrative action in certain circumstances.
2
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The over-utilisation of the criminal sanction has various undesirable
consequences.
If the legislature is too eager to resort to criminalisation to enforce
obedience, the legitimacy of the whole criminal justice system is impaired.
According to Packer." only if the criminal sanction is reserved for the most
serious forms of conduct, where there are no satisfactory alternatives to
criminalisation, will the moral authority of the criminal law be upheld instead of
being undermined. By using criminal punishment as a regulatory tool only, or
merely as a means of expressing disapproval, the lawmaker effectively
undermines the gravity and significance of a criminal convictlon." The stigma
that accompanies a guilty verdict will no longer have the same force, and it will
therefore be harder to utilise the criminal sanction effectively to persuade
people to desist from committing crimes.
The public's lack of confidence in the criminal justice system is
exacerbated by the perception that resources spent prosecuting trivial
offences could better be used to ensure the speedy apprehension and
prosecution of those committing serious and violent crimes. If many of the
existing petty crimes were decriminalised, the state would no longer need to
waste time and money enforcing them. The criminal justice system would
have greater legitimacy, since police and judicial officers would be seen to
focus on serious criminal matters rather than on trivlalities." The financial
burden that the state bears in ensuring the smooth running of the criminal
justice system should not be underestimated; and the greater the number of
crimes that exist, the greater the cost. Packer addresses the heart of the
matter when he says:
"Every hour of police, prosecutorial, judicial and correctional time that is spent
on marginal uses of the criminal sanction is an hour lost to the prevention of
serious crime. Conversely, every trivial, imaginary, or otherwise dubious crime
14 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 26l.
15 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 272. See also 273 where Packer says: "The more
indiscriminate we are in treating conduct as criminal, the less stigma resides in the mere fact that a
man has been convicted of something called a crime."
16 In the context of the decriminalisation of sodomy, Sachs J remarked: "[If sodomy is decriminalised],
[t]he courts, the police and the prison system are enabled to devote the time and resources formerly
spent on obnoxious and futile prosecutions, to catching and prosecuting criminals who prey on gays
and straights alike" (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of
Justice and Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); 1998 2 SACR 556 (CC); 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) § 130).
3
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that is removed from the list of criminal offenses [sic] represents the freeing of
substantial resources to deal more effectively with the high-priority needs of the
criminal justice systern.t"
Although it may be argued that a crime such as incest does not claim a
particularly large slice of the criminal justice system's financial pie, such
reasoning is unpersuasive. The same may be said of many other trifling and
redundant criminal offences. Although enforcing each individual criminal
prohibition may require a relatively negligible amount of time and money, the
resources used add up. If there is a reluctance to consider economic reasons
for decriminalisation with respect to each and every minor offence, the
number of unnecessary offences will never be reduced.
The view that the limited resources of the police and the courts are being
utilised inefficiently, as well as wide-spread frustration due to the often time-
consuming court process, leads people to believe that they can only achieve
justice by taking the law into their own hands." Although it is not the direct
focus of the present study, the undermining of the rule of law that
accompanies this perceived need for vigilantism is an important priority that
requires urgent attention on various fronts.
In addition to its economic cost, a proliferation of trivial crimes has a
considerable social cost. Not only is there unnecessary suffering (inherent in
punishment) imposed on all those convicted of crimes where non-criminal
means of enforcement might be more appropriate;" but the mere stigma of a
criminal record may be extremely prejudicial to convicted offenders
themselves.2o For instance, there can be little doubt that an incest conviction
17 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 259-260.
18 Morris "Kangaroo Courts Demand Government Action" The Star (2002-01-21) at
(http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set id=l andclick id=13andart id=ct20020121214147799G525179)
(2003-02-03). The state is entrusted with the duty of exacting retribution against criminals on behalf
of society, and ifit is unable to do so, this may lead to the community's being understandably
frustrated and feeling that there is no other option but to resort to self-help.
19 This study will only peripherally attempt to address the issue of alternatives to the criminal sanction.
Suffice it to say that the possibility of resorting to options other than punishment to enforce obedience
is frequently not adequately taken into account by lawmakers. Options other than criminalisation will
be considered in the context of incest only - see § 5 3 3 infra.
20 This prejudice is apparent in a practical as well as symbolic sense. Practically speaking, it may for
instance be far more difficult for persons with a criminal record to obtain employment, and they and
their family may therefore suffer financially. On a symbolic level, the imposition by criminal law of
status of "criminal" is regarded by Chidester Shots in the Streets: Violence and Religion in South
Africa (1992) 68 as one of the means used to classify persons as "subhuman entities to be excluded,
dominated or exploited." See also Van Zyl Smit "The Limits of the Criminal Sanction" (1986) TRW
4
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is accompanied by a considerable stigma, since "our society has an intense
moral abhorrence for sexual relations between close relatives.:" As will be
shown." the aim of the punishment and stigma accompanying an incest
conviction is to condemn perpetrators because they have violated a social or
moral taboo, rather than because the conduct in question is harmful to others.
Due to the intensity of social feeling against incest, the public humiliation of
being exposed as having committed incest can be viewed as punishment
enough - it is doubtful whether the additional reinforcement of a criminal
sanction is required."
1 3 The presumption against criminalisation
There is no doubt that all criminal laws are prejudicial to the individuals
they affect." It is therefore generally recognised that if the legislature resorts
to criminalisation, it should be able to defend its decision." According to
Bayles,26 the "burden of proof thus rests on those who favour criminal
legislation; they must provide good reasons for overriding the presumption
against it." If the legislature is to fulfil this duty of imposing criminal sanction
sparingly and only in cases where it is deserved, the question is: how should
the choice of deciding when the criminal sanction is appropriate, be made?
How may the instances where the use of the criminal sanction is inappropriate
be recognised in order to remove such conduct from the sphere of
enforcement by means of the criminal law altogether?
188-191 for more on the symbolic significance of criminalisation. He notes at 190 that "the person
who wishes to decriminalise, to limit the criminal sanction [in the area of immorality legislation]
must ... challenge the belief system itself."
21 Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume 11:Common Law Crimes 3 ed (Hunt 1
ed) (1996) 236.
22 At § 5 2 2 irfra.
23 See in this regard Bailey & McCabe "Reforming the Law of Incest" 1979 Crim LR 749 756: "[T]he
social taboo associated with incest would remain as, arguably, a more effective way of discouraging
the conduct than that provided by criminal proscription." See also § 5 3 3 8 infra.
24 See further §§ 3 2 1 and 3 22 irfra on the rights of the accused affected by criminalisation.
25 See Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1999), where it is stated at 12-27: "By
placing the burden of proof on the government we simply recognize the government's unmatched
power to shape, manipulate and determine the content of our lives, and require it to justify the use of
its power in areas in which the Constitution tells us we are notionally free."
26 "Criminal Paternalism" in Pennock and Chapman (eds) The Limits of Law: Nomos XV (1974) 175.
5
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1 4 The problem: how to identify criteria for determining the optimal
use of the criminal sanction
In § 1 2 above it was stated that the legitimacy crisis of the criminal
justice system has been brought about (in part) by the related problem of
over-criminalisation. One way of tackling the issue is to attempt to create a
hierarchy of crimes in order to "put first things first, but also, what is perhaps
harder, to put last things last"27 - in other words, to develop a way of
identifying priority crimes and of distinguishing them from possible
"candidates" for decriminalisation. This study addresses the question of over-
criminalisation by identifying standards that should be applied in deciding
whether to criminalise or decriminalise. It is argued that crimes without a
convincing rationale as well as those that are ineffective in putting a stop to
the evils that they are designed to prevent, or over-burdensome for persons
subject to them, should be discarded.
Assuming the existence of a rational law-maker, who stops, looks and
listens before legislating,28 and assuming, too, that there are some grounds
for criminal ising conduct that carry more weight than others, the vexing
question remains how to identify and distinguish good reasons for
criminalisation from bad. And as will become clear, even if the rationale for
criminalising particular conduct is theoretically laudable and justifiable,29 this
merely implies that criminalisation may be an option - it does not necessarily
mean that the criminal sanction should be resorted to. It must also be
established that imposing criminal punishment is practically feasible and
effective, without being unduly onerous.3D
The worthwhile reasons, if any, for punishing incest (and conduct in
general) may only be distinguished from the bad if certain criteria relevant to
such an investigation are developed and applied. Standards are also required
27 Packer The Limits a/the Criminal Sanction 260.
28 Packer The Limits a/the Criminal Sanction 3.
29 See § 3 3 2 infra for a critical discussion of the various justifications for criminalisation. It will be
argued that a criminal prohibition designed to prevent harm or serious offence to others is prima facie
justifiable, whereas one that merely expresses moral outrage or paternalistically protects persons from
the harmful consequences of their own decisions, is not.
30 The second stage of the inquiry is aimed at determining the reasonableness of using criminal
punishment (see § 3 3 3 infra).
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to determine whether resorting to the criminal sanction is reasonable in a
particular instance.
When determining guidelines for (de)criminalisation, there are always
many competing values, rights and interests at stake. These include the
rights of accused persons and their victims (if applicable), societal interests,
state interests in retaining the criminal sanction, and practical considerations.
On what grounds may one choose between them? What, or who, should
have the final say? Society, and hence criminal law, is complex and
dynamic," which means that any criteria or test developed for determining the
optimal use of the criminal sanction must be flexible and be able to be
adapted in accordance with changing societal priorities. Criminalisation has
far-reaching effects, and, for this reason, a decision as to its utilisation should
surely be a well-reasoned, non-arbitrary one. A meaningful and workable
solution must be found to the problem of balancing the conflicting interests,
rights, principles and values that are at stake when criminalisation decisions
are made.
Choosing between multiple independent and irreconcilable claims is no
easy task." Some interests must perforce take precedence over others - it is
not always possible to compromise and strike a balance between competing
demands. But which interests and values should be deemed as deserving of
more consideration? Sometimes the answer to this question is simple: the
limitation for a certain period of a cold-blooded murderer's right to physical
freedom is clearly justified by society's interest that murderers be punished for
depriving others of the right to life.33 And if the principle of de minimis non
Jl An example of the dynamic evolution of criminal law is the way in which a common law crime such
as crimen iniuria has been utilised to protect persons against racially discriminatory remarks that
infringe upon their human dignity - see S v Steenberg 1999 1 SACR 594 (N), where the joking use of
the word "kaffir" was sufficient to warrant conviction, since it was shown that there was the
necessary dolus eventualis to infringe the complainant's dignity. Changing societal values are
reflected by the shift in types of conduct criminalised by this particular crime.
J2 Woolman in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 12-56 goes so far as to say that balancing of
rights is impossible, since "[h]uman goods are often incommensurable." In making the "[h]ard
choices as to which human good we pursue", he advocates neither the adoption of a "strict hierarchy
of goods" nor an ad hoc approach; instead, he suggests a combination of the two (see Chaskalson
supra 12-57 to 12-64 for more details).
JJ For instance, it was decided in SvMakwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC); 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); 1995
2 SACR 1 (CC) at § 123 that the right to life is important enough that those who violate it may be
subject to life imprisonment.
7
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
curat lex is applied, society's interest in seeing all those who steal being
convicted of theft and punished may have to yield to the right to freedom of a
person who steals a worthless scrap of paper.34 However, all cases are not
so clear-cut.
1 5 Addressing the problem: approach to be followed
An attempt will be made to answer the questions raised above by initially
identifying and isolating a number of criteria to be taken into account in the
criminalisation determination, and then incorporating them into a test to be
used in deciding whether state punishment of any particular conduct is both
justifiable and reasonable.
To this end, this study commences" with an analysis of relevant
constitutional provisions. Since the Constitution is supreme, it is an essential
source in the quest for standards against which the decision whether to
(de)criminalise can be tested. It is particularly hoped that the factors outlined
in the limitation clause of the Constitution may be used as a point of departure
for the development of guidelines to be considered when balancing competing
interests in the criminal law context.
The next stage36 is an evaluation of selected relevant academic
literature. These sources are used in conjunction with the Constitution as the
basis for drawing up a possible list of guidelines, and hence a test, that can
serve as a basis for determining the desirability of criminalisation in any
specific case. The focus is on critically discussing the opinions of various
legal scholars regarding the proper use of the criminal sanction. Examples
from relevant case law are also considered briefly throughout the following
chapters. The purpose is to illustrate the application of the theoretical
principles examined, as well as to evaluate the standards used by our courts
in deciding whether the criminal sanction may be resorted to in a particular
34 S v Kgogong 1980 3 SA 600 (A).
35 In § 2 2.
36 In §§ 2 3-2 5 infra.
8
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
situation." An attempt is made to establish whether these judicial standards
are the same as (or similar to) those identified in the Constitution and by
academics.
Following this, a general test for evaluating the desirability of
criminalisation is developed in chapter three. Although this test is fairly similar
to the limitations test in section 36 of the Constitution, factors especially
relevant to criminal law are taken into account in its formulation. It involves a
step-by-step process that aims to maintain a fair balance between the
competing rights and interests of the state, society, the victim and the
accused. The ultimate goal is to evaluate whether the benefits to society
(including the victim, if any) outweigh the negative consequences produced by
criminalisation - ie, whether criminalisation will bring about "social or personal
damage greater than it was designed to prevent"." By evaluating the cost of
criminalisation against its advantages, it is hoped to reach a conclusion as to
whether specific crimes such as incest should be decriminalised in their
entirety, or whether certain aspects thereof may be retained without
undermining the idea that the criminal sanction should be "reserved for what
really matters.v"
In addition to assessing, and borrowing from, the work done by others on
the proper use of the criminal sanction, this study aims to distil some uniquely
South African values and priorities that should be considered when
determining whether particular forms of conduct should (continue to) be
criminalised. For instance, in the development of general criteria for
criminalisation, individual autonomy has often been regarded as a value that
trumps all other rights or values." For this study, however, in keeping with
37 Eg Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC); 2002 Il BCLR 1117 (CC) (prostitution);
Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC); 2002 3 BCLR
231 (CC) (use of cannabis); and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of
Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) (sodomy).
38 Canadian Committee on Corrections in Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (1969) 11-
12 quoted in Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 33.
39 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250.
40 As is commonly the approach of American authors, for example Feinberg The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law (1984), discussed in § 2 3 infra.
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recent Constitutional Court decisions," the value of human dignity is regarded
as a value worthy of special protection. It should only be limited if there are
compelling reasons for doing so, and, where necessary, human dignity should
be given precedence over other values such as freedom.
After examining a number of sources that concern themselves with the
problem of when the criminal sanction should be used, the focus of this study
shifts to the examination of the desirability of the continued criminalisation of a
single crime, incest. Before determining whether incest should be retained as
a crime, it is essential to achieve clarity on the precise scope of the common
law crime of incest, as well as of the Law Commission's proposed extension
of the incest prohibition.V In addition, the history of the crime is investigated
and a comparative analysis of incest in other jurisdictions is undertaken."
The objective is to establish whether there is conduct criminalised as incest in
South Africa that is not regarded as worthy of punishment in other open and
democratic societies as well as to identify a universal rationale for prohibiting
incest, if any.
In chapter five, common law incest is then assessed in terms of the test
developed in chapter three. This includes a detailed examination of the
reasons advanced for justifying the criminalisation of incest." The particular
conduct to which each distinct justification applies is also identified. This is
done in an attempt to separate the forms of incest where criminalisation may
indeed be justified on balance, from those where criminalisation is
unwarranted per se. Instances of incest where criminalisation achieves
worthy state objectives are singled out. Whether justified criminalisation of
incest in fact is necessary or desirable on policy grounds is then considered."
41 See Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA
936 (CC); 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC), where O'Regan J said:
"The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be doubted ... Human dignity
therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that
informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights" (§ 35; footnotes omitted).
42 §§ 4 2 and 4 3 42 infra.
43 In §§ 4 3 and 44 infra.
44 See § 5 2 infra.
4S § 5 3 infra.
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Once again, the criteria and test developed by examining the literature
facilitate this task.
After the balancing process in accordance with the proposed test has
been undertaken in the context of incest, a submission regarding the
continued criminalisation of common law incest is then made. The outcome of
applying the "criminalisation criteria" and test identified makes it apparent that
the present crime is beyond salvation - the decriminalisation of the common
law crime of incest in its entirety is advocated. Both criminal and extra-judicial
alternatives to retaining incest as a crime are also outlined at this staqe."
The study concludes" with a summary of the investigation undertaken
and aims to evaluate the extent to which its stated objectives were achieved.
It includes recommendations for future study as well as final proposals
regarding the optimal use the criminal sanction.
1 6 Motivation for focusing on common law incest
There are various reasons for using the common law crime of incest as a
test case for investigating the circumstances in which it is inappropriate for the
criminal sanction to be used.
First, in South Africa the various forms of conduct punishable as incest
are extensive and diverse, encompassing both the trlvlat" and the potentially
extremely harmful." Since this is the case, various underlying justifications
for the criminalisation of incest have been advanced, ranging from the
prevention of harm to the mere enforcement of a particular rnorality.P? Taking
46 § 5 3 3 infra.
47 In ch 6.
48 Consensual sexual relations between an adult son and his mother-in-law, for example.
49 Sexual intercourse between a father and minor daughter, which, although it may be consensual in the
narrow sense of the word, is subject to a real danger of abuse of authority. See § 4 2 infra for a
detailed discussion of the elements of the crime of common law incest.
50 See, eg, in this regard Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 749; Bratt "Incest Statutes and the
Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to Marry?" 1984 Family LQ 257 267-296;
Labuschagne "Dekrirninalisasie van Bloedskande" 1985 THRHR 435 452-454; Labuschagne
"Teoretiese Verklaring van die Bloedskandeverbod" 1990 TSAR 415; Temkin "Do We Need the
Crime of Incest?" 1991 Current Legal Problems 185 188-193; Wolfram "Eugenics and the
Punishment of Incest Act 1908" 1983 Crim LR 308 315-316; and Milton SA Criminal Law &
Procedure: Common Law Crimes 235-237.
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into account the wide scope of the incest prohibition, the reasons advanced
for criminalising incest are critically examined in detail. The aim is to identify
the true rationale for the incest prohibition as well as to separate the
worthwhile motivations from those that seem unsatisfactory reasons for
retaining incest as a crime. It is submitted that the diverse spectrum of
conduct criminalised and the correspondingly disparate rationales for
criminalisation make incest an ideal example for testing the hypothesis that
some justifications for criminalising conduct are better than others.
Second, even if criminalising incest is justified in principle, a further
question remains: is the specific crime of incest a reasonable limitation of the
rights of those subject to it? It is argued that it is possible for the state (and
others) to apply a variety of alternative (criminal and non-criminal) sanctions
and pressures to inhibit the incidence of incest, if so desired. Thus an
examination of incest is once again an appropriate means to assess the
assumption that the criminal sanction should be used only as a last resort,
where other alternatives are not available, ineffective or unduly onerous.
12
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2 EVALUATION OF SOURCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TEST
2 1 Introduction
The vague and general assertion has been made that only where the
beneficial consequences of a criminal sanction outweigh its negative aspects,
can criminal legislation truly be regarded as justified and reasonable. But how
may this initial insight be expanded upon to practically determine whether the
criminal sanction is being used optimally in a particular instance? There are
various sources that may yield valuable insight into the process of giving good
reasons for criminalisation, and which may assist in the formulation of
guidelines as to what conduct ought to be criminalised and what ought to be
beyond the reach of the criminal law.
The Constitution is a logical starting point in the quest for criteria, since
all law and conduct, including criminal prohibitions, must be compatible with
it.51 As will be shown at §§ 2 2 and 3 1 below, section 36 of the Constitution is
especially useful in this regard.
To enable the application of the constitutional criteria in the criminal law
context, insights gleaned from the Constitution will be supplemented by the
views of various academic writers concerning when the criminal sanction
should be applied. The question of when the criminalisation is appropriate
and desirable has not sufficiently come under the spotlight since the
Constitution came into force; thus there is clearly scope for innovative work in
this field.
For the purposes of this study, the discussion of legal authors will be
confined to the approaches of Feinberg, Packer and Rabie. Although there is
a variety of other academic literature that addresses the problem of
cnrnlnansatlon," the three writers chosen are representative of the work done
51 S 2 of the Constitution states: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled."
52 Mill On Liberty (Shields ed) (1956); Hart Law, Liberty and Morality (1962); Hughes "Morals and
the Criminal Law" 1962 Yale LJ 662; Devlin The Enforcement of Morals (1965); Mitchell Law.
Morality and Religion in a Secular Society (1967), especially 52-69; Sartorius "The Enforcement of
Morality" 1972 Yale LJ 891; Bayles "Criminal Paternalism" in The Limits of Law (Pennock &
Chapman eds) (1974) 174-188; Morris Law, Crime and Community 40; Van der Vyver Law, Crime
and Community 53; Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Burns &
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in this field thus far. Feinberg and Packer both write from an American
perspective, while the work of Rabie has been chosen to illustrate the South
African approach.
The ideas of each chosen author will be examined separately, since their
perspectives on the issue differ, and the viewpoint of each yields individual
insight into how this problem may be approached. Feinberg, discussed at
§ 2 3 below, focuses on the circumstances under which criminalisation may
be justified in principle, referring mainly to the underlying rationale for
criminalisation. On the other hand, Packer53 and Rabie54 consider the
criminalisation question from a more pragmatic perspective, emphasising the
question of whether it is appropriate and desirable to criminalise in a particular
situation. As will be seen at § 3 3 below, both angles are indispensable for
the formulation of a comprehensive test for determining the appropriate use of
the criminal sanction: it is necessary to establish not only whether conduct
may be criminalised, but also, if criminalisation is indeed justified in theory,
whether the criminal sanction should be used in practice.
It has been noted at § 1 4 above that the problem of conflicting interests
- those of the victim, the accused, the state and society as a whole - is
inherent to the issue of the optimal use of criminal punishment. A cost-benefit
analysis is necessary to determine the proper limits of the criminal sanction.
Such analysis is hampered by the fact that there is a significant grey area
where it is virtually impossible to single out which interests ought to be
protected at the expense of others - the assistance of certain guidelines is
indispensable. By the end of the discussion of the Constitution and legal
authors that follows, there should be more clarity on what these guidelines
could be. In turn, the identification of criteria and standards used in the
Constitution and by academic writers should facilitate the formulation of a
more generally applicable test for deciding on the optimal use of the criminal
sanction.
Hart eds) (1982); Hodson The Ethics of Legal Coercion (1983); Dash "Philosophy of Punishment"
1986 TRW 194; Van Zyl Smit 1986 TRW 186; Mureinik "Law and Morality in South Africa" 1988
SAL! 457; Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Law's Empire (1986) and A Matter of Principle
(1985); and Lotter Moraliteitswetgewing en die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg (1991).
53 See § 2 4 infra.
54 At § 2 5 infra.
14
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2 2 Constitution
2 2 1Weighing up
As has already been noted, no discussion of the limits of the criminal
sanction in the South African context would be complete without mention of
the impact of the Constitution. Since the Constitution is the supreme law of
the country and any law inconsistent with it is invalid,55 any law convicting and
punishing people for engaging in forbidden conduct must also be in line with
its fundamental constitutional principles and underlying values. There are a
number of core fundamental values underlying the Constitution, namely
openness, democracy, human dignity, freedom and equality." Any weighing-
up of competing constitutional rights needs to be done within the framework of
these values, and must attempt to advance them wherever possible."
It is also apparent that the decision to criminalise or to decriminalise
seems to require a process whereby the relevant rights and interests at stake
are weighed against each other. The social benefits of the criminal sanction,
which include the interest of society in being protected against certain forms of
antisocial conduct and in feeling appeased by the knowledge that persons
who act in such a manner will be punished, must be weighed against the cost
thereof, both to the person being punished and to society as a whole.58 The
unpleasant consequences for the person being punished may include loss of
physical freedom, deprivation of property and undermining of human dignity
due to the stigma attached to being labelled a criminal.59
On the one hand,' there are interests or values so important and
fundamental that society deems those who threaten or impair them as
deserving of retribution and punishment, considerations outweighing any
55 S 2 of the Constitution.
56 Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 12-17. These values are constantly emphasised in the Bill
of Rights as being central to South African society - see, eg, s I(a), s 7(1), s 36(1) and s 39(1)(a).
57 According to s 39(2) of the Constitution, when courts interpret legislation or develop the common
law they must "promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights". Especially important in
interpreting the Bill of Rights itself are "the values that underlie an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom" (s 39(1)(a)).
58 This includes the social cost of criminalisation as well as its economic cost - considerable resources
need to be expended for even minimally efficient enforcement of a criminal sanction. See also
§ 2 4 6 infra.
59 See §§ 3 1 and 3 2 supra for more on the fundamental rights infringed by the imposition of criminal
punishment.
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interests that offending individuals may have in avoiding such punlshrnent."
On the other hand, in instances where a value or interest is relatively
insignificant, and the worth of its protection disproportionate in comparison to
the drastic and far-reaching infringement of individual rights entailed by
conviction, criminal punishment should not be utilised. The cost simply
outweighs the benefit.61
But what about situations that are less straightforward, where the
interests at stake appear to be fairly commensurate? In such hard cases it
would be useful to be able to determine where the particular societal value
protected by criminal ising the conduct in question is situated in relation to the
position of the interests of the accused (or society) that are infringed by such
prohibition."
Underlying constitutional values may be of assistance in this regard.63
However, in instances where both competing interests advance (some of) the
fundamental constitutional values, the task is somewhat more complicated. It
is submitted that, although it may not be possible to discern an explicit
hierarchy of rights in the Bill of Rights,64 the Constitution contains sufficient
implicit indications of the comparative status of rights to assist in the balancing
process. There may be various ways to determine the position of a particular
right or interest in relation to others. For instance, it is apparent that human
rights not recognised in chapter two of the Constitution would in all likelihood
be regarded as less worthy of protection that those that are so recoqnised."
60 See n 33 supra.
61 In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others
1999 1 SA 6 (CC) at § 37-38, it was decided in the context of the decriminalisation of sodomy, that
the conflict between the state's desire to combat "immoral" conduct, and the rights of the accused not
to be subject to the stigma of the criminal sanction, should be resolved in favour of the accused. It
will be argued in eh 5 supra that incest is also an example of such a crime.
62 As will become clear at § 23 infra, Feinberg's hierarchy would probably place human autonomy at
the top, followed by the right not to be subjected to harm or offence from others, while the right to
state protection from the harmful consequences of one's own voluntary conduct and the right to
protection of one's moral sensibilities would be low on the list. See also Rabie (Rabie and Strauss
Punishment: An Introduction to Principles 5 ed (1994) 102-103 referred to at § 2 5 1 infra) for the
values that he prioritises.
63 See supra.
64 But see n 66, where it is noted that the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) did indeed contain the
equivalent of a rights hierarchy in its limitation clause, s 33.
65 It may be argued in favour of the decriminalisation of incest that restricting the sexual relations
permitted in the family context deprives people of the right to a distinctive variant of family life -
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It is further proposed that rights that may not be derogated from, even in a
state of emergency, such as human dignity and life, have more weight than
those from which derogation is permitted." Another consideration may be
whether a right is limited by other constitutional provisions - if so, such
provisions may take precedence over it.67 Similarly, rights that are textually
unqualified may enjoy priority above those that are internally qualified by
language that "specifically demarcates their scope"." A clear indication that a
right may have to yield to another is where it is stated explicitly that the right in
question may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision in
the Bill of Rights.69 Rights that are not limited in this way might well be
enforced at the expense of rights so limited. The Constitution also provides
that some rights may only be exercised subject to legal requlation." - a
further sign that enforcement of another, non-limited, right may be preferred.
It must be emphasised that the considerations outlined above are merely
indications of how the process of determining whether there has been a
violation of a fundamental right might unfold, and are not necessarily decisive.
Although the underlying values of the Constitution as a whole, as well as the
status afforded to specific constitutional rights, may have some bearing on
determining the outcome of the process involving the weighing up the rights of
namely incestuous family life. However, this particular right is not explicitly recognised in the
Constitution (but see also n 163 and § 5 2242 infra).
66 See s 37 of the Constitution. It may also be noted that, in terms of s 33(1) of the interim
Constitution, certain classes of rights and freedoms were more highly protected than others. S
33(1)(b) stated that rights including dignity, security, conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion,
voting, campaigning, freedom from servitude, unlimited detention, arrest without due process, and
freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement and information where these rights relate to
political activity, could only be limited if such limitation was reasonable and necessary. They
received greater judicial protection than the rights outlined in s 33(1)(a), eg privacy, life, residence,
labour relations, property, language, education, citizenship, access to court, environment and
economic activity, where limitation was permissible, provided it was reasonable (Chaskalson et al
Constitutional Law of SA 12-9). However, it must be noted that this "express hierarchy of
constitutional rights" found in the limitations clause of the interim Constitution has been eliminated
from the final Constitution (Chaskalson et al supra 12-13).
67 See s 36(2) of the Constitution and, eg, Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the
Republic of South Africa 19964 SA 671 (CC), where it was held (at § 14) that legislation allowing
amnesty to be granted to the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights was permissible, in that
the constitutional right of access to court was limited by the postambie (or epilogue) of the interim
Constitution.
68 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) 164. An example of an internally limited
"right is s 17, which protects the right to assembly only where such assembly is peaceful and unarmed.
69 Eg s 30 and s 31. If there should be a conflict between, for instance, the right to language or culture
and the right to dignity, dignity would in all likelihood take preference.
70 Eg the right to choose one's profession - see s 22 of the Constitution.
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the accused against those of society, establishing the relative merit of rights is
an exercise that must be undertaken in context.
2 2 2 Limitations clause
Another very important aid in the quest for a uniquely South African way
to demarcate the proper use of the criminal sanction, is section 36 of the
Constitution, the limitations clause." Section 36 recognises that compromise
is not always possible - there will invariably be situations where it will be
necessary to choose between competing rights or interests constitutionally
recognised as worthy of (equal) protection. The limitations clause contains
guidelines that must serve as a basis for balancing rights against one another
and deciding which should weigh more heavily in specific circumstances.
If criminal punishment necessarily entails some degree of limitation (or
deprivation) of freedom, dignity, etc, as it is submitted it does," punishment
must invariably also involve the infringement of constitutionally protected
human rights of the accused. This has a crucial constitutional implication: the
Constitution requires that in any situation where a constitutionally protected
right is limited, such limitation needs to be convincingly justified if the law
limiting such right is not to be declared invalid. In the case of a criminal
prohibition, it is the state that would bear the onus of such justification. I am
thus of the view that there is a constitutional imperative to restrict the use of
criminal punishment to cases where the state is able to justify its use in terms
of section 36 of the Constitution. The conclusion that resorting to the criminal
sanction is an absolute last option is supported by the limitations clause itself.
Analysis and application of the factors outlined in section 36 in the criminal
law context strongly suggests that the limitation of fundamental rights is not
something to be taken lightly. Rights should only be limited by resorting to
criminal punishment in truly deserving cases where there is no other option
but to do so.
71 See § 3 1 infra for the full text of s 36 of the Constitution.
72 See also §§ 3 2 1 and 3 2 2 infra for more on rights that may possibly be at stake.
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If the argument is correct that, in principle, the Constitution requires the
state to show that the use of any criminal sanction is a reasonable and
justifiable limitation of the accused's fundamental rights, it may be asked how
the state may go about doing this. Naturally, section 36 of the Constitution will
be the point of departure, but it is a sketchy and incomplete guide for
establishing whether the criminal sanction is justified and reasonable in a
specific situation. Fortunately, it will become apparent that the criteria
identified in the limitations clause as relevant in the balancing process for
determining whether limitation of a right is constitutionally permissible, are
echoed to a great extent by the literature analysed in §§ 2 3 to 2 5 below in
the context of criminal punishment. Important considerations suggested by
the various legal academics complement the guidelines in the limitations
clause, in that they attempt to give substance to how one may practically go
about determining whether the criminal sanction should be used in any
particular instance. What follows is a closer analysis of the views of these
writers. By combining the constitutional imperatives contained in the
limitations clause with the standards proposed by the writers discussed below,
it is hoped that it will be possible to formulate a comprehensive but simple test
for determining whether the state has managed to show that criminalisation is
indeed justified, and whether, if criminalisation is indeed theoretically
permissible, the state should have recourse to the criminal sanction in the
specific circumstances.
19
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2 3 Writers: Feinberg
2 3 1 Introduction
In the four volumes of his work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law,
Feinberg considers the broad question: "What sorts of conduct may the state
rightly make criminal?"73 He recognises that the purpose of the criminal
prohibition is to "discourage the particular antisocial behavior [sic] that is
forbidden"." and his objective is to come to an understanding of the forms of
conduct that can legitimately be prohibited and punished. If a particular
(criminal) legal prohibition oversteps the limits of such moral legitimacy,
Feinberg would regard the prohibition itself as a serious moral crime. This is
because he agrees that the stigma attached to the criminal sanction and its
effect on human interests are inherently extremely destructive and therefore
always need to be [ustified."
Feinberg writes from a liberal perspective. He is committed to "the
presumption in favour of liberty,,76 (liberty being the absence of legal
coercion). He uses this point of departure to determine what kinds of penal
laws (criminal sanctions) have sufficient weight to justify a limitation of
individual liberty.77 Each coercion-Iegitimising principle he considers is not a
sufficient condition for criminalisation in itself, and may not on its own be
decisive in determining when use of the criminal sanction would be
appropriate." However, each of the liberty-limiting principles discussed below
may according to Feinberg be regarded as putting forth relevant reasons for
justifying legal coercion in principle.
73 The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others (1984) 3.
74 Harm to Others 20.
75 Harm to Others 4. See also Bayles "Criminal Paternalism" in The Limits of Law 175.
76 Harm to Others 14.
77 Harm to Others 9.
78 Although use of criminal coercion may be theoretically justified, it is still necessary to ascertain
whether it is practically necessary in a particular case. See discussion of proposed test § 3 1 infra.
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2 3 2 "Harm to others principle"
Feinberg defines this principle as follows:
"It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably
be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the
actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other means that
is equally effective at no greater cost to other values."79
Feinberg is of the view that criminal prohibitions are generally directed
towards prohibiting conduct which causes harm to people. Harm he defines
as the thwarting, setting-back or defeating an interest of another (a thing in
which that person has a stake)" by causing the interest to be in a worse
condition than it would otherwise have been in had the invasion not occurred
at all.81 Before the "harm principle" can apply, offenders should not only have
harmed another person in the sense described above, but also have wronged
such persons by violating their right(s)82 in an indefensible (unjustifiable and
inexcusable) manner." Only where setbacks to interests ("harms") are also
wronqs'" can we speak of "harm to others" in Feinberg's sense.
However, Feinberg does not regard the harm-to-others principle as
either a necessary or sufficient condition for justifying state coercion."
Indeed, as Feinberg himself admits." on its own the harm principle is of little
use as a practical guide to legislative decisions about the desirability (or not)
of criminalising particular conduct. The harm principle must therefore be
supplemented. Feinberg proposes various strategies (which he calls
"mediating maxims") for coping with the "gaping uncertainties about how to
79 Harm to Others 26.
80 Harm to Others 34.
81 Harm to Others 33 and 34.
82 Analysed as a valid claim against another's conduct. A claim is valid when its rational support is
decisive, not merely relevant and cogent - Feinberg Harm to Others 215.
83 Feinberg Harm to Others 34.
84 Thus "harms" which are not wrongs - such as set-back interests produced by justified or excused
conduct (such as killing somebody in private defence - see, for instance, Ex parte die Minister van
Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A), as well as Harm to Others 35-37) - and wrongs that
are not "harms" - violations of rights that do not set back interests (such as where there is harmless
trespass on land which violates the property rights of the landowner and thereby ''wrongs'' him, "even
though it does not harm the land, and might incidentally improve it" - Harm to Others 34-35) - are
excluded (see also Harm to Others 215). It is clear, therefore, that Feinberg sees volenti not fit
iniuria as a "mediating maxim for the application of the harm principle" - a necessary implication of
his emphasis on personal liberty and freedom of choice (see Harm to Others 215).
85 Harm to Others 10; 187.
86 Harm to Others 187.
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apply the harm principle in tricky circumstances"." He outlines a number of
supplementary criteria that may be used as "rules of thumb" when the
legislature is deciding whether to criminalise:
• the greater the gravity of the possible harm." the less probable its
occurrence need be to justify conduct threatening to produce it;
• the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the harm need be to
justify coercion;
• the greater the magnitude of the risk of harm (which consists of its
gravity and probability), the less reasonable it is to accept the risk;
• the more useful (or valuable) the dangerous conduct (both to the actor
and others), the more reasonable it is to take the risk of harmful
consequences; and
• the more reasonable the risk of harm (the danger), the weaker the case
for prohibiting conduct creating it.89
The relative importance of the harm must also be considered. In cases
where the interests of more than one person are at stake, Feinberg
recognises the need for the legislature to balance or compare the relative
importance of conflicting interests in order to determine whether a "harm"
(setback to interests) can also be viewed as a punishable wrong.90 Relevant
considerations include:
• how "vital" or important the' particular interest is in the "interest network"
of the one possessing it;
• the degree to which other interests, both public and private, reinforce the
right;
• the inherent moral quality of the interest; and"
• whether the interest is a purely personal one or an external one.92
87 Harm to Others 188.
88 Feinberg advocates the use of the maxim de minimis non eurat lex to avoid the need for resorting to
the criminal sanction in cases where the harm is genuine, but so minor as to be trivial. He equates the
use of the criminal sanction to punish conduct such as rudeness as "smashing mosquitoes with a club"
(Harm to Others 188-200).
89 Feinberg Harm to Others 216; see also detailed discussion of assessing and comparing harms 187-
193.
90 Harm to Others 203.
91 Feinberg Harm to Others 202-206 and 217.
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Finally, since criminal sanctions always invade citizens' interest in liberty
by closing options to them." legal prohibitions may be justified by the harm
principle only if a greater harm would be caused to victims if the conduct were
not proscribed. It is harder for the legislature to justify closing a "fecund"
option (one which closes off many other options too) by prohibiting certain
conduct on pain of punishment, as opposed to an alternative that limits
freedom only very slightly.94
It is clear, however, that even by employing the guidelines outlined
above that seek to clarify when punishment based on the harm principle
would be justified, Feinberg's harm principle alone will not legitimise
prohibiting conduct on the grounds that it is offensive to others, harmful to
actors themselves or inherently immoral. These justifications will be
considered below.
2 3 3 "Offence principle"
Feinberg's definition of the offence principle is:
"It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it
would probably be an effective way of preventing serious offense [sic] (as
opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor and that it is probably
a necessary means to that end."9S
Feinberg defines offence in this context objectively, as anyone of a
number of unpleasant and disliked mental states or conditions (such as
disgust, shame, hurt and anxiety), that is caused by the wrongful (right-
violating) conduct of others." Therefore, while it is necessary that there be a
wrong, in Feinberg's sense, the victim need not feel wronged for the offence
principle to come into play.
Feinberg recognises that the offence principle is extremely dynamic,
dependent on prevailing cultural standards and subject to change as society
92 Generally speaking, if there is no distinction between the interests based on the first three criteria
mentioned, Feinberg suggests that precedence be given to a personal interest (The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law Volume IV: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988) 57-61.
93 Liberty is always limited by legal prohibitions in that people's options are narrowed by not
permitting them to act in a certain manner - see Feinberg Harm to Others 206-214.
94 Feinberg Harm to Others 206-214 and 217.
95 The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume II: Offense to Others (1985) 1.
96 Offense to Others 1-2.
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itself does." Although it appears that people are generally most affronted
when the offence concerns public nudity or sexual behaviour, the range of
potentially offensive conduct is far wider than this.98 What all "offended
states" have in common is that they are unpleasant to those who suffer them,
and they are nuisances, inconveniencing victims by making it difficult for them
to enjoy work or leisure at a place which they cannot reasonably be expected
to leave in the circumstances."
Feinberg views offensive conduct as a minor evil in the sense that it is a
"severely irritating nuisance" at worst - certainly not any "sort of menace to
individual or collective interests" .100 Although offensive conduct wrongs its
victims, Feinberg acknowledges that due to the fact that offence is almost
always a less serious thing than harm, punishing "offenders" will most often
also be a disproportionately greater evil than the offended mental states they
cause their "victims". Thus it is not easy to justify why criminal law need
concern itself with defining crimes of offensiveness at all, and it is clear that
the criminal sanction should only be resorted to with extreme caution in cases
of offence - preferably as a last resort where alternative less restrictive
sanctions fail. In many cases, social sanction and public opinion are sufficient
to keep more extreme forms of offence in check. Criminal punishment should
be reserved as a back-up threat in most cases of offence-related crime, to be
employed against persons not so much because they have caused offence,
but because they have defied authority by persisting in prohibited conduct.'?'
Even in cases where the criminal sanction is employed to punish offensive
conduct, Feinberg believes that the penalties should be light.
Thus not all forms of offensive conduct that annoy or inconvenience
others should be punished. Feinberg advocates the application of a qualified
offence principle, whereby only offensive conduct satisfying certain criteria
would warrant punishment. This requires a legal balancing act to weigh up
97 Offense to Others 47-48.
98 See Feinberg's graphic example of the ride on the bus. The hypothetical passenger is confronted
with scenes ranging from coprophagia and blasphemy to sexual sadism, mutilation of corpses and
people carrying banners with Nazi slogans (Offense to Others 10-13).
99 Feinberg Offense to Others 21-22.
100 Offense to Others 5.
101 Feinberg Offense to Others 2-3.
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the relative interests of "offenders" and their "victims". Relevant
considerations for establishing whether criminalisation should be resorted to
include:
• the seriousness of the offensiveness, which is determined by:
• the magnitude of the offence, which concerns the intensity and
duration of the repugnance produced, as well as its extent (whether
there is widespread susceptibility to a given type of offence, while
discounting abnormal susceptibilities); 102
• whether the offence can reasonably be avoided; and
• whether or not the witnesses have willingly assumed the risk of
being offended - application of the valenti non fit iniuria maxim.
• the reasonableness of the offending party's conduct, which depends on:
• the conduct's personal importance to the actors themselves 103 and
its social value generally (which includes the importance of freedom
of expression);
• the availability of alternative times and places where the conduct in
question would cause less offence; and
• the extent, if any, to which the offence was caused by spiteful or
malicious motives.ï'"
In Feinberg's opinion, if the above criteria are taken into account,
criminal laws prohibiting pornoqraphy.!" obscenity.'?" any kind of private
sexual conduct and prostitution are but a few of the cases where
offensiveness as justification for the criminalisation would fail. On the other
hand, laws aimed at punishing public nuisances with an identifiable victim,
102 Feinberg Offense to Others 26, 35.
103 Feinberg uses the example of an activity by which the actor earns his living, so that curtailing it
would harm his economic interest (Offense to Others 37). Possible examples would be prostitution or
"stripping" - see Jordan and Others v S and Others 20026 SA 642 (CC) §§ 23-26 and §§ 54-56, where
the Constitutional Court considered and rejected this argument in the context of prostitution.
104 Feinberg Offense to Others 26, 37-44.
IDS Which he discusses in detail in Chapter 11 of Offense to Others.
106 Unless it amounts to an offensive nuisance in that the victim is constantly being bombarded with
obscenities - see Feinberg's detailed discussion of obscenity in Chapters 13-16 of Offense to Others.
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which may range from solicitation and voyeurism107to disturbing the peace,
might well be justifiable.!"
Feinberg differentiates between the manifestations of offence described
above, which he calls "offensive nuisances merely", where criminalisation
would be inappropriate unless the conduct was serious and unreasonable and
a specific victim could be identified,109and so-called "profound offences". The
latter category refers to conduct which is not trivial and need not be perceived
personally for it to cause offence. Examples would be the desecration of
religious icons, the brandishing of symbols of race hatred and genocide, or the
violation of a corpse."? It is submitted that offensive crimes in this category
may also include attempting to commit the impossible, such as attempted
murder!" or attempted rape!" of a corpse.l'" Feinberg is uncertain whether
profound offences such as those above, even if they are unwitnessed and not
pointedly personal.!" warrant criminalisation on the basis that the mere
107 Although in South Africa voyeurism is punishable as crimen iniuria even if "victims" are unaware
of the fact that they are being observed - R v Holliday 1927 CPO 395 401-402 and R v Daniels 1938
TPD 312 - see discussion of "profound offence" infra.
108 Feinberg Offense to Others 46.
109 Hart (Law, Liberty and Morality 45-48) supports the view that the evil of merely being aware that
"immoral" conduct is being indulged in in private is not sufficient for the imposition of the criminal
sanction. He states (at 46) that "[t]he fundamental objection surely is that a right to be protected from
the distress which is inseparable from the bare knowledge that others are acting in ways that you
think wrong, cannot be acknowledged by anyone who recognizes individual liberty as a virtue."
110 The South African common law crime of violating a corpse does not require that the violation
should have been witnessed, although this will clearly be taken into account as an aggravating factor
- see Sv Coetzee 19932 SACR 191 (T), where an undertaker invited a teacher and her biology class
to observe the removal of the heart and lungs of the deceased. The offended parties in this case were
not the observers, but non-observers affected by the mere knowledge that such conduct had taken
place. In this case the ratio for punishment was thus clearly based on the profound offence principle.
Roos J observed at 197 g-h:
"Namens die Staat is betoog dat die misdryf 'n ernstige misdryf is en dat dit die gemeenskap met
afsku en walging vervul het. Ek stem met laasgenoemde submissie saam. Die appellante het
deurentyd roekeloos en onsensitief opgetree. Selfs in die hof a quo het hulle geen berou getoon nie,
maar het hulle gepoog om hulle laakbare optrede te probeer regverdig. Die eerste appellante het in
haar getuienis gesê dat 'n lyk feitlik as iets heiligs beskou moet word. Daarmee stem ek saam. Selfs
primitiewe volkere het die hoogste respek vir dooies en hulle grafte."
III SvNdhlovu 1984 3 SA 23 (A).
112SV W19761 SA 1 (A).
113 However, it could also be argued that attempt to commit the impossible is punishable because
conduct such as attempting to murder or rape a corpse is indicative of the fact that the perpetrator
shows a potential tendency to harm others.
114 An example of a personal offence might be bare knowledge of a person's wife that his corpse has
been violated without her knowledge or consent and without prior consent of the deceased, although
not in her presence. Thus Feinberg would view violation, etc of a corpse as a crime only where it
takes place in public and there are identifiable offended parties, or where it is a personal offence in
the sense described above.
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knowledge that such activities take place is sufficiently ottensive.!" He
nevertheless concludes that punishment based on the offence principle would
be inappropriate, since there is no violation of a particular offended party's
rights.
It is submitted that the state of mind of the offender should be taken into
account, and could be decisive, in concluding whether criminalisation would
be permissible in cases of profound offence where there is no identifiable
vlctim.!" The main reason for punishing attempts to commit the impossible,
such as "murder" of a corpse, is because of the evil and malicious state of
mind of the offender, and not because harm or offence to an identifiable
"victim" has been caused.!" If the motive of the perpetrator is considered, it
would be possible to distinguish between unwitnessed offensive conduct such
as engaging in cannibalism as an act with the aim of self-preservation and
survival in a situation where no other food is avallable,"" and the same
conduct engaged in purely to shock or disgust others. Similarly, one could
distinguish the brandishing of a swastika engaged in as an act of political
conviction and self-expression, with the aim of advocating policies, entering
political debates or persuading audiences.!" from the same behaviour
engaged in purely to shock, insult, terrorise or intimidate others. It could be
argued that the latter should be subject to criminal prosecution, but not the
former."?
115 Offense to Others 60-96.
116 See Chachalia et al Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (1994) 54, where it is stated that
the degree of protection afforded to freedom of expression depends on "the nature of the expression
and the purpose it is intended to achieve."
117 In R v Davies 19563 SA 52 (A), which concerned attempted abortion where the foetus was already
dead, Schreiner Al held that the fact that the conduct in question caused no harm was irrelevant for
finding the accused guilty of attempted abortion: the "moral guilt of the accused person" was decisive
(61 D-F) [emphasis added].
118 See also R v Dudley and Stephens 1884 14 QB 273, where the defendants' reliance on the defence
of necessity in a similar situation did not succeed. The Dudley case may be distinguished from the
scenario sketched above, however, on the grounds that Dudley and Stephens killed their victim before
eating him, whereas the cannibal in my example did not do so - harm to others is thus not at issue.
119 Feinberg Offense to Others 95.
120 In constitutional terms, it is submitted that the latter is in conflict with s 16(2)(c) of the Constitution,
which prohibits "advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes
incitement to cause harm", while the former conduct may be justified either as legitimate self-
expression or as a reasonable limitation ofs 16(2)(c).
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2 3 4 Legal paternalism
The crux of legal paternalism, a view that Feinberg as liberal rejects as
being a non-legitimate justification for imposing the criminal sanction, is:
"It is always a good and relevant (though not necessarily decisive) reason in
support of a criminal prohibition that it will prevent harm (physical, psychological,
or economic) to the actor hlmself."!"
Feinberg distinguishes between two types of paternalism:
He refers to the first category as presumptively blameable paternalism, which
consists of "treating adults as if they were children, or older children as if they
were younger children,,122 by forcing them to act in certain ways, either "for
their own good" (benevolent paternalism) or for the good of other parties,
irrespective of the wishes of the parties themselves (non-benevolent
paternalism). It is contentious whether the former is justifiable, while it is fairly
apparent that the latter is not, since it treats parties as a means to an end that
is not even to their advantage.
The second category identified is presumptively non-blameable paternalism,
which consists of
"defending relatively helpless or vulnerable people from external dangers,
including harm from other people when the protected parties have not
voluntarily consented to the risk, and doing so in a manner analogous in its
motivation and vigilance to that in which parents protect their children."m
This form of paternalism is usually concerned with protecting minors and
other persons lacking the necessary legal capacity, such as mentally ill adults,
and interference in such cases is generally legitimate. Although the
vulnerable party may give de facto consent to the harm or danger in question,
it is doubtful whether such consent could be regarded as de iure consent.
This is because the vulnerable party is not sufficiently capable in law of
comprehending the nature and consequences of the harm consented to, and
thus of giving real, informed and voluntary consent.!"
121 Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Sanction Volume fIl: Harm to Self(1986) 4.
122 Harm to Self5.
123 Feinberg Harm to Self5.
124 See Burchell SA Criminal Law & Procedure: General Principles 127-129 for more on the criminal
law requirements for valid consent. It is noted at 129 that "the recognition of consent as a defence
depends upon identifying the societal objectives of the crime in question. In the end, the determining
issue is whether, in all the circumstances, public policy warrants juristic recognition of the consent."
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The type of paternalism where justification is most contentious is
benevolent paternalism, and Feinberg devotes the rest of his discussion to
this topic.
Paternalistic legislation is not always easy to identify. After all, it may be
argued that even purely self-destructive behaviour, such as refusing to wear a
crash helmet when riding a motor-bike, implies a degree of social harm as
well as self-harm, especially if the envisaged harm to self materiallses.!" It
may therefore be contended that it is impossible to characterise criminal
sanctions as (wholly) paternalistic, since prohibiting self-destructive conduct is
always to some extent in the public interest. In order to address this dilemma,
Feinberg suggests distinguishing between conduct that is "primarily and
directly self-regarding", where the public interest is only trivially or indirectly
affected and where prohibition cannot be justified on that basis alone, and
"other-regarding" behaviour, where criminal sanctions could be more easily
justified on the basis of protection to others.l" Only in the former situation
would one be concerned with justifying prohibitive legislation on a paternalistic
basis.
Another indication of whether the underlying rationale for a particular
criminal sanction is purely paternalistic or not, is whether the prohibition or
command in question has as its only motive the prevention of self-harm or
consented-to harm from others, or alternatively whether it is justified partly by
the rationale of preventing people from suffering harm at their own hands (or
with their own consent at the hands of others), and partly for other reasons,
such as protecting others or the general public from harm or oftence.!" The
125 For example, if the motorcyclist in this example crashes and is seriously injured, not only is society
deprived of the services of the injured party, but other expenses, such as medical expenses, may also
have to be paid out of state coffers.
126 Harm to Self22.
127 Feinberg Harm to Self8. It is often very difficult to establish the "real reason" for criminalisation in
a particular instance. There may be alternative rationales for a prohibition, or the rationale for
proscribing certain conduct may change over time. A good example of this is the reasoning of the
minority in Jordan and Others v State and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). The laws at issue were
provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, which the Court accepted as having been enacted
in 1988 for the illegitimate governmental purpose of enforcing a particular conception of morality on
the whole of society (§ 108). However, the minority stated that "the mere fact that the original
legislative purpose of a statute might have been incompatible with current constitutional standards,
does not deprive it of the capacity to serve a legitimate governmental purpose today" (§ 112).
O'Regan and Sachs JJ were of the view that an overall purpose could be ascribed to the Act that was
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harshness of the punishment imposed may be indicative of the purpose: if it is
far more severe than the harm to self risked by the offender, this signifies that
"protective solicitude toward prospective violators"!" is not a high priority, but
that the law is motivated by other considerations, such as expressing moral
abhorrence or preventing harm to others.
According to Arneson.?" something else that may be considered when
deciding whether to characterise a prohibition as paternalistic, is that although
the chief justification for paternalistic laws is consideration for the good or
welfare of those subject to them, such laws are always applied against the will
of those who must obey them. Thus, if the majority of people subject to it,
approve of a coercive rule that has been imposed for their sakes, and such
rule is essentially in the public interest, the rationale of the prohibition is not
paternalistic, even if the unwilling minority is incidentally prejudiced by it.
It is possible to classify paternalistic laws still further. Some such
criminal sanctions apply to the single-party case, such as laws against drug
use (also called direct paternalism), while others apply to the two-party case,
for example laws prohibiting euthanasia (also called indirect paternalism). In
such instances, legal paternalism comes into play where a party cannot validly
consent to the action of the second party - ie, the volenti non fit iniuria maxim
will not apply - which means that consent will not be a ground of justification
excluding uniawfulness.P? Such a law is paternalistic towards the first party in
that it prevents such party from having their wishes done. There is a
distinction between the word "harm" as meaning "wrongful injury" (used in the
not inconsistent with the values of the new South African constitutional order, and which was both
important and legitimate - namely the control of commercial sex (§ 114). See also § 3 3 22 infra.
128 Feinberg Harm to Selfl7.
129 "Mill versus Paternalism" 1980Ethics 471.
130 The decision to exclude consent as a defence is one that is explained with reference to
considerations of public policy. For instance, it is said that the bani mores (or legal convictions of the
community) would oppose the notion of killers going free merely because their victims consented to
their own death. See also Burchell SA Criminal Law and Procedure: General Principles, where it is
stated at 127-128:
"A crime is not so much harm against the victim as a harm against the community as a whole. Thus it
does not lie within the power of the victim of a crime to render the act not unlawful by consenting to
suffer the harm involved. Accordingly, the general rule of criminal law is that consent on the part of
the victim will not serve to excuse the crime of the offender. There are exceptions to this principle ...
The question of whether consent will be a defence is determined not so much by logic as by public
policy."
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context of the harm principle),131and its use in this sense, as a simple setback
to interest, whether unlawful or not. The implication is that, where criminal
prohibitions are justified by reference to legal paternalism, the volenti maxim
will not apply, whereas consent will always be a valid defence where harm to
others is the justification for a criminal sanction.
Feinberg also distinguishes between hard paternalism, which accepts
that it may be necessary to "protect competent adults, against their will, from
the harmful consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and
undertakings";132and soft paternalism, which holds that the state has the right
to "prevent self-regarding harmful conduct only when the conduct is
substantially non-voluntary, or where temporary intervention is necessary to
establish whether it is voluntary or not.,,133Thus this view holds that is crucial
to establish whether the consent is fully voluntary134- whether the choice is
one made by the actor's "true self' or not.!" According to Feinberg, factors
excluding voluntariness may include ignorance or rnistake.!" coerclon.!" and
incapacity due to derangement, drugs, etc.138 Feinberg views "soft
paternalism" as completely reconcilable with the spirit of liberalism, and
therefore not really paternalism139 at all."" while he regards "hard
paternalism" as morally offensive and demeaning because it "invades the
131 § 2 32 supra.
132 Harm to Self12.
133 Harm to Self 12.
134 Contra Arneson 1980 Ethics 482, where he criticises Feinberg's strict definition of voluntariness,
being of the view that Feinberg confuses the voluntariness of a choice with its rationality. He argues
(at 488) that persons who make irrational choices should not be prevented by the law from doing so-
"a person who is capable of thinking matters through and does not should be held responsible for his
choice." After restricting his attention to "adults who are neither severely mentally retarded nor
emotionally deranged", he proposes (at 482) that "we may say that a person acts voluntarily if and
only if his choice of the act (a) would not be abandoned if he were apprized of all the act's.
unforeseeable consequences, (b) does not proceed from an emotional state so troubled as to preclude
the full use of the reasoning faculty, and (c) does not occur under conditions of external coercion or
compulsion."
135 The question may be asked whether "soft paternalism" is in any way distinguishable from the harm
to others principle. However, soft paternalism cannot be reduced to the harm principle where there is
only one person involved in non-voluntary self-harming conduct, since the actor requires protection
only from himself, not another person, as would be the case if a second party were inflicting the
harm.
136 Feinberg discusses this ground in detail in eh 25 of Harm to Self.
137 Feinberg discusses this ground in detail in ch 23 and 24 of Harm to Self.
138 Feinberg discusses this ground in detail in ch 26 of Harm to Self.
139 As understood in the sense of "hard paternalism", supra.
140 Harm to Self14.
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realm of personal autonomy where each competent, responsible, adult human
being should reign supreme."!"
It is submitted that legal paternalism in the hard sense not only
undermines personal autonomy, but also human dignity, since the underlying
assumption is that the state knows what will be for the good of an individual
better than that individual knows it himself. It is surely a core element of
human dignity that the rational choices and decisions of competent adults be
taken seriously, since status as a person is dependent on being in rightful
control of one's own life. Insofar as the criminal sanction ought not to be
imposed merely because the state regards a certain choice as self-
destructive, Feinberg's presumption against legal paternalism may be
supported as a general point of departure. However, it is debatable whether
Feinberg and Arneson's conclusion is correct that a person has a sovereign
and absolute right to make voluntary, informed and genuine (although
objectively foolish and unreasonable) choices, and that personal autonomy
should thus always be regarded as a "moral trump card".142 This implies that
state intervention by means of criminal punishment is never justified to
prevent harm to the offender himself, even where the potential harm to the
person concerned resulting from a free choice is great and the limitation of
freedom and human dignity as a consequence of state coercion is slight.143 If
a cost-benefit analysis is undertaken, it is possible to argue that there may be
some limited instances where coercing persons to act in a certain manner for
their own good, should be permissible. Although it is true that "[w]henever a
person is compelled to act or not to act on the grounds that he must be
protected from his own bad judgment even though no one else is endangered,
then his autonomy is infringed",144autonomy (or even human dignity) are not
absolute and unqualified rights. Depending on the relevant interests at stake
when someone's right to make a choice is weighed up against their own good,
a "hard" paternalistic criminal sanction that prevents a graver harm than it
causes may be capable of justification if public policy is taken into
141 Harm to Self25.
142 Feinberg Harmless Wrongdoing xvii.
143 See further Feinberg Harm to Self 94, where he compares a "trivial interference" with personal
sovereignty to a "minor invasion of virginity".
144 Feinberg Harm to Self68.
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consideration.l" However, in keeping with the idea of criminal punishment as
sanction of last resort, alternative means of control or coercion would
generally be more appropriate than criminalisation in such lnstances.!"
It appears that, although Feinberg largely ignores the role of public policy
in limiting the freedom of persons to make "self-regarding" decisions, he limits
personal autonomy in a more subtle and implicit way. He sets very high
standards that must be complied with before a choice of this nature will be
regarded as truly voluntary (and thus not susceptible to state intrusion),
especially where it appears to be a decision that is not in the interests of the
one making it. He even concedes that in such cases of unreasonable and
harmful-to-self decision-making, state intervention should be allowed until it
can be properly established whether the decision made is indeed truly
voluntary. Thus Feinberg moderates his standpoint against legal paternalism
to some extent, in that he regards fewer decisions as voluntary and thus
within the sphere of personal autonomy than originally supposed, and is not
opposed to state intervention in circumstances that seem suspiciously similar
to "hard" paternalism. If this argument is correct, the question may be asked
whether the "soft" paternalism argument is not just a way of bringing
necessary elements of "hard" paternalism in through the back door?
2 3 5 Legal moralism
Feinberg uses the term "legal moralism" in two senses. According to
him, the narrow version of the legal moralism principle may be defined as
follows:
145 Feinberg Harm to Self25-26; 61. The magnitude of harm may be relevant here. For instance, the
minor infringement of freedom and human dignity entailed by requiring motorists to buckle up their
seat belts on pain of punishment while driving a car, may be justified on balance if it is compared to
the extreme harm that may be suffered by a motorist not having a fastened seat belt while being
involved in a head-on collision. After all, dying in a car accident irrevocably terminates the
motorist's capacity to choose altogether!
146 See also discussion of Packer's viewpoint § 24 7 supra and Rabie's viewpoint § 2 5 3 1 infra. For
example, the state may wish to compel people to install smoke detectors and fire extinguishers in
their private residences in order to safeguard themselves from fires. Instead of criminal ising non-
compliance with a rule of this sort, provision need merely be made that no insurance benefits would
be paid out to persons not in possession of smoke detectors and fire alarms whose houses had
suffered fire damage.
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"It can be morally legitimate to prohibit conduct on the ground that it is inherently
immoral, even though it causes neither harm nor offence to the actor or to
others. ,,147
Legal moralism in its broad sense embodies the principle that
"[ijt can be morally legitimate for the state to prohibit certain types of action that
cause neither harm nor offence to anyone, on the grounds that such actions
constitute or cause evils of other ("free-floating") kinds.,,148
When referring to "morality", Feinberg distinguishes between two types
of "morality": (moral) "rules designed to protect individual interests from being
thwarted or individual rights from being infringed" and "rules designed to
prevent evils of a kind whose existence would not be the basis of any
assignable person's grievance", which he characterises as "free-floating"
evils."? While criminalisation may be justified to enforce the former category
of morality on the basis of the harm to others or offence principles, this is not
the case where the evil in question is "free-floating". According to Feinberg,
no-one at all needs protection from the occurrence of a "free-floating" evil or is
entitled to complain or claim the prevention of such an evil as their due, since
the evils in question are impersonal and do not violate the rights of anyone in
partlcular.!" Although he concedes that the prevention of non-harmful!
offensive "evils" in the above sense 151 is not a completely irrelevant motivation
for imposing criminal punishment, Feinberg is of the view that its weight, when
balanced against that of the presumption in favour of liberty, is so slight that
legal moralism is extremely rarely, if ever, a decisive reason for imposing the
criminal sanction. The interest in enforcing morality for its own sake or
punishing "free-floating" evils by means of the criminal sanction is invariably
outweighed by the suffering and injury inherent in imposing criminal
punishment. Thus Feinberg rejects so-called strict moralism. This view holds
that true morality should be enforced for its own sake - regardless of whether
the immoral conduct is also harmful or offensive - and that criminalisation is
147 Harm to Others 27.
148 Feinberg Harm to Others 27.
149 Harmless Wrongdoing 79.
150 Harmless Wrongdoing 65,
151 Conduct possibly qualifying as a "free-floating evil" includes violations of taboos, "immoral"
conduct performed in private by consenting adults; religiously forbidden practices; moral corruption
of another (or oneself); evil or impure thoughts; false beliefs, cultural change, etc (see Harmless
Wrongdoing 20-25).
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justified on the basis that free-floating evils/immoralities should be forbidden
due to their inherent evil alone.152
152 Although Feinberg's Harmless Wrongdoing includes an interesting and comprehensive discussion
of the Lord Devlin v Professor HLA Hart debate (and the original John Stuart Mill v James Fitzjames
Stephen argument) in the chapter on strict moralism (at 124-175), it has been decided not to re-hash
the enforcement of morality discussion in full here. For more on the general debate on law and
morality, see Blom-Cooper and Drewry (eds) Law and Morality (1976) 1-35 and the sources quoted
in n 52 supra. Suffice it to say that I am of the view that the enforcement of morality is on its own an
insufficient reason for the justification of the criminal sanction.
This view is also clearly espoused by the Constitutional Court. A good example is to be found in the
context of the decriminalisation of sodomy (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and
Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC». When considering whether the
limitation of gay men's rights to equality, privacy, dignity and freedom caused by sodomy's
criminalisation could be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, the majority, per
Ackermann J, refers to the purported purpose of such limitation, namely "[t]he enforcement of the
private moral views of a section of the community, which are based to a large extent on nothing more
than prejudice" (§ 37). Ackermann J does not regard this as a valid or legitimate purpose. He also
refers to the changing religious and societal attitudes about such matters and concludes that even if
people continue to condemn sodomy based on deep conviction and sincere belief, these views
"cannot influence what the Constitution dictates in regard to discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation." (§ 38). Thus Ackermann J opposes criminal enforcement of morality alone as being
unconstitutional, in that he is of the opinion that conflict between mere moral disapproval and a right
entrenched in the Constitution would always be resolved in favour of the bearer of the constitutional
right (in this case the accused person), with arguments based on the supposed immorality of the
conduct in question being immaterial in comparison. He does not consider whether those wishing to
enforce morality may possibly base their claim on constitutional grounds, (such as the rights to
freedom of religion, belief and opinion entrenched in sec 15 of the Constitution) but it is apparent
that, even if he were to recognise a constitutional right allowing enforcement of mere morality by
means of the criminal sanction, such right would in Ackermann J's opinion be trivial when balanced
against the much more significant considerations of human dignity and equality that would be
undermined if purely immoral conduct such as sodomy continued to be a crime. I would venture to
say that Ackermann J would under no circumstances regard enforcement of mere morality as a
justifiable limitation of the various constitutional rights of the accused.
In contrast, at first glance Sachs J, who delivered the minority judgment in National Coalition supra,
seems to support criminalisation of conduct that is merely morally wrong. At § 136, he states:
"A State that recognizes difference does not mean a State without morality or one without a point of
view. It does not banish concepts of right and wrong, nor envisage a world without good and evil. It
is impartial in its dealings with peoples and groups, but is not neutral in its value system. The
Constitution certainly does not debar the State from enforcing morality. Indeed, the Constitution is
nothing if not a document based on deep political morality. What is central to the character and
functioning of the State, however, is that the dictates of the morality which it enforces, and the limits
to which it may go, are to be found in the text and spirit of the Constitution itself [emphasis added]."
It would be easy to misunderstand Sachs J and to conclude from the above that he wholeheartedly
advocates the legal enforcement of mere morality, unconnected to harm or serious offence to others.
However, a closer reading of the passage in context suggests otherwise. The enforcement of morality
in its broader sense does not entail criminalisation of conduct on the basis of moral undesirability
alone, and it is unlikely that Sachs J meant to suggest as such. It is submitted that all this extract does
is to highlight the point that conduct that is harmful or seriously offensive is necessarily bad or evil -
morally reprehensible - too. This clearly does not mean that use of the criminal sanction in such
cases is inappropriate. However, confusion may arise in that Sachs J fails to draw a distinction
between the enforcement of mere morality - which is unjustifiable apart from in the most exceptional
(and inconceivable) circumstances - and the criminal enforcement of morality where moral
disapproval is accompanied by some other evil, such as harm to others, and the conduct is not
therefore condemned on moral grounds alone. The use of the term "political morality" is also
somewhat misleading. It appears that what Sachs J is implying by using this expression is that the
"text and spirit" of the Constitution should be taken into account when balancing the benefits of
criminalisation against its disadvantages. According to Sachs J, the rights and values given
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Feinberg is also strongly opposed to the idea of using persons as
"means to an end" unless the "end" is the protection of other persons. Thus
he regards moral consetvetism.ï'" which argues in favour of prohibiting
certain conduct on the grounds that permitting the behaviour in question
would "subtly change the moral environment", as an unjustified and "perverse"
limitation of the individual's liberty for the sake of the interests of others. The
criminal sanction should not be used to prohibit non-harmful and inoffensive
behaviour merely to prevent such "evils" as social or cultural change.154
precedence in the Constitution should serve as the point of departure when determining which
interests are deemed so important that those who undermine them should be subject to the wrath of
the criminal sanction (see also § 2 2 1 supra for more on the Constitution's fundamental underlying
values). The reverse is also true: the Constitution is the standard against which the cost of
criminalisation should be assessed - if too high a price has to be paid by the offender to protect the
interest concerned, the option of criminalisation should not be resorted to. Thus it is submitted that
his viewpoint is perfectly reconcilable with the claim that criminal enforcement of "mere" morality is
impermissible.
Similarly, in the case of Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC), in the context of its
discussion of the regulation of commercial sex by means of prohibiting brothel-keeping (prohibited
by subsections 3(b) and 3(c) of the Sexual Offences Act), the minority of the Constitutional Court
(per O'Regan and Sachs JJ) considered the appellants' argument that these provisions amount to a
constitutionally impermissible attempts to "legislate for a particular moral code" (§ 102). As did
Sachs J in National Coalition supra, the minority asserted that the South African constitutional
framework does indeed require the legislature to enact laws promoting morality, provided that such
morality is founded on constitutional values (§§ 104-105). However, the minority clearly accepted
that legislation with the underlying rationale of enforcing a particular moral position as an end in
itself cannot be constitutionally justified. This purpose is characterised as "illegitimate" (§ 108), and
at § 113 the following is said:
"There are textual indications in the [Sexual Offences] Act which make it plain that the Act was
originally enacted to impose a particular view of morality - one which considered sexual intercourse
other than between husband and wife to be 'unlawful carnal intercourse'. There are many people in
our society who would support such a view today, and they remain free to conduct their lives
accordingly and to urge others to do the same. At the same time, it is quite clear that for the state to
impose such views on everyone in our society would be in conflict with the values of the Constitution,
were such to be enacted in the current era" [emphasis added].
According to the minority, although the purpose of the legislation in question at the time when it was
enacted, could very possibly be described as the enforcement of morality, it had changed over time.
The minority viewed its rationale for modern society as being the controlling of commercial sex, and
this was regarded as sufficiently important and legitimate to justify criminalisation, while not being
"manifestly inconsistent with the values of our new order" (§ 114).
153 An advocate of which appears to be Devlin, who argues in favour of enforcing morality by means of
the criminal sanction in order to protect society from disintegration (The Enforcement of Morals
(1965) 10). For an interesting alternative perspective on moral conservatism, also in the context of
incest, see Johnson "Harm to the 'Fabric of Society' as a Basis for Regulating Otherwise Harmless
Conduct: Notes on a Theme From Ravin v State" 2003 Seattle University LR 41-74.
154 Harmless Wrongdoing 67-68.
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This according to Feinberg, legal moralism is almost always 155 an
unconvincing liberty-limiting principle, and thus also an illegitimate reason for
imposing the criminal sanction.
2 3 6 Evaluation
Feinberg supports his argument on the justified use of state coercion by
developing a system that categorises crimes according to their underlying
rationale. His distinction between the four main grounds generally advanced
for justifying criminalisation is a useful starting point for determining whether
the raison d'être for a criminal prohibition is a worthy one or not. I support his
conclusion that if particular conduct causes harm to others, or serious offence
to others, this can be regarded as a decisive reason for the legitimate use of
the criminal sanction. I also approve of his view that where conduct is
immoral, although not harmful or offensive, there is a relevant, but virtually
never decisive, basis for justifying criminalisation. For the reasons mentioned
above.!" however, I am not entirely convinced that criminal prohibitions
based on legal paternalistic considerations may never be justified.
There are, however, other arguments for regarding Feinberg's analysis
as an insufficient one for present purposes.
First, although he states clearly that all harmful or offensive conduct
should by no means be the target of criminal punishment, he does not to any
great extent explore the role of societal opinion - policy considerations or the
bani mores - in deciding what particular harmful or offensive conduct should
be crirninalised.l'" Similarly, nowhere does he outline the possible practical
consequences or implications of imposing and enforcing the criminal sanction
on (some) conduct harmful or offensive to others, while leaving (other) harmful
or offensive conduct, as well as self-harming or purely immoral conduct,
situated within the personal sphere - beyond the scope of the criminal
155 See, however, Feinberg's discussion of Irving Kristol's example of gladiatorial contests before
consenting audiences discussed in Harmless Wrongdoing at 128-133 for a possible exception to the
rule against legal moralism.
156 § 2 34.
157 He merely mentions that the risk of danger to others will more easily be justified where conduct is
socially useful and relatively important (see discussion § 2 3 2 supra), and that the social value of
offending conduct is a factor to be taken into account when determining the reasonableness of such
offensiveness (see § 2 3 3 supra).
37
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
sanction. This is despite his recognition that the criminal sanction should only
be resorted to as a last option, and the emphasis he places on the need for
proportionality between crime and punishment. The fact that he neglects
wider community interests somewhat is no doubt due to his preoccupation
with individual liberty and autonomy, but it is a deficiency. Criminal law
operates within a particular societal context, and this needs to be
acknowledged and accommodated if a comprehensive set of guidelines for
determining the appropriateness of criminalisation is to be torrnulated.t"
Second, Feinberg's approach appears more suited to USA than South
Africa and would need considerable adaptation for the present context. This
is because his agenda is a liberal one, with personal autonomy of the
individual being acknowledged as the ultimate good and most fundamental
personal right. However, the value of autonomy as such has yet to be fully
recognised in South African case law. In the context of an inquiry into the
appropriateness of criminalising prostitution.!" the Constitutional Court
recently had to consider whether autonomy itself is a fundamental
constitutional right. The submission of counsel for the appellants to support
an argument based on "global concept of autonomy" comprising the rights to
dignity, privacy and freedom 160 could have been a direct quote from Feinberg.
It was argued that
"the state should not be empowered to make judgments concerning the good or
bad life, provided that the conduct in question does not harm others. Such
conduct might be unworthy or risky, but if it is not harmful to others then the
state can not [sic] interfere.,,161
The minority rejected this autonomy argument, holding that the right of
persons to determine how to live their lives, including the right to make
decisions and not merely the content of such decisions, should not be
regarded as an independent right.162 Thus it appears that sole reliance on the
right to autonomy in present-day South Africa would be unconvincing and
158 See also Van Zyl Smit 1986 TRW 187: "The 'correct' limits of the criminal sanction cannot be
determined by armchair reflection as penal sanctions are interventions in the real world."
159 Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC).
160 Jordan supra §§ 52-53.
161 Jordan supra § 52.
162 Jordan supra § 53.
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fraught with uncertainties, given that such a right is not explicitly recognised in
the Constitution.
Nevertheless, these deficiencies do not imply that Feinberg's liberal
arguments should simply be dismissed. From a South African perspective it
might be possible to contend that the right to human dignity has the same
elevated role here as autonomy does in USA - it has been used by the
Constitutional Court in the past as a "catch-all" right which may be relied upon
in circumstances where there is uncertainty as to which particular right
contained in the Constitution has been infringed upon, but where it is clear
that the interests of justice require a constitutional remedy to be found.163
Human dignity is surely inclusive enough to encompass the right of individuals
not to be subject to state interference when making autonomous decisions
that do not harm or offend others.
2 4 Writers: Packer
2 4 1 Introduction
An essential component of any discussion of the proper use of the
criminal sanction is Packer's seminal The Limits of the Criminal Sanction.
Although it was first published in 1968, the majority of Packer's opinions on
this topic are as relevant today as when the book was written. He devises
certain "limiting criteria" for the optimal use of the criminal sanction, and
proposes that these criteria be used in drawing up a priority list of conduct for
which the legislature might consider making use of the criminal sanction.
Although several of these guidelines overlap to a certain extent, the content of
each and its implications for the appropriate use of criminal sanction will be
discussed briefly.
163 One of the first manifestations of this tendency was in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA 936 (CC), where the case concerned the
right to family life and the right of spouses to cohabit, neither of which are explicitly recognised in
the Constitution. Because there was no specific right protecting "individuals who wish to enter into
and sustain permanent intimate relationships", O'Regan J held that the applicants could rely on the
right to human dignity (§§ 27-39).
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2 4 2 The conduct must be prominent in most people's view of socially
threatening behaviour, and must not be condoned by any
significant segment of society
Packer believes that the immorality of the conduct in question is a
necessary, but insufficient, condition for criminalisation. He is of the view that
it is undesirable to criminalise morally neutral behaviour, because this
undermines one of the strengths of the criminal sanction - its quality of moral
condemnation - and thus also the legitimacy of criminal law in the eyes of the
public and those who enforce criminal law.164 Although he acknowledges that
it is difficult to ascertain whose morality we are talking about, if the majority of
society does not condone the conduct in question, Packer regards this as
sufficient for characterising the conduct as lmmoral.!"
However, it is clear that Packer is opposed to the criminalisation of
conduct "purely or even primarily because it is thought to be immoral.,,166 An
extra standard must be met: the conduct must also be harmful to others in the
sense that it should threaten society's sense of security. However, even
conduct that is immoral and harmful is not and should not inevitably be a
crime. Due to limited resources, a weighing up of the benefits and
disadvantages of punishing the conduct in question is required, with
considerations such as the gravity (or seriousness) and remoteness of the
harm playing a role in the decision whether criminalisation is appropriate in a
particular case.!"
2 4 3 Subjecting the conduct to the criminal sanction must not be
inconsistent with the goals of punishment
Packer considers the justifications for criminal punishment at length,168
and distinguishes between punishment as retribution (the idea of criminals
receiving their just desert) and utilitarian justifications, which include
164 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 262-263.
165 See also Rabie's concerns regarding the establishment of a moral consensus in a diverse society
§§ 2 5 2 and 2 5 3 2 infra.
166 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 266-267.
167 See also the discussion of quantitative strains on law enforcement § 2 4 6 infra.
168 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction eh 3 and eh 4.
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deterrence, intimidation, incapacitation and rehabilitation. He regards use of
criminal sanction as inappropriate if its only purpose is to inflict suffering on
the wicked. At least one of the utilitarian modes of prevention must also be
effectively served, preferably involving a combination of deterrence and
incapacitation - the criminal sanction is appropriate "where people are
relatively likely to be deflected by the possibility of being caught and where
punishment is likely to prevent the commission of further crimes."169
2 4 4 Suppressing the conduct would not inhibit socially desirable
conduct
Packer regards it necessary to rank (criminal) conduct according to its
remoteness from the ultimate harm that the law seeks to prevent. The aim is
to determine the degree of likelihood that any preparatory conduct (which is
not necessarily harmful in itself) will result in harm in the absence of the
criminal sanction. Only where the risk of eventual harm is substantial, and the
preparatory conduct cannot otherwise be justified as being socially useful,
may criminal punishment be resorted to.170 Another reason to refrain from
criminalising preparatory conduct is that if the conduct in question is far
removed from the ultimate harm apprehended, unconstitutional and invasive
means would probably need to be resorted to to detect it and to apprehend
suspects.!" In order that personal freedom be maximised and strain on law
enforcement minimised, Packer therefore advocates caution before a decision
is made to criminalise preparatory conduct that is remote from harm.
2 4 5 The conduct may be dealt with through even-handed and non-
discriminatory enforcement
According to Packer, the criminal sanction should not be used where its
enforcement would be extremely difficult or sporadic. Sporadic enforcement
is not only futile, but may also have indirectly harmful consequences such as
diminishing respect for the law and leading to discretionary and arbitrary
169 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 269.
170 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 270-271.
171 See § 246 infra.
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entorcernent.!" Especially in cases where the crime is a consensual sexual
offence, where the offence is "just barely taken sertously"!" and enforcement
is particularly erratic, there is also the danger that police or prosecutors may
abuse their discretion in deciding whether or not to enforce the criminal
prohibition.F" In such situations the option of decriminalisation should
seriously be considered.
2 4 6 Controlling the conduct through the criminal process will not
expose that process to severe qualitative or quantitative strains
In cases where criminal conduct can only be effectively suppressed by
extremely intrusive means that will also be time-consuming and expensive,
time, money and manpower may be better utilised if the conduct in question is
not criminalised, unless societal interests would be seriously threatened
thereby. In Packer's view, the quantitative problem is purely pragmatic:
UA rational legislator should not vote to subject previously legal conduct to
criminal proscription unless he is prepared to say, first, that the conduct being
proscribed is so threatening to important social interests that he is willing to see
people who engage in it subjected to criminal punishment and, second, that he
expects law enforcement to devote adequate resources to detecting,
apprehending, and convicting violators."!"
It is a reality that there is a limited law enforcement budget. To
determine whether using the criminal law to suppress conduct is justified, it
may be necessary to rank crimes in accordance with whether enforcement of
the sanction is a budgetary priority. Only if socially threatening conduct is so
undesirable that the apportioning of substantial resources is warranted to
facilitate its detection and punishment, should it be subject to the criminal
sanction. If suppression of a certain form of antisocial conduct is relatively low
on this hierarchy, alternatives to the criminal sanction should possibly be
made use of to ensure compliance mstead.!" or it may be necessary to
consider the option of decriminalising altogether.
172 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 286-290.
173 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 290.
174 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 290-292.
175 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 272.
176 See also discussion of alternatives to the criminal sanction § 2 4 7 infra.
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As regards qualitative constraints on law enforcement, Packer points out
that it is paradoxical that the police are often most visible when they are doing
their least important work, such as enforcing so-called "victimless" or
consensual crimes.!" for example crimes involving sexual deviance or
druqs."" Since there is no victim to complain, the police would be more likely
to make use of unsavoury detection practices179 in order to apprehend
culprits. Where law enforcement officials readily resort to "wide-spread and
visible intrusion into what people regard as their private lives" in these
instances."? they violate the offender's human dignity and privacy to a degree
unwarranted by the gravity of the offence. If arbitrary and discretionary
conduct by police and prosecutors is inevitable for a criminal prohibition to be
enforced eftectively.!" this may also result in a lower quality of law
enforcement.
2 47Th ere are no reasonable alternatives to the criminal sanction for
dealing with the conduct
Packer's point of departure is that the criminal sanction should be used
as a last resort, only where the social gains accruing from the successful
prevention or reduction of the conduct in question outweigh the loss of human
dignity and autonomy inherent in the imposition of the criminal sanction, and
where the economic cost of enforcement is not disproportionate to its benefits.
Criminalisation is uncalled for if there are "readily available alternatives that
avoid or minimise the formidable battery of objections and obstacles"!"
inherent in use of the criminal sanction. For example, Packer is of the opinion
that the criminalisation of trivial conduct should be avoided - only conduct that
is regarded as worthy of being punished with imprisonment, as opposed to a
177 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 284. See also Devlin The Enforcement of Mora Is 18-19.
178 A South African example is the tactics employed to enforce the provisions of the Immorality Act 23
of 1957 prohibiting consensual sexual relations across the colour bar. Police methods were often
unsavoury and an infringement of privacy. See, for instance, S v Boshoff and Others 1981 1 SA 393
(T), where the police, acting on information received, kicked a hole in the complainant's front door
and burst into her bedroom at 4 am to take photographs as evidence that an offence in terms of the
Immorality Act was being committed. It was found by the magistrate that the police conduct was an
unlawful invasion of privacy.
179 Such as physical intrusion, electronic surveillance and decoys - see Packer 285-286.
180 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 283.
181 See discussion § 245 supra.
182 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250.
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mere fine, or lesser sanction, should be criminalised. This will ensure that the
criminal punishment is not resorted to indiscriminately, and the stigma
inherent in the "mere fact that a [person] has been convicted of something
called a crime"183 will then remain sufficiently weighty for deterrence. In the
case of crimes such as trivial public welfare offences, where there is no
accompanying feeling of societal moral disapproval, it would be better to avoid
the criminal sanction altogether. Packer suggests that the state use publicly
instituted civil action for recovery of a monetary penalty lnstead.!"
Even if after careful consideration it appears that there are no viable
substitutes to punishing conduct as a crime, Packer regards it as necessary to
consider the alternative of doing nothing, rather than simply rejecting it out of
hand. If the costs of utilising the criminal sanction are greatly disproportionate
to its benefits, doing nothing would probably be preferable, unless
suppression of the conduct concerned was an absolute social priority.185
Total decriminalisation must always be an option in appropriate cases.
2 4 8 Evaluation
If Feinberg's approach to the criminalisation problem is characterised as
being theoretical and systematic, Packer's methodology is more practical and
policy-orientated. What is especially relevant to him is that both criminal law
and punishment need to be practically implemented in a broader social
context. He does not regard it as sufficient merely to concern himself with
what would be ideal - ie, under what circumstances criminal punishment may
possibly be justified - but also with what is feasible, given the inherent
limitations of the criminal justice system. Thus he acknowledges the
importance of effective enforcement of a (theoretically) justified criminal
prohiblnon.!" If a criminal sanction cannot be successfully put into effect due
to qualitative or quantitative constraints, and serves no utilitarian purpose that
183 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 273.
184 No more will be said at this stage about alternatives to the criminal sanction. See The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction 273-275 for more details, as well as § 5 3 3 for possible alternatives to
criminalisation in the context of incest.
185 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 258.
186 The constraints of the criminal justice system include a lack of financial resources, time, manpower,
etc.
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cannot also be achieved by using other (less costly) means, Packer is of the
view that criminal punishment is inappropriate, even if the conduct sought to
be discouraged is both harmful and socially undesirable.
His point is that the legislature needs to be discriminating when deciding
whether it is worthwhile to criminalise. Punishment of many forms of only
slightly harmful or offensive conduct may, objectively speaking, be justified,
but if even minimally effective enforcement of all such (often trivial) criminal
prohibitions presently in force were to be attained, the criminal justice system
would crack under the strain. Thus, even if punishment is deserved, the
legislature may need to compromise - and definitely to prioritise: should petty
offences really be subject to the wrath of the law, or should more energy and
money be devoted to detecting and punishing violent crime instead? Packer
notes that in practice selective enforcement (especially of less serious
offences) takes place anyway - why not legitimise this instinctive prioritisation
by decriminalising the bulk of trivial offences altogether?
The only objection I have to Packer's approach is that, although inspired
(and inspirational) he is rather haphazard and unsystematic. He fails to
distinguish sufficiently between relevant reasons for criminalisation based on
theory/principle, and those based on practical/policy considerations. The
former criteria could be used to justify criminalisation irrespective of whether
there were budgetary constraints on law enforcement, whereas the latter
would be more directly dependent on the specific context or community in
which they were applied. The logical question I would ask Packer, therefore,
is: what if we lived in Utopia, where there was an unlimited budget made
available for law enforcement, and each type of (indisputably morally wrong)
conduct declared criminal by the legislature was invariably and successfully
detected and punished? Would Packer then support extending the criminal
sanction to consensual sexual conduct, or petty offences, etc in principle? His
book does not give us clarity about his answer to this question. Packer's
arguments, then, seem to lack Feinberg's theoretical strength, in that he does
not differentiate between universally valid criteria for criminalisation that would
continue to apply irrespective of the realities of law enforcement in any
45
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
particular society, and considerations that are merely pragmatic and context-
bound in nature.
2 5 Writers: Rabie
2 5 1 Introduction
In the book Punishment: An Introduction to Principles,187 Rabie devotes
a considerable number of pages to the problem of guiding criteria in the
establishment of what conduct should be made criminal.
Rabie's starting point is to identify the ideal purpose of criminal law.
According to him, criminal punishment should only be used as a drastic
sanction of last resort to protect "fundamental interests or values without
which society cannot exist, against reprehensible conduct which seriously
threatens or impairs these values".188 Significantly, he echoes Packer in
recognising the important role of weighing up competing interests and values
in deciding what conduct should be criminalised. Since human dignity and
autonomy are undermined by over-zealous resort to the criminal sanction, the
criminal sanction is an ultimum remedium that should be used with restraint
only where alternative sanctions are unsuccessful in achieving the desired
societal security.l" According to Rabie, only interests that are so valuable
that they are a prerequisite for a peaceful and orderly societal co-existence,
should be protected by using the criminal sanction to punish those who
disregard them.19o If the state were to leave unpunished wrongful acts that
seriously threaten or infringe fundamental social values such as life, limb and
property, there is the danger that members of society would take the law into
their own hands to exact retribution, which could threaten the peace and order
of society as a whole.
187 Rabie and Strauss 5 ed.
188 Punishment 99 (emphasis in the original).
189 See Rabie Punishment 100.
190 See Punishment 102-103 for examples of such interests, and the corresponding crimes.
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2 5 2 Protected interests
It is important to Rabie that only harmful (or potentially harmful) human
conduct that threatens or infringes values such as life, personal integrity, truth
and order should be subject to criminal punishrnent.l'" However, he points
out that not all harmful conduct is criminalised - other criteria must also be
used to limit the reach of the criminal sanction. Rabie is also of the opinion
that criminal law is not an appropriate tool to enforce certain moral standards;
mere morality is not an interest that should be protected by means of the
criminal sanction. Although upholding a particular standard of morality may
be of importance to the society in question, and is even worth treasuring, in a
heterogeneous society it would be difficult and contentious to determine the
limits of criminal punishment of immorality, and enforcement of mere morality
by means of the criminal sanction is therefore undestrabte.!"
2 5 3Nature of the attack
Although the value of the protected interest may playa role in deciding
whether those who infringe it should be criminally purusned.!" this factor is
not necessarily decisive - the nature of the attack upon the protected interest
is another significant consideration. There are certain requirements with
which the behaviour of the accused must comply before criminalisation can be
resorted to.
2531 Dangerous
Criminalised conduct must be dangerous, in that it must create a
substantial risk of injury to a protected interest. The more fundamental the
interest in question (for example life), the easier it would be to justify punishing
191 Examples of such conduct include crimes of violence, crimes of fraud, crimes against peace, order
and good government and crimes against property (Punishment 102).
192 Rabie Punishment 103-104. He also points out (at 114) that there are more appropriate instruments
than the criminal law that may be utilised for moral education, for example, schools, religious
institutions and the media.
193 Rabie Punishment 106-107.
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conduct even remotely threatening it.194 However, dangerousness is not
inevitably a decisive criterion for criminalisation, according to Rabie.
In this context Rabie also briefly considers the question of whether the
criminal sanction should be used to punish people endangering themselves -
ie, whether paternalistic criminal provisions are justified. Since Rabie agrees
with Bayles 195 that in harm-to-self situations there are usually alternatives to
the criminal sanction that are more effective and less prejudicial to the person
performing the action, he does not regard the use of the criminal sanction as
warranted in these cases.!"
2 5 3 2 Reprehensible
Rabie is of the view that before conduct may be criminalised, it must not
only be dangerous, but also morally reprehensible. He shares Packer's
concern that the criminalisation of morally neutral conduct could weaken
respect for the law and lead to half-hearted enforcement of such oftences.!"
Rabie disapproves of the expedient use of the criminal sanction in respect of
petty public welfare offences. He regards immorality as a necessary condition
for criminalisation, but holds that immorality should by no means be a
sufficient reason for justifying criminalisation - not all immoral conduct should
be subject to the criminal sanction. In addition, he acknowledges the difficulty
of determining the extent of society's moral disapproval in today's pluralistic
society. However, he takes the view that factors such as the proportion of the
community that disapprove of the particular conduct, the intensity of their
disapproval and "the qualitative nature of the majority and minority groups"
could playa role.198
194 Rabie Punishment 108.
195 In Pennock and Chapman (eds) The Limits a/Law 184, 187.
196 Punishment 110.
197 Punishment 112.
198 Punishment 113, quoting Hughes 1962 Yale LJ 673.
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2 5 3 3 Blameworthy
In addition to being dangerous and morally reprehensible, the state of
mind of the person performing the criminal conduct is relevant. According to
Rabie, only those who are deserving of punishment should be subject to the
criminal sanction. Rabie opposes the notion of guiltless or strict liability
(where the offender has no mens rea, or is at most negligent), being of the
opinion that it is inappropriate to resort to the criminal sanction in these
instances. There are alternative ways of dealing with such conduct.!'"
2 5 4 Effectiveness
Another more practical criterion that Rabie proposes is what he calls
effectiveness. Only if a criminal sanction achieves the overall purpose of
criminal law - ie, it prevents deviation from certain rules of conduct - can the
threat of punishment be regarded as effective. While conceding that absolute
prevention of crime is impossible, and also that it is very difficult to determine
how effective the criminal sanction is in encouraging persons to desist from
undesirable conduct, Rabie says that it may be useful to examine the nature
of the conduct in question as well as the kind of persons likely to engage in it
to determine criminal punishment's degree of efficacy.2oo
And even if the criminal sanction can be shown to be effective, says
Rabie, this should not invariably imply that it should be resorted to. There
may be alternative means of social control that are as successful as the
criminal sanction in regulating human conduct, while being less costly and
harsh.201 Once again, weighing up or balancing of interests is required:
whether the criminal sanction is truly necessary can only be determined once
it has been established "how important society considers the values to be
protected through suppression of the conduct in question, in relation to the
values that may be impaired by the proposed method of control.,,202 The
severe sanction of criminal punishment is clearly required where fundamental
199 Rabie Punishment 125.
200 Punishment 126-127.
201 As has already been mentioned, the criminal sanction should be used only as a last resort.
202 Rabie Punishment 131.
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interests are at stake, but many forms of conduct presently criminalised, such
as public welfare offences and some sexual offences, may well be regulated
better by using other legal203 (or even extra- or non-legal)204 means.
However, where the legislature deems it necessary to intervene, but chooses
to use an alternative to criminalisation such as administrative action, Rabie
believes that there still appears to be no substitute for the criminal sanction as
coercive measure of last resort, in cases where "other sanctions are wilfully
disobeyed ."205
Another significant consideration when ascertaining the effectiveness of
the criminal sanction is the extent and success of its practical enforcement.
The criminal sanction is not an effective deterrent where the perceived risk of
detection, apprehension and conviction is very low.206 Like Packer, Rabie
points out that consensual crimes will be much less effectively enforced in
practice than crimes where there is an identifiable victim. The potentially
harmful side effects of criminalising certain conduct, although difficult to
predict, must also be taken into account.207
2 5 5/ndispensability
It is only justified to resort to criminalisation where it is absolutely
essential and where no other sanction is adequate. This is because the
implementation of the criminal sanction has extremely prejudicial
consequences for persons who are prosecuted and convicted, and all options
must thus be considered before punishing those who infringe upon societal
interests.208
203 Rabie discusses various legal alternatives, for example administrative sanctions, at 132-138.
204 The humiliation and social stigma resulting from being publicly exposed as someone who has
committed bestiality, for example, may be a far more effective deterrent than any fine or period of
imprisonment could be.
205 Punishment 132.
206 Rabie Punishment 140.
207 See Punishment 141-142 as well as the discussion of Packer 245 supra and Packer The Limits of
the Criminal Sanction 270-295.
208 See also in regard to the criminal sanction being used only as a last resort, the Hogan quote in
§ 3 3 3 3 infra.
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2 5 6 Evaluation
By emphasising the potentially extremely harmful effects of criminal
punishment, Rabie is mindful that the criminal sanction should be used only
as a last resort, a view I strongly support. As regards what conduct should be
deemed punishable, he agrees with Packer that moral reprehensibility alone is
insufficient: there must also be a degree of harm in that the relevant conduct
should seriously threaten or impair interests of fundamental importance to
society. He also notes that even conduct harmful to society should only be
criminalised if punishment will be effective and will be able to be enforced, and
where use of the criminal sanction would be essential.
My objections to Rabie's approach overlap to a great extent with my
criticism of Packer. Like Packer, Rabie does not separate reasons for
opposing criminalisation which are practical (based on policy considerations)
and theoretical arguments based on legal principle. Many of his reasons for
limiting the use of the criminal sanction may therefore not be relevant in all
circumstances. For instance, he opposes legal moralism on the basis that it
would be very difficult to come to an agreement about what conduct is morally
reprehensible enough to warrant crirninalisation.ê'" This implies that, should a
foolproof method for determining moral consensus be developed, he would
not oppose legal moralism as fundamentally unacceptable per se, as does
Feinberg. Similarly, his only objection to legal paternalism is that sanctions
less severe than criminal punishment are more suttable,"? which suggests
that in principle he would support the use of criminal coercion to protect
persons from the consequences of their voluntary choices, if it were the only
feasible option. He does not make a distinction between criteria for
determining the desirability of criminalisation that would always apply,
irrespective of the society in which they were utilised, and those that are
context-specific. Such a distinction would facilitate the use of his proposed
criteria in practice.
209 See §§ 2 5 2 and 2 5 3 2 supra.
210 § 2 5 3 1 supra.
51
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 PROPOSED TEST: DETERMINING WHETHER CRIMINALISATION IS
APPROPRIATE
3 1 Introduction
The views contained in a cross-section of the sources useful for deciding
when the criminal sanction should be used, have been discussed. While the
criteria developed by such authors as Feinberg, Packer and Rabie form a
convenient point of departure for further investigation, the guidelines proposed
by each for determining the limits of the criminal sanction sometimes diverge
and are even somewhat contradictory. At times it seems unclear whether
they are each addressing the same issue, and it is difficult to see at first
glance how the various viewpoints, most of which are valid and worth
considering, could be integrated and systematised into a single simple method
of determining whether conduct should be prohibited as a crime.
As has been shown, legal writers are not the only source of information
for establishing criteria for when criminalisation would be appropriate. The
legislature needs to look at the standards outlined in the Constitution when
determining the desirability of enacting new criminal legislation, as do courts
when evaluating the validity of existing criminal laws. The Constitution is,
after all, the "supreme law of the Republic"211 against which all law or conduct
must be tested to determine whether it is valid or not and is the ultimate
indicator of the values, rights and interests our society deems worthy of
protection. It contains indispensable guidelines to assist in a determination of
the circumstances under which fundamental rights protected in the
Constitution may be limited in a manner that is constitutionally permissible.
Since all criminal law prohibitions entail the infringement of the rights of the
individuals subject to them to a greater or lesser extent,212 it is thus vital that
the implications of the limitations clause, section 36 of the Constitution, be
considered. Section 36(1) of the Constitution reads as follows:
"The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account
all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right;
211 S 2 of the Constitution.
212 See additional discussion § 2 2 supra and §§ 3 2 1 and 3 2 2 infra.
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(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose."
This study proposes to utilise the limitations clause as the underlying
starting point for developing a reliable two stage test that can be used by the
legislature or courts in the criminal law context to solve the problem of what
conduct is a proper subject of criminal punishment. Although the basic
structure of section 36 of the Constitution will be used as a framework for the
suggested test, the various views of the writers already discussed, as well as
my own views, will also be incorporated into this outline. It is interesting to
note that it is surprisingly easy to reconcile the views of the writers concerning
what criteria may be useful in determining the appropriateness of the use of
the criminal sanction, with the considerations regarded as relevant in section
36.213 Factors, guidelines and criteria that seemed contradictory or unclear
suddenly form a coherent whole that is easy to understand and apply in
practice.
3 2 Preliminary issues
32 1Section 36(1) - Limitation in terms of a law of general application
Before the limitations clause can be applied, it must of course be
established that one or more of the rights in the Bill of Rights has been limited
or infringed upon. In the case of a criminal prohibition this is a fairly easy task.
213 This includes not only the three writers already discussed in detail, but others such as Bentham who,
in Principles of Morals and Legislation (158-159), advocated a utilitarian approach to criminal law.
He was of the view that, even in instances where conduct was immoral, the criminal sanction should
be used extremely sparingly because "all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.
Upon the principle of utility, ifit ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it
promises to exclude some greater evil."
According to Bentham, then, there are certain situations where punishment ought not to be inflicted:
"1. Where it is groundless; where there is not mischief for it to prevent; the act not being
mischievous upon the whole.
2. Where it must be inefficacious; where it cannot act so as to prevent the mischief
3. Where it is unprofitable or too expensive; where the mischief it would produce would be
greater than that it prevented.
4. Where it is needless: where the mischief may be prevented, or cease of itself, without it: that
is, at a cheaper rate" [emphasis in the original].
See also Hughes 1962 Yale LJ 663.
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Accused or convicted persons, who in practice would also be the persons with
the locus standi to challenge the criminal sanction's constitutionality, need
merely to show limitation of one or more of their constitutional rights. As has
been noted above.i" criminal sanctions always entail some limitation of the
rights of the person accused or convicted of a crime. It is submitted that not
only is there a prima facie indication that all criminal sanctions limit
fundamental rights, but that, in many cases, the activities of accused or
convicted persons impaired by government imposition of criminal punishment
"fall within the sphere of activity the right[s were] intended to protect"?"
Feinberg agrees, emphasising that the invasion of the interest in liberty (a
harm) is a necessary consequence of every legal prohibition, since such
prohibitions narrow the options of those subject to them.216 All criminal
prohibitions have prejudicial consequences for the persons they affect - at the
very least there is (potential) limitation of the rights to human dignity217(due to
the stigma attached to the criminal sanction) and physical freedom (if the
person should be found guilty and sentenced to a term of incarceratlonj.i"
214 See preliminary discussion of the role of the Constitution § 2 2.
215 Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA 12-17. It may be argued that the sphere of activity
protected by freedom or human dignity would not extend to the freedom to rape, but the freedom to
engage in consensual sexual intercourse with the partner of one's choice may indeed be protected as
falling within the scope of the right to dignity (see discussion of this right's infringement by the
incest prohibition § 5 2 1 infra). However, even if it is incorrect to submit that criminal prohibitions
always limit at least some activities that fall within the applicable rights' sphere of protected activity,
there is no doubt that all criminal sanctions prima facie infringe upon "activit[ies] which could
notionally fall within the ambit ofa [particular] right" (see Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA
12-17 to 12-18 for more on this distinction and its implications). It is submitted that, for present
purposes, the distinction is one without substance, since it would not influence the end result of
applying the proposed test to determine whether criminalisation is appropriate.
216 Harm to Others 217.
217 S 10 of the Constitution. See also S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), where Chaskalson CJ
states (at § 142):
"Dignity is inevitably impaired by imprisonment or any other punishment, and the undoubted power
of the state to impose punishment as part of the criminal justice system, necessarily involves the
power to encroach upon a prisoner's dignity."
See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and
Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) § 28 and §§ 120-129, where it was held that the common law of sodomy
also violated the right to human dignity.
218 S 12(1) of the Constitution, which inter alia guarantees the right to physical liberty. As stated by De
Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 250, "arrest or imprisonment are the clearest cases of
limitation of freedom". In addition, if there is no convincing justification or rationale for the
existence of the crime in question, it may be argued that deprivation of freedom is arbitrary and
without just cause (s 12(1)(a» - see for example Snyman's argument (Criminal Law 4 ed (2002) 361)
in the context of bestiality.
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Depending on the particular crime that the person is being charged with, other
rights may also be at stake and could be relied upon by the accused.!"
The limitation of such rights as human dignity and freedom, which are
inevitable if the criminal sanction is utilised, also invariably occurs in
accordance with a law of general application - either a statutory or a common
law criminal prohibition. Thus it is clear that it is necessary to examine the
factors mentioned in the limitations clause in more detail to establish the
reasonableness and justifiability of the limitation of the rights of the accused
person.
3 2 2 Nature of the right
It has been mentioned that although the some of the rights of the
accused person are necessarily limited by all criminal sanctions, the nature of
the particular rights affected is determined to a great extent by the specific
crime being challenged. As will be discussed in more detail later,220criminal
sanctions may restrict behaviour warranting constitutional protection in three
distinctive ways: first, the conduct proscribed might be of such a nature that
prohibiting it effectively prevents law-abiding individuals from realising
constitutionally-protected aims;221second, the specific punishment imposed
may undermine the exercise of fundamental human rights, either due to its
nature or its duration;222and third, the methods necessary to apprehend a
person suspected of a particular type of crime may be more likely to be
unacceptable and to require unconstitutional conduct on the part of law
enforcement officers.223
As regards the nature of the right specifically, in all likelihood the right to
human dignity will be at issue when the constitutionality of a criminal
prohibition is challenged,224as will the right to freedom and security of the
219 See discussion § 3 22 infra as well as n 226 to n 232.
220 At § 3 3 3 1 1 infra.
221 This would be contrary to s 7(2) of the Constitution, which provides: "The state must respect,
f:rotect,promote andfulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights" [emphasis added]. See also n 255 supra.
22 If the duration is out of proportion with the crime committed.
223 Especially in the case of consensual crimes, where there is no complainant.
224 See n 217 supra.
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person in the case of a crime where the person's punishment may be
imprisonment.225 Other rights that may be relevant include the right to
equality,226the right to privacy,227the right to freedom of religion, belief and
opinion,228the right to freedom of expression.ê" the right to freedom of trade,
occupation and protesslon,"? property rights231and children's rights,232to
name but a few.
In the criminal law context, therefore, the nature of the right as a relevant
factor for determining the constitutionality of the right's limitation is not
decisively useful in formulating general guidelines or principles, since the
rights at stake vary, depending on the content of the criminal prohibition in
question. It is clear, however, that since important rights such as human
dignity, equality and freedom are usually implicated, this will tend to add
weight to an argument that criminal prohibitions are prima facie unjustified
and/or unreasonable.
225 See n 218 supra.
226 S 8 of the Constitution - see National Coalition supra §§ 15-27 and §§ 108-114 and Jordan and
Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) §§ 8-20 and §§ 57-73.
227 S 14 of the Constitution - see National Coalition supra §§ 29-32 and §§ 110-119 and Jordan supra
§§ 27-29 and §§ 76-84.
228 S 15(1) and s 31(1)(a) of the Constitution - see Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of
Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) §§ 37-39 and §§ 110-113.
229 S 16 of the Constitution would be implicated if, for instance, the common law crimes of criminal
defamation or crimen iniuria were being challenged.
230 See Jordan supra §§ 23-26 and §§ 54-56, where the argument that the right to economic activity (s
26 of the Constitution) was implicated was considered and rejected.
231 S 25 of the Constitution would be at issue if a person who is found guilty is fined rather than
imprisoned.
232 See S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) § 18, where the constitutionality of corporal punishment for
youths was considered and the punishment was declared unconstitutional. Another punishment
declared unconstitutional was the death penalty - see S vMakwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC) § 151.
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3 3 Proposed test
3 3 11ntroduction
In formulating this proposed test, the assumption is that any criminal
sanction entails a significant prima facie infringement of important
constitutional rights of the accused. Thus the real question to be answered is:
can the state show that there is a sufficiently good and worthwhile reason for
limiting such rights? There are two separate matters that need to be
considered in answering this question. The first is what I call the justification
(or principle) question, where the inquiry is: may the criminal sanction be
used in a specific case? It is submitted that this justification question is a
threshold one: where the rationale for criminalisation is unconvincing, the
criminalisation inquiry ends then and there.233 However, if this question is
answered in the affirmative, the investigation as to the desirability of the
criminal sanction is not yet complete. A second issue must still be borne in
mind - what I call the reasonableness (or policy) question: even where the
use of the criminal sanction may theoretically be justified, this does not
necessarily imply that it should be used in a particular case. Separate factors
need to be taken into account in determining whether using a criminal
prohibition is practically desirable and feasible.
Before the state may successfully discharge its onus of proving that the
limitation of the accused's rights is constitutionally permissible, the criminal
prohibition must be shown to be not only justifiable, but also reasonable.
233 This approach is supported by Chaskalson et al SA Constitutional Law 12-49. In the context of the
limitations clause, it was said (at 12-50): "If the objective or purpose of the limitation does not serve
[the values of openness, democracy, human dignity, freedom, equality and the other values which
underlie the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole] in a manner which justifies the
infringement of an express fundamental right, then the party seeking to uphold the limitation loses
and our limitation inquiry ends."
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3 3 2 First stage: justifiability
3 3 2 1 Importance of the limitation's purpose: introduction
It has generally been recognised that the only true justification for the
imposition of criminal punishment is retribution or just desert, in the sense that
persons being punished must be regarded as deserving of punishment (and
should be punished in proportion to the crime that they have committed).234
Since the underlying rationale for all punishment is to appease the
community's feelings of anger and indignation, and to restore the moral
balance of society,235resorting to the criminal sanction may only be regarded
as warranted if the conduct engaged in is reprehensible, frowned upon by
society, and engaged in by persons who were aware that their conduct was
wrong.236 This view is echoed by Packer, who emphasises that it is only
socially threatening behaviour that is not condoned by the majority of society
that may be crlmlnallsed.!" If morally neutral conduct is prohibited, this
reduces the stigma inherent in being convicted of a crime, which may be
detrimental to the criminal justice system as a whole. Similarly, Rabie is of the
view that only where a person engages in dangerous, reprehensible and
blameworthy conduct that seriously threatens fundamental societal interests
or values may the use of the criminal sanction be justified.238 The focus at this
stage, then, should be on identifying what types of conduct society deems
deserving of punishment - it must be established what behaviour is regarded
as bad or wrong enough for the state to impose the ultimate sanction, namely
criminal punishment.
234 See Snyman Criminal Law 24 and Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 48-49. The
utilitarian punishment theories can help us determine the purpose of punishment in a particular
instance, but since they do not presuppose proportionality between the crime and punishment, they
need to be supplemented by the idea of punishment being deserved. See also Packer The Limits of
the Criminal Sanction 35-70 for a detailed discussion of the link between specific punishment
theories - what Packer calls the "justifications for criminal punishment" - and the proper use of the
criminal sanction. He is of the view that conduct must be characterised as blameworthy before use of
criminal penalties is permissible (62).
235 Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 39; 41.
236 It is doubtful whether the punishment theory of just desert can truly be applicable in cases where the
community does not feel sufficiently aggrieved - for example, where the "crime" committed consists
of conduct that is morally neutral or non-harmful.
237 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 273.
238 Punishment 99 and §§ 2 5 1-2533 supra.
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If what has been said above is particularised, it is apparent that the
purpose of the initial justification stage is to identify the underlying rationale for
resorting to the criminal sanction in a particular case, and to decide whether
this is a good enough reason for resorting to criminalisation. There is a close
connection between this stage and section 36(1)(b) of the Constitution, which
advocates that the "importance of the purpose of the limitation" is a factor
to be taken into account when determining whether the right in question may
be limited. Only where the reason for criminalisation is compellingly
important, in the sense that imposing a criminal sanction serves a worthwhile
and important purpose in a constitutional democracy, will the justifiability
threshold be met.239
The justifiability stage of the proposed test has much in common with an
approach such as Feinberg's. Since it is doubtful whether either Packer or
Rabie would condone criminal punishment if the conduct in question is merely
morally wrong, or harmful only to the perpetrators themselves, I will limit my
discussion about the underlying rationale to Feinberg's views, since his
guidelines for determining the justifiability of criminalisation are more
satisfactory for the justifiability stage of the test in that they are clear and
systematised. His concern is not so much the practical feasibility of imposing
the criminal sanction, but its theoretical permissibility.
As seen above,240Feinberg distinguishes between four basic reasons
that are advanced for justifying criminal punishment, namely harm to others,
offence to others, legal paternalism and legal moralism. While the first two
are, in principle, good and worthwhile justifications for criminalisation, legal
paternalism and moralism are of insufficient value to justify inflicting criminal
punishment to safeguard them. Thus if Feinberg's four categories are used
as a point of departure, once the criminal prohibition's reason for existence
has been adequately identified, it should be a relatively straightforward task to
determine whether such a rationale is worthy of protection. Where the
overriding justification for use of the criminal sanction is shown to be to
prevent harm or offence to others, the state will have met its burden of proof in
239 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 162.
240 § 2 3.
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relation to justifiability - it will have shown that, in principle, suppression of the
conduct concerned is a sufficiently weighty reason to warrant the imposition of
the criminal sanction. However, where the only reason for criminalising the
conduct in question is to protect actors from the consequences of their
informed choices (paternalism) or to enforce private morality, these must be
regarded as inadequate reasons for imposing the criminal sanction.
3322 Problems
However, there may be situations where it is virtually impossible to say
with certainty what the underlying reason is for criminalising a specific type of
conduct.ê" especially in most of the borderline cases that would tend to give
rise to a legal dispute. The raison d'être for a crime may be contested or
doubtful in a number of senses:
First, it may be unclear what the rationale for the crime in question is,
and the court may in the absence of evidence have to guess or presume a
rationale itself.242 If this is the case, the courts must be especially vigilant.
According to Labuschagne,243the lex certa rule of the principle of legality
requires the definition of a crime to have a rationale that is clear and easy to
establish.
241 See also § 2 3 4 supra.
242 This appears to have been the case in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another
vMinister of Justice and Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). There was no evidence in favour of retaining the
crime, simply because none of the respondents opposed the application to declare the crime invalid
and thus did not seek to justify its retention. When considering whether the clear infringement of the
right to equality entailed by criminalising sodomy could be justified, the majority (per Ackermann J)
concludes that "there is nothing which can be placed in the other balance of the scale" (§ 27).
Elsewhere in the judgment, however, Ackermann J makes his views about the underlying rationale
for criminalising sodomy very clear when he refers to the purported purpose of the limitation of the
rights of those effected by the criminal sanction as being: "to criminalise conduct which fails to
conform with the moral or religious views of a section of society" (§ 26). Ackermann J also
examines whether the rationale for criminalising sodomy is to punish "male rape", and comes to the
conclusion that it is not. Rather, "[t]he sole reason for [the crime of sodomy's] existence was the
perceived need to criminalise a particular form of gay sexual expression; motives and objectives
which [the Court] found to be flagrantly inconsistent with the Constitution" (§ 69). Clearly, in the
absence of evidence, Ackermann J is forced to draw his own conclusions. Although this is not
necessarily a bad thing, I am of the view that the Constitutional Court as court of final instance might
have benefited from counter-arguments, possibly advanced by an amicus curiae if parties to the
dispute were reluctant to do so.
243 "Die Legaliteitsbeginsel in die Strafreg en die Groeiende Geregtigheidsbehoefte aan Abstrakte
Misdaadomskrywing: 'n Regsantropologiese Perspektief' 2001 Obiter 57 66 and 72.
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Second, the raison d'être for the crime suggested by the state may be an
ostensible one, differing from the real (less acceptable) reason. This could be
a problem, particularly in instances where there appears to be more than one
underlying reason for imposing the criminal sanction. Understandably, it
would be in the state's interest to emphasise the more legitimate-seeming
reason(s) for criminalisation, while downplaying the less savoury one(s), thus
(deliberately or otherwise) misleading the court.i"
Third, it may be difficult for the court to evaluate the validity of the
crime's rationale as advanced by the state, or the court might be unwilling to
do so. This could result in the court merely accepting the state's purported
reason as correct without itself delving into the matter sufficiently in order to
satisfy itself that the state rationale is indeed the true one. This difficulty may
arise when the person applying to have the crime declared unconstitutional
accepts the state's justification without question, thus depriving the court of
the "other side of the story".245
Fourth, the rationale for criminalisation may genuinely be a mixed one,
with some reasons being satisfactory and others being unacceptable. The
court might find it difficult to know whether to accept the justification as
legitimate or not.246
244 It will be seen at § 5 2 2 infra that incest is an example of a crime where legitimate-seeming
justifications mask less acceptable ones. See discussion of Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6
SA 642 (CC) n 246 infra for more on this problem.
245 For example, in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794
(CC), the state's contention that the prohibition on the smoking of dagga had a legitimate purpose
was not contested by the appellant (at § 35). The court also accepted that prohibiting the use of
harmful dependence-producing drugs is always a worthy aim, and failed suo mota to even consider
the possibility that it might be a less than convincing justification.
246 Eg, in Jordan supra various rationales for criminalising prostitution were advanced by the state,
some of which were contested by the applicants. Some of the underlying reasons for suppressing
commercial sex, as advanced by the state and accepted by the court, were the following (n 11 of the
judgment):
• prostitution breeds violent crime and drug abuse;
• prostitution leads to the exploitation of women and children;
• prostitution leads to trafficking in children; and
• prostitution leads to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
In addition, the minority judgment (§ 86) refers to a number of other reasons advanced by the state in
favour of curbing prostitution, including:
• prostitution per se is degrading to women; and
• prostitution is a frequent and persistent cause of public nuisance.
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Fifth, there is a distinct possibility that the underlying reason for imposing
the criminal sanction may have changed over time. It may be that the initial
reason for criminalisation would have been deemed objectionable, whereas
the contemporary justification advanced by the state is regarded as a good
one.247 t.abuschaqne!" is of the view that the interests of justice place a duty
on the legislature to amend the limits and content of a criminal sanction. The
interests protected by criminalising particular conduct are dynamic, and may
thus change in response to new scientific (or other) evidence or the evolution
in society's system of values.
Although South African case law creates the impression that establishing
the rationale of criminal prohibitions is a task fraught with difficulties, pitfalls
and uncertainties, I am of the view that these problems are more apparent
than real. The chief obstacle is not so much that it is impossible to ascertain
the true justification for criminalisation, as it is that both the parties to disputes
of this nature, as well as the courts adjudicating them, do not sufficiently
The Gender Commission, appearing as amicus curiae, alleged that the true reason for criminalising
prostitution was the enforcement of morals, implying that the reasons advanced by the state were
merely ostensible ones (§ 88).
It is clear that some of the above rationales are legitimate grounds that may justify a resort to the
criminal sanction (ie, where the harm to others or offence to others principles are implicated), while
others are not, being based purely on paternalistic or moralistic considerations. Disappointingly, the
court chose to accept the reasons advanced for criminalising prostitution in toto, without considering
each one individually to assess whether it is truly legitimate. The minority states (§ 94): "The state
argued that it chose to criminalise prostitution for a series of purposes - all of which are legitimate
and important" [emphasis added]. The majority also accepts the importance and legitimacy of
criminalising prostitution unconditionally without considering the need to distinguish between the
various reasons for criminalisation advanced by the state (§ 15). To my mind, many of the
justifications outlined above are unconvincing, to say the least. Most, if not all, are inapplicable,
unproven, purely emotive, or fall far short of the required harm or offence to others standard. In
addition, the conduct being prohibited is very remote from much of the ultimate harm envisaged.
247 In the context of its discussion of the regulation of commercial sex by means of prohibiting brothel-
keeping (prohibited by subsections 3(b) and 3(c) of the Sexual Offences Act), the minority in Jordan
supra considers the appellants' argument that these provisions amount to a constitutionally
impermissible attempts to "legislate for a particular moral code" (§ 102). As does Sachs J in National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 1 SA 6
(CC) (§ 139 of that case), the minority asserts that the South African constitutional framework does
indeed require the legislature to enact laws promoting morality, provided that such morality is
founded on constitutional values (§§ 104-105). It is submitted that adherence to constitutional values
would require that the criminal sanction be used only as a last resort. Conduct should not merely be
morally wrong, but also harmful or very offensive before criminalisation may be resorted to. Indeed
the minority in the Jordan case do accept that legislation with the underlying rationale of enforcing a
particular moral position as an end in itself cannot be constitutionally justified (§ 113). According to
the minority, however, the rationale of the legislation for modern society is to control commercial
sex, and this is regarded as sufficiently important and legitimate to justify criminalisation. See also n
152 supra.
248 2001 Obiter 72.
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emphasise the importance of a systematic approach to the issue of
determining whether a particular criminal sanction may theoretically be
justified. If in every case the state outlined (with sufficient clarity) the reasons
relied upon to justify retention of a criminal sanction, it would assist the court
in making a well-informed decision about whether use of criminal punishment
was justified in that situation. Naturally, it would then also be easier for the
party challenging the criminal sanction to formulate counter-arguments
contesting the state's allegations in this regard.
Similarly, courts have largely been unaware of the value of identifying
the criminal provision's rationale clearly in their judgments, and, if applicable,
of giving reasons why the rationale is regarded by the court as sufficiently
important and legitimate. If the courts were to do so, such guidelines would
facilitate the task of the state should it attempt to justify the raison d'être of a
particular criminal provision in future cases, since the state would know what
reasons had been accepted as legitimate in the past.
Where there is more than one justification advanced by the parties, the
court should have the discretion to decide which rationale it regards as being
of overriding importance. If sufficient evidence is before the court, this should
be a relatively simple task.249 As is the case in all criminal law matters, in
cases where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the justification is a
worthy one or not, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the party
seeking to challenge the criminal prohibition in question, not the state.
3323 Conclusion
If our point of departure is that criminal punishment should be deserved
before its use can be justified, it is submitted that harm or serious offence to
others are in principle worthwhile reasons for using the criminal sanction.
Although there is little South African case law on this subject to date, it
appears that our courts do implicitly support the view that preventing harm, or
serious offence, to others is a legitimate and important state goal that may
249 As explained above, where the justification relied upon promotes the prevention of harm or offence
to others, it is should prima facie be regarded as legitimate, whereas the opposite is true where the
legislation's underlying rationale is paternalist or moralist in nature.
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justify the use of the criminal sanction. But whether these are regarded as the
only legitimate reasons is questionable. Although the Constitutional Court has
stated in no uncertain terms that the enforcement of morality alone is not a
sufficient justification for the imposition of the criminal sanction."? there is
uncertainty about the status of legal paternalism as a justified rationale for
resorting to criminalisation. Insofar as the Constitutional Court has uncritically
accepted (hard) legal paternalism as a worthy reason for criminalising
conduct,"? it is submitted that a more nuanced approach may be preferable.
3 3 3Second stage: reasonableness
Even if it has been established that the criminal sanction may be
resorted to - ie, that there is sufficient theoretical justification for the criminal
sanction - this does not conclude the inquiry into the appropriate use of
criminal punishment. Although it is a relevant reason in support of criminal
prohibition that society regards the conduct concerned as deserving of
punishment in that it violates an interest worthy of protection by causing harm
or offence to others, this is not a decisive or sufficient condition for state
coercion to be appropriate - a second key question still needs to be asked.
This question explores the issue of whether utilising the criminal sanction is
practically desirable or feasible - reasonable - in the circumstances.
3331 Nature and extent of limitation of the rights of the accused
The first step of the reasonableness inquiry corresponds with section
36(1)(c) of the Constitution. A relevant factor to be considered, according to
this provision, is the nature and extent of the limitation of the right. In the
present context, when the suitability of the criminal sanction is being
250 See, eg, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and
Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) §§ 37-38; Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) §§ 113-
114.
251 In Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC), "harm to
self' was the clear rationale for the prohibition on the use of dagga, and this was not disputed by
either the appellant or the court. At § 35, the court states that
''the case was approached on the footing that the prohibition contained in the impugned provisions
served a legitimate government interest. Indeed, there was no suggestion either in the papers or in the
argument that the objective pursued by the prohibition was not laudable."
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determined, the right(s) being limited are those of the accused or sentenced
person, and it is the state's utilisation of criminal punishment that results in
such infringement. As has already been outlined above,252the use of a
criminal sanction necessarily limits to a certain extent fundamental rights of
the person who is charged with and found guilty of a crime, although the
particular individual rights infringed (the nature of the right) as well as the
seriousness of harm suffered by the accused as a result of imposition of
criminal punishment (the extent of the limitation) may vary from crime to
crime.
3 3 3 1 1 Nature of the right
Something has already been said about the nature of the rights
implicated by criminal punishment, and it has been concluded that the rights
concerned are important ones. The investigation is somewhat more complex
than it first appears, however, since ascertaining the nature of limitation of
rights in the criminal law context is an inquiry that operates on at least three
levels:253
First, by prohibiting specific conduct, criminal sanctions dissuade law-
abiding citizens from engaging in conduct that they might otherwise have
chosen. According to Feinberg,254this means that the freedom interest in
having as many open options as possible with respect to what one is allowed
to do is always invaded to some degree by criminalisation. It is submitted that
a criminal prohibition that explicitly denies persons the opportunity to exercise
constitutionally-protected rights by prohibiting the exercise of rights on pain of
252 §§ 3 2 1 and 3 2 2 supra.
253 For another approach, see Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 163, where he divides the
"evil of punishment" into four branches, namely:
(1) the "evil of coercion or restraint" suffered by a person observing the law who is deterred from
committing the particular act on pain of punishment;
(2) the "evil of apprehension" that is feit by those who anticipate being punished once they have
disobeyed the law;
(3) the "evil of sufferance", or the pain felt when undergoing punishment; and
(4) the pain of sympathy and other derivative evils suffered by those closely connected to the
original sufferers.
Bentham notes that the extent of the first evil will depend on the nature of the act from which the
party is restrained, while the second and third evils will vary according to the nature of the
punishment prescribed for a particular offence.
254 Harm to Others 213.
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punishment, should be viewed with suspicion. Especially where the conduct
criminalised has a constitutionally-protected status, the criminal proscription
may limit human rights to a greater extent than a mere restriction of
autonorny.ê" Feinberg proposes that the nature of the limitation imposed by a
criminal sanction may be determined by ascertaining the degree to which the
prohibition in question reduces an individual's alternatives.i'" On the one
hand, a criminal prohibition that closes many key options indirectly by closing
a given option directly may be unreasonable.!" while on the other, the closing
of an option may indeed be acceptable if the option closed is not a "fecund"
one.258 This is linked with Feinberg's opinion that the more useful (or
valuable, or constitutionally-protected) the dangerous conduct is for the actor
and others, the harder it will be for the state to show that criminalisation is
reasonable.i'" Packer has much the same idea when he states that the
criminal sanction should not be used to inhibit socially desirable and useful
conduct.260 He views it as objectionable to reduce an individual's alternatives
to an unacceptable extent by prohibiting (preparatory) conduct very remote
from any ultimate harm.
Second, the purpose of criminal sanctions is not only to prevent
individuals from acting in a particular manner that they would otherwise have
chosen, but also to punish those who are not deterred by the threat of
punishment. The degree to which human rights are limited by punishment
also depends on the nature of the punishment irnposed.i'" which in turn is
255 For example, criminalising sodomy prevents homosexuals from giving expression to their sexual
orientation, thereby affecting their ability to achieve self-identification and self-fulfilment (National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 1 SA 6
(CC) § 28 and §§ 120-129). A crime that prohibits free assembly, free speech, religious freedom (see
Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) §§ 37-39 and
§§ 110-113), etc would be automatically suspect. The crime of prostitution, that denies prostitutes
the right to carryon their trade or profession without the risk of criminal prosecution, would also fall
in this category (Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) §§ 23-26 and §§ 54-56). In
contrast, the criminalisation of rape closes off one small limited unfruitful option that is not
constitutionally protected, namely the option of having non-consensual sexual intercourse. See also
n 221 supra.
256 Harm to Others 207.
257 See n 255 supra.
258 Feinberg Harm to Others 214 and n 255 supra.
259 Harm to Others 216 and §§ 2 3 2 and 2 3 3 supra.
260 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 270-271.
261 For example, imprisonment, a fine, community service, correctional supervision, a suspended
sentence, etc. Corporal punishment and the death penalty have already been declared
unconstitutional (see n 232 supra).
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dependent on the particular conduct criminalised. More serious crimes tend
to be punished more severely and by means of punishment that is invasive
and unpleasant to a greater degree than that imposed on persons guilty of
trivial offences. There is thus a more extreme violation of human rights that
will be harder for the state to rationalise convincingly. However, it may also
be argued that the lighter the sentence is, the less the perceived need to
subject the conduct in question to criminal punishment in any event. Packer
argues that the threshold for determining whether criminalisation is
reasonable in this sense should be whether the legislature is willing to impose
a prison sentence of longer than three months on those who are convicted of
the particular offence, rather than a mere fine or lesser punishment.262
According to him, "we ought to purge from the criminal calendar all offenses
[sic] that we do not take seriously enough to punish by real criminal
sanctions".263
Third, the methods necessary to enforce a particular prohibition may
also playa role in determining the nature of infringement of fundamental rights
entailed by criminalisation. Especially in the case of so-called "consensual"
crimes264that are "just barely taken seriously",265enforcement is extremely
sporadic anyway. Packer believes that this creates the danger of a
discriminatory abuse of the exercise of the discretion to enforce such criminal
prohibitions.266 In addition, where the crime is a consensual one with no
complainant to lay a charge, enforcement may require police to resort to
underhand and unsavoury tactics to secure evidence for convictions. This
involves further human rights violations, such as unwarranted invasion of
privacy and human dignity.267
Taking the content of the prohibition itself, the punishment prescribed or
the method used to enforce the crime (or a combination of the three) into
262 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 275-276 supra.
263 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 273 and § 2 4 7 supra.
264 For example, prostitution and offences involving deviant sexual practices.
265 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 290.
266 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 286-287 and § 245 supra.
267 Unsavoury methods include physical intrusion, electronic surveillance and the use of decoys. See
also Packer supra 282-286 and § 246 supra, as well as the facts of S v Jordan and Others 2002 1 SA
797 (T) 799B, where the third appellant admitted to performing a pelvic massage for reward "on a
person who later proved to be a police agent". See also n 178 supra, where enforcement of the
Immorality Act in South Africa is discussed in this context.
67
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
consideration, it should be possible to establish the nature of the human rights
that infringed upon by the imposition of the criminal sanction in any specific
case.
3 3 3 1 2 Extent of the limitation
What still needs to be considered is the extent of the violation - whether
criminal punishment has a considerably severe negative effect on the
fundamental rights of accused or convicted persons, or whether the impact is
a relatively minor and benign one. It is submitted that the degree of violation
of the accused's human rights may only be determined in relation to the good
(for society, the victim of the crime, if any, etc.) resulting from the imposition of
the criminal sanction. Thus the extent of the harm resulting from
criminalisation cannot be determined in isolation - a comparison is required.
It is necessary to weigh up the benefits of criminalisation against the harm
caused by imposition of criminal punishment. The rationale for criminalising
an offence may give an indication of the harm that imposing criminal sanction
seeks to prevent. Where it is a worthy and important one, for example the
protection of human life, a particularly severe degree of impairment of human
rights inherent in the use of the criminal punishment chosen will be required
before the sanction may be regarded as unreasonable. Conversely, where
the justification for criminalisation is theoretically justifiable, but otherwise
unconvincing,268 it will be a difficult task for the state to justify even a slight
infringement of individual rights.
Factors relevant in the determination of the nature of individual rights
infringed have already been discussed above. Depending on the degree to
which the prohibition itself, its punishment and the methods of enforcement of
the crime violate human rights, the rights of the individual accused will weigh
more or less heavily in the balance. For instance, if the criminal punishment
has a serious impact on fundamental rights, such as where it prevents
persons from exercising constitutionally protected rights, or infringes on the
right to life as is the case with the death penalty, the limitation will extremely
268 Eg, where a minor degree of offence to others is at issue.
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hard to justify, while in cases where criminal punishment is light and rights are
impaired to a very slight extent, the state's reason for prohibiting the conduct
in question on pain of punishment need not be quite so compelling.269
If the harm caused by the commission of the crime is less severe than
the harm caused by criminal punishment, the criminal sanction is likely to be
regarded as unreasonable, since the good envisaged by the criminal sanction
is outweighed by the bad. Thus where the proportionality inquiry reveals that
the harm of imposing a criminal sanction is disproportionate to its benefits,
criminalisation will be undesirable."?
3332 Relation between the limitation and its purpose
Once it has been established what purpose a particular criminal sanction
is designed to serve (with reference to its underlying rationale), the next stage
in the reasonableness inquiry is to ask whether such criminal prohibition is in
fact effective in achieving its purported purpose. There must be a sufficiently
rational connection between the objective of the criminal sanction and the
manner in which it attempts to achieve such objective. This stage of the
investigation corresponds with section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution, which
advocates that the relation between the limitation of rights and its
purpose is a relevant factor to be considered when determining the
reasonableness of an infringement of a fundamental right.
At this point it is necessary to say a few words about the general goals of
punishment in establishing whether criminal punishment can be regarded as
being reasonable. The punishment theory of just desert has already been
mentioned in the context of emphasising the importance of deserved
punishment, and it was mentioned that deserved punishment is often
regarded as the true justification for punishment.271 Like the just desert
theory, the present stage of the inquiry underlines that it is crucially important
269 See also Feinberg's discussion of factors to be considered when deciding whether harm or offence
to others are serious enough to warrant criminal punishment (§§ 2 3 2 and 2 3 3 supra).
270 See also § 3 3 3 2 infra for a closer look at how to undertake a cost-benefit analysis in the context of
determining whether there is a rational connection between the function of a criminal sanction and the
means employed to achieve its stated goals.
271 At § 3 3 2 1 supra.
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for there to be "proportionality between the harm done by the infringement and
the beneficial purpose that the law is meant to achieve" before a limitation of
rights will be regarded as reasonable."!
However, quite apart from just desert as general justification for
punishment, there may be a myriad of other reasons or purposes served by
punishment in a particular case, that take into account not only the interests of
society and the crime committed, but also the individual circumstances of the
accused. Packer is of the view that in situations where criminal punishment
serves only to punish the wicked (ie, where it is deserved), it should not be
resorted to. According to him, there should be evidence that imposing the
punishment is also likely to have a deterrent effect and preferably also to
prevent the commission of further crimes.273 Although it is extremely difficult
to prove that the threat of punishment deters people from committing
crimes,274 Packer's view that the role of criminal law is not merely to punish
evil is to be commended. Criminal punishment should in addition have some
other positive social value such as incapacitation, deterrence or rehabilitation
before it may be used. If a criminal prohibition fails to serve such purposes as
it is designed to achieve, or achieves them only to a very minor extent,
criminalisation is ineffective and should not be resorted to.
The purpose of criminalising conduct may be explained on two levels.
On a primary level, criminal penalties are backward-looking, aimed at
punishing those who have already violated rights and interests that are worthy
of protectlon.ê" On a secondary level, the purpose of criminal punishment is
forward-looking, not focused on the punishment of past offences, but on the
avoidance of future ones. It is especially this second level that is relevant
when the question is asked whether there is a rational connection between
the purpose of a criminal sanction and the manner in which this purpose is
achieved.
272 De Waal et a! The Bill of Rights Handbook 161.
273 See The Limits of the Crimina! Sanction 269 and § 2 4 3 supra.
274 See for example S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) § 127, where Chaskalson CJ refused to
accept the contention of the attorney-general that the death penalty was a greater deterrent than life
imprisonment, citing lack of evidence.
275 This level corresponds with the rationale for punishment, which has already been discussed at
§ 3 3 2 supra.
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Whether a criminal prohibition achieves the secondary purpose of
preventing crime is a question concerned with its efficacy. Rabie supports this
argument, suggesting that a criminal prohibition's efficacy may be determined
by establishing the extent to which it prevents deviation from certain rules of
conduct.276 Simply put, the question is: does the mere threat of criminal
punishment cause people to refrain from prohibited conduct? If so, this could
indeed be an indicator of the prohibition's value. Although it is clear that no
criminal sanction could ever be a completely successful deterrent, the validity
of deterrence as a rationale for punishment depends largely on the
perception"? that there is a relatively good chance that a person committing
the crime in question will be apprehended, tried, convicted and punished.278
Thus it would appear that the extent and success of practical enforcement of a
criminal sanction are very good indicators of whether there is a sufficient
relation between the intended aim of such sanction and the extent to which
this aim is actually achieved in practice.
Packer agrees with the view that the practical enforceability of a criminal
sanction is of decisive importance. A criminal sanction will not tend to serve
the purpose of preventing individuals from causing harm or offence to others if
its deterrent effect is negligible. Unsatisfactory deterrent value may be due to
a variety of reasons, including:
• enforcement that is extremely sporadic at best;
• the nature of the crime resulting in an increased risk of discriminatory
enforcement;
• effective enforcement only being possible if over-intrusive detection
methods are used;279
• it being necessary to allocate and expend a disproportionate amount of
resources such as time, money and energy to ensure the enforcement of
an offence generally perceived as relatively trivial;28oand
276 Punishment 126 and § 2 5 4 supra.
277 Both of members of society in general and of those who have already committed crimes.
278 See also S v Makwanyane supra, where Chaskalson CJ stated at § 122: "The greatest deterrent to
crime is the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and punished."
279 See discussion of Packer §§ 2 4 5 and 2 4 6 supra for more on qualitative strains on law
enforcement.
280 See discussion of Packer § 2 4 6 supra for more on quantitative constraints on the criminal process.
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• the undermining of the moral legitimacy of the criminal sanction (and
thus its deterrent value) due to its overuse or abuse.281
It is submitted that this stage of the inquiry requires a cost-benefit
analysis, a weighing up of the competing rights, values and interests at stake
- state objectives, societal priorities and interests, the rights of those accused
and convicted of crimes, as well as obligations towards those directly harmed
by crime. The state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting certain conduct that
results in harm of serious offence to members of society. However, if in so
doing, the state "imposes costs or burdens on the rights-holder(s) which far
outweigh the benefits said to flow to other members of society",282then the
decision to criminalise is a questionable one. In the present context, it may be
argued that severely limiting the rights of accused and convicted persons may
indeed be beneficial to (potential) victims of crime and to the community in
general, since the consequence could well be the more effective deterrence
and prevention of crime - but at what cost? In instances where the rights of
accused and convicted persons are restricted in a manner disproportionately
harsh in relation to the interests that the particular criminal sanction seeks to
protect, the link between achieving state aims and the means employed to do
so may be sufficiently tenuous to make such sanction unreasonable.
A criminal prohibition that is relatively unsuccessful in deterring people
from committing crimes - ie, one whose application in practice does not
achieve its stated goals because the (perceived) risk of detection,
apprehension and conviction is comparatively low - should be viewed as
suspect because the relation between the limitation and its purpose in such a
case would probably be too unconvincing to be regarded as rational. Such
misgivings about a criminal sanction would be exacerbated where the means
necessary to enforce the prohibition severely and unreasonably prejudice the
rights of those subject to it. Thus if there are clear indications that a criminal
proscription is for whatever reason being ineffectively enforced in practice, or
281 See Packer § 2 4 7 supra for more on the idea of moral legitimacy. Over-use or abuse of the
criminal sanction will lead to individuals feeling entitled to engage in criminalised conduct with
impunity since it is not widely viewed as reprehensible. In addition, enforcement of the crime will be
less than satisfactory, since even those responsible for enforcement will be reluctant to ensure
compliance with an extremely trivial criminal proscription.
282 Chaskalson et al SA Constitutional Law 12-51.
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may only be enforced by resorting to disproportionately expensive, harsh or
unsavoury means, this is an indication that decriminalisation is an option that
should be taken seriously.
3 3 3 3 Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose
In the words of Hogan,283 "[t]here is often more than one way to skin a
cat, and flaying the hide off it with the criminal law is not always the most
efficacious." The last factor to be considered in determining whether use of
the criminal sanction would be reasonable - namely, whether criminalisation
is strictly necessary to reach the envisaged goals of the state - is one that has
long been neglected by both the legislature and the courts. By considering
section 36(1 )(e) of the Constitution, the question is asked whether the aims
sought to be reached by utilising the criminal sanction could possibly be
achieved by less restrictive means. As has been mentioned already, all
criminal prohibitions are restrictive of rights per se. In the criminal law context,
then, considering resorting to less restrictive means could refer to a variety of
different aspects:
First, the criminal provision defining the prohibited conduct may be over-
broad, including both objectionable and unobjectionable conduct within its
ambit. It may be necessary to limit the scope of the prohibition to ensure that
it only proscribes conduct truly deserving of punishment and nothing else.284
Second, the punishment prescribed for a crime may be too severe.
Even punishment that is in itself not unconstitutional may be regarded as
unreasonable if its nature or degree is disproportionate to the prohibited
283 "On Modernising the Law of Sexual Offences" in Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour
of Glanville Williams (Glazebrook ed) (1978) 176.
284 Such a process could amount to severance or reading down. A similar argument was advanced in
Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 (CC). The appellant
did not dispute the state's contention that the aim of prohibiting the use of dagga was a legitimate
one. What he did dispute, however, was that the means used to achieve this aim were necessary. He
contended that the state could achieve its stated goal equally effectively without restricting his right to
religious freedom. Thus the Constitutional Court had to decide whether or not the impugned
provision was overbroad - ie, "whether the granting of the religious exemption would undermine the
objectives of the prohibition" (§ 47). The majority was of the view that permission given to Rastafari
to possess dagga would undermine the general prohibition against such possession (§ 141) and
dismissed Prince's appeal.
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conduct in question or if the goals of punishment may be satisfactorily
achieved by lesser means.285
Third, the existence of the crime in its entirety may be at issue.
Decriminalisation, including both the use of the many readily available and
viable alternatives to the criminal sanction as well as the valid option of doing
nothing,286 has received comparatively little attention from legislature and
courts alike.287 It is submitted that this approach should be reconsidered.
Section 36( 1)(e) places a constitutional imperative on courts to consider
whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the aim that may be
realised by criminalisation, and to take such alternatives seriously.
Unfortunately, our courts have thus far been loath to do so.
285 Our courts have considered the constitutionality of specific punishments on various occasions. In S
v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that there were many sentencing
alternatives to corporal punishment that would achieve the aims of punishment just a successfully, if
not more so. It was held (at § 91) that "[i]t has not been shown that there are no other punishments
which are adequate to achieve the purposes for which [corporal punishment] is imposed." In S v
Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), a factor that weighed heavily with the court in its decision to
abolish the death penalty was the existence of a satisfactorily severe alternative to the death penalty
that was less restrictive of prisoners' rights, namely life imprisonment (§ 145). The principle that a
less severe punishment should be preferred, provided that the goals of punishment is still adequately
achieved thereby, may apply not only when the consideration is whether to abolish a particular form
of punishment altogether, but also where the suitability of the use of a specific type of punishment in
a particular case is at issue.
286 See especially Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 258 and § 2 4 7 supra.
287 As mentioned earlier, a detailed exposition on alternatives to the criminal sanction will not be
considered here. Suffice it to say that alternatives such as regulation, the use of administrative
sanctions, and extra-legal sanctions such as social disapproval, etc, exist and may well be as effective
as the criminal sanction in coercing individuals to refrain from harming or offending others. Several
such arguments have been advanced in our courts, but have been unsuccessful.
For example, it was argued in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002
2 SA 794 (CC) that it was not necessary to impose a blanket ban on the sacramental use of dagga by
criminalising the possession and use of dagga by Rastafarians. The court was divided on this issue.
The minority, per Ngcobo J, was of the view that the religious use of cannabis could indeed be
accommodated, for example by means of a permit system coupled with the necessary administrative
guidelines and infrastructure. The majority, per Chaskalson CJ, Ackermann and Kriegler JJ,
disagreed. According to the majority, the granting of a limited exemption for the religious use of
dagga was not a competent remedy since it might interfere with the state's ability to enforce its
legislation. I submit that this argument is unconvincing. With the correct infrastructure in place an
exemption could indeed be a workable option. I would like to go so far as to argue for the
decriminalisation of the use and possession of dagga altogether, but such an argument is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Another instance illustrating the Constitutional Court's reluctance to consider decriminalisation as an
option was Jordan and Others v S and Others 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). Although various workable
alternatives to the criminal sanction were submitted to the court, it refused to consider "whether the
interests of society would be better served by legalising prostitution than by prohibiting it". The
majority per Ngcobo J held that this policy decision (concerned with the desirability of the
prohibition) was beyond the scope of what the court was permitted to do, and should be left to the
legislature (§ 30). The minority echoed this sentiment, holding that the legislature had the choice to
decide whether it wished to prohibit prostitution, regulate it or abstain from addressing it at all (§ 92).
I disagree.
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3 4 Conclusion
It cannot be denied that the South African criminal justice system is
inadequately funded. Our criminal justice system does not have sufficient
resources to enforce even criminal prohibitions pertaining to serious crimes
against life and limb, with more than a modicum of success. This vital task is
considerably hampered by the simultaneous diversion of time and resources
for the enforcement of a proliferation of trivial, non-priority offences contained
in virtually every piece of legislation that is enacted. In an ideal world it would
indeed be possible to criminalise all forms of dangerous and reprehensible
conduct that threaten to harm or offend others, without considering the
budgetary implications. However, that is simply not feasible in our society.
Packer is perfectly correct, then, when he says that the legislature should not
subject conduct to criminalisation unless it is prepared to subject offenders to
criminal punishment and to make adequate resources available for
enforcement of the prohibition.i'"
The state needs to take the option of decriminalisation seriously. I would
go so far as to say that the state has a constitutional obligation to prioritise the
allocation of its criminal justice budget instead of spreading it so thin that
enforcement cannot possibly be effective. This implies that criminal penalties
should be reserved only for those who violate the values deemed most
precious by society.289 Less restrictive (and expensive!) alternatives should
be used wherever possible, provided that alternative options would
adequately achieve legitimate state aims. In many circumstances the criminal
sanction is far from indispensable. With the will to decriminalise and a
creative approach to the consideration of alternatives to criminal punishment, I
am convinced that feasible and acceptable options could be developed and
applied. Crimes that are Iowan the hierarchy of conduct that is regarded as
threatening and harmful enough to warrant the intervention of the criminal law
should simply be decriminalised, freeing up money that could be far better
spent elsewhere.29o Thus a shift away from the focus on criminal punishment
288 The Limits a/the Criminal Sanction supra 272.
289 Ie, cases of conduct resulting in serious harm or offence to others.
290 See also the motivation for this study § 1 2 for more details on why large-scale decriminalisation is a
worthwhile option to be considered.
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as the only effective means for social control would benefit not only those
(formerly) subject to criminal sanctions, but would also be to the advantage of
the state and society in general. The legitimacy of the criminal justice system
would be enhanced if extra resources were available to combat priority
crimes, instead of being diverted to enforce trifling ones.291
Only once all alternatives to criminalisation, including the option of doing
nothing, have genuinely been considered and it has been decided that the
criminal sanction is a sanction of last resort that is absolutely essential and
indispensable in the circumstances, can it be said that resorting to the criminal
sanction is truly both justifiable and reasonable.
291 As noted by Van Zyl Smit 1986 TRW 188: "penal sanctions cannot be limited only to the enacted
criminal law." He illustrates this by using a negative example. He notes that the repeal of the
colonial Masters and Servants laws by means of the Second General Law Amendment Act 94 of 1974
had little if no practical effect on those it was meant to benefit. Referring to farm labourers in the
Western Cape, he points out that after 1974 they were just as strictly controlled, and their "crimes" as
heavily penalised, as before the repeal of the laws in question. Conduct such as disobedience,
drunkenness, using abusing language, etc was no longer formally criminalised, but farmers still had
the power to punish infringements despite not having the "formal backing of the enacted criminal
law".
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4 WHAT IS INCEST?
4 1 Definition of the crime
Common law incest292is defined as the unlawful and intentional sexual
intercourse between (male and female) persons who may not marry each
other because they are related within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity,
affinity or adoptive relationship.i'" It is a dynamic crime, in the sense that its
definition corresponds with the private law rules relating to the degrees of
consanguinity and affinity within which a man and a woman may not marry
each other (as well as any statutory provisions regarding when marriage
between two persons in an adoptive relationship is forbidden).294 The
category of persons between whom incest is possible is expanded or
contracted as the category of persons who are prohibited from marrying due
to close blood, marriage or adoptive relationships is added to or diminished.295
42 Elements
4 2 1Sexual intercourse
At present, sexual intercourse (defined narrowly as penetrationi'"
involving the male inserting his penis into the female's vagina) is the only
conduct punishable as incest. Marriage within the prohibited degrees, without
proof of intercourse, is insufficient, although an inference of sexual intercourse
292 No reference will be made in this study to conduct criminalised as incest in terms of South African
customary law. For more information on this topic, see Olivier NJJ, Olivier NJJ Ur) & Olivier WH
Die Privaatreg van die Suid-Afrikaanse Bantoetaalsprekendes 3 ed (1989) 10-15 and Labuschagne
"Die Bloedskandeverbod in die Inheemse Reg" 1990 TRW35. See also Nel "The Constitutionality of
'Affinity' Incest: An Argument Based on the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act" 2002 Stell
LR 331 for a constitutional perspective on the incest prohibition in the context of customary law.
293 Snyman Criminal Law 355; Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 239; De
Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg 4 ed (1985) 279; LA WSA VI Criminal Law § 222.
294 Contra R v Blaauw and Blaauw 1934 SWA 3 6-10.
295 LA WSA supra; Snyman Criminal Law supra; Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law
Crimes 240. See also S v Shasha 1996 2 SACR 73 (Tk) 76: "The common-law crime of incest is
therefore not a self-contained crime, but is coupled with marriage law. If the degree of relationship as
impediment to marriage is either enlarged or decreased by way of legislation, the category of persons
with whom incest is possible is correspondingly enlarged or decreased."
296 See § 4 3 4 2 I infra for the SA Law Commission's proposals relating to an extended definition of
penetration.
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can be drawn from the fact that the parties have lived together after the
celebration of a (putative) marriage.297
4 2 2 Prohibited degrees
Where marriage is prohibited for reasons other than close blood,
marriage or adoptive relationship, for example because the one party is
already married, intercourse does not amount to incest.298 In determining
whether parties are related within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity or
affinity, no distinction is made between children born in wedlock and those
born out of wedlock. Similarly, it makes no difference whether the parties are
related in the half blood or in the full blood.299
4221 Consanguinity
Consanguinity or blood relationship exists between parties who have an
ancestor in common. Consanguinity can be either in the direct line or in the
collateral line. Persons who are ascendants (ancestors) or descendants
(offspring) of each other (for example father and daughter or grandfather and
granddaughter) are related in the direct line, while all other blood relatives (for
example uncle and niece, siblings or cousins) are coliaterals.30o Blood
relations who are ascendants and descendants in the direct line ad infinitum
may not intermarry, and thus commit incest if they engage in sexual
intercourse with each other.'?' Sexual intercourse between collaterals, where
either collateral is related to their common ancestor in the first degree of
descent, is incest.302
297 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 239-240; Snyman Criminal Law 356.
298 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 214; Snyman Criminal Law 356.
299 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 241; Snyman Criminal Law 357.
300 LA WSA XVI Marriage § 25; Snyman Criminal Law 357.
301 This category of incest includes father and daughter (eg S v M 1999 2 SACR 548 (SCA)); mother
and son (eg S v A 19624 SA 679 (E))
302 Thus this category includes brother and sister (eg R v Troskie 1920 AD 466); uncle and niece (but
only where they are related by blood - see RvD 19572 SA 74 (E)) or grandniece (eg R v M 1957 2
SA 73 (E)) and aunt and nephew, but excludes first cousins.
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4222 Affinity
Affinity relationships come into existence between a person and the
blood relatives of their spouse.303 In spite of customary unions purportedly
being placed on the same footing as civil marriages for all purposes in terms
of sections 2(1) and 2(2) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120
of 1998,304it appears that the only marriages that create a relationship of
affinity are legally recognised civil law marriages. This is due to section 3(6)
of the above Act, which stipulates that "[t]he prohibition of a customary
marriage between persons on account of their relationship by blood or affinity
is determined by customary law.,,305
Relations by marriage in the ascending and descending line ad
infinitum306 may not marry and sexual intercourse between them is therefore
incest, even if the marriage is ended by death or divorce.
There is some uncertainty about the legal position as far as marriage
relations in the collateral line are concerned. On the one hand, it is clear that
the Roman-Dutch law position has been abolished prohibiting marriage
between a man and the consanguines of his (deceased or divorced) wife
whom she would not have been permitted to marry had she been a man (and
vice versa).307 On the other hand, where a person has sexual intercourse with
a collateral relative by affinity before their marriage to their spouse is
terminated by death or divorce, strictly speaking such intercourse amounts to
incest.308 However, it may be argued that such conduct should merely be
303 De Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg 281. See also S v Shasha 1996 2 SACR 73 (Tk) 78, where it is
stated that the affinity incest prohibition is "founded on the fiction that upon marriage a man and wife
become one flesh."
304 Section 2(1) provides that: "A marriage which is a valid marriage at customary law and existing at
the commencement of this Act is for all purposes recognised as a marriage." Section 2(2) reads as
follows: "A customary marriage entered into after the commencement of this Act, which complies
with the requirements of this Act, is for all purposes recognised as a marriage."
305 See Nel 2002 Stell LR 331 for more details on this argument. See also in this regard R v Tshipa
19582 SA 384 (SR).
306 For example, a man and his (former) daughter-in-law or mother-in-law, or a man and his (former)
step-daughter or step-mother.
307 By s 28 of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, quoted at n 357 infra. Examples of such relatives are "his
deceased wife's sister or any female related to him through his deceased [or divorced] wife in a more
remote degree of affinity than her sister, other than an ancestor or descendant of the deceased [or
divorced] wife." - Snyman Criminal Law 357. See also §§ 4 33 and 4 3 4 1 infra.
308 See cases quoted in n 359 infra.
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regarded as (non-criminal) adultery rather than incest.30g Such view is
supported by Snyrnan'"? and Milton.311 It is submitted, then, that the incest
prohibition relating to affines only applies to those in the ascending and
descending line, and not to collaterals.ê"
4 2 2 3 Adoptive relationship
Section 20(4) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 prohibits adoptive parents
from marrying their adopted children. The implication of this provision is that
sexual relations between such parties constitute incest.313 There is, however,
no prohibition on marriage (or sexual intercourse) between adopted children
and the relatives of their adoptive parenttsj.?"
4 2 3 Unlawfulness
Sexual intercourse within the forbidden degrees must be unlawful - ie,
no ground of justification must be present. An example of a defence
excluding unlawfulness applicable in the case of incest would be duress (a
form of necessity). Consent is, however, not a defence to a charge of incest-
on the contrary, consent indicates that the sexual intercourse will indeed be
punishable as incest, as opposed to rape, which would be committed if the
woman315 had not consenteo.!"
309 See R v Delport 1901 18 SC 355 where it was said at 361 that
"[t]he existence of the marriage tie [where intercourse between a man and his wife's sister takes place
before his wife's death] made the intercourse adultery, but that is very different from saying that the
fact that the wife of the accused was alive, not dead, made it incest." See also R v V 1959 3 SA 621
(T), where it was held that intercourse between a man and his wife's brother's wife was not incest.
310 Criminal Law 358. He notes that where such conduct is punished as a crime, the punishment is in
any event so light as to indicate that the "moral reprehensibility" of such conduct is slight, referring to
R v Paterson 1907 TS 619, where the "sentence" was imprisonment until the rising of the court.
311 SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 243.
312 See also LA WSA VI § 224 n 19.
313 S v M 1968 2 SA 617 (T) 621.
314 For example, intercourse between an adopted daughter and the biological son of her adoptive
parents is not incest. See §§ 4 3 1 and 4 3 4 1 infra for more on the historical development of the
incest prohibition between adoptive parents and adopted children.
315 See also § 4 3 4 2 for more on the SA Law Commission proposals suggesting that the crimes of
incest and rape be made gender neutral - the implication would be, eg, that if two men related within
the forbidden degrees engaged in sexual penetration, the conduct would be punishable as incest if
both consented, and as rape if the penetration was non-consensual.
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· Although the following point has seldom been raised, it is submitted that
sexual intercourse between an adult and a child below sixteen and related to
the adult within the forbidden degrees, should never be prosecuted as incest.
Our law recognises that consent to sexual intercourse obtained from a girl
under twelve is in any event invalid,317while if consent to sexual intercourse is
obtained from a girl between the ages of twelve and sixteen, the male partner
can still be held criminally liable.318 The male partner to "consensual"
incestuous sexual intercourse with a girl under twelve should be charged with
rape.?" or where the girl is between the ages of twelve and sixteen, a charge
of statutory rape should be preferred.32o
I propose that it would be both appropriate and in the interests of justice
for an incestuous male partner to be charged with rape whenever there is any
doubt as to whether the sexual intercourse was truly consensual, whether due
to the age of the female party or any other factor. Characterising such sexual
conduct as rape rather than incest would more accurately reflect the true
nature and seriousness of the offence.321 Incest is a competent verdict on a
charge of rape.322 Thus if lack of consent cannot be proven beyond
316 See also Snyman Criminal Law 358; Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes
239; LAWSA VI § 223.
317 R vM 1950 4 SA 101 (T) 102; R v Z 19601 SA 739 (A) 742; Sv A 19902 SACR 266 (ZS) 267e-f.
318 S 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957; Snyman Criminal Law 363; Labuschagne
"Ouderdomsgrense en die Bestraffing van Pedofilie" 1990 SACJ 1015-16.
319 Where the girl is below the age of 12. This is in accordance with the common law rule that girls
under 12 are not capable in law of consenting to sexual intercourse, a rule that is also recognised in s
3(5)(f) of the SA Law Commission's proposed Sexual Offences Bill, which reads: "The
circumstances in which a person is incapable of appreciating the nature of an act which causes
penetration [and where the penetration is therefore rape] ... include circumstances where such person
is, at the time of the commission of such act - ... below the age of 12 years."
320 In terms of s 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, which prohibits "unlawful carnal
intercourse" with children between 12 and 16 years old. Defences include mistake as to age and the
accused being under 21. S 14 is similar to the new offence proposed in slO of the Sexual Offences
Bill, namely "[a]cts which cause penetration or indecent acts with certain children with their
consent". SlO provides for the criminalisation of consensual sexual penetration or indecent acts with
children under 16 where the accused is 16 years and above and at least 3 years older than the child
victim. See also Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 759-760.
321 See, for instance, S v Abrahams 2002 1 SACR 116 (SCA), where the court increased the accused's
sentence for raping his 14-year-old daughter from 7 to 12 years, stating at § 17:
"Of all the grievous violations of the family bond the case manifests, this is the most complex, since a
parent, including a father, is indeed in a position of authority and command over a daughter. But it is
a position to be exercised with reverence, in a daughter's best interests, and for her flowering as a
human being. For a father to abuse that position to obtain forced sexual access to his daughter's body
constitutes a deflowering in the most grievous and brutal sense."
l22 See s 261(1)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which states: "If the evidence on a charge
of rape or attempted rape does not prove the offence of rape or, as the case may be, attempted rape,
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reasonable doubt, but sexual intercourse within the prohibited degrees is
proven, an incest conviction would still be possible.
Although a person charged with rape may be convicted of incest, the
opposite does not apply, since a court would not consider finding a person
guilty of a more serious offence than that with which they have been charged.
This means that if incest is the only charge against an accused, it is not open
to a court to find such person guilty of rape instead, even if the facts support
such a finding. The state should always include a charge of rape as well as
incest in appropriate instances. Less than competent drawing up of the
charge sheet may explain the anomalous case law supporting the view that
the male partner to an incestuous sexual relationship with a girl under sixteen
can be convicted of incest instead of rape.323
It is apparent, then, that it would be preferable to reserve the incest
charge for cases where both parties related within the prohibited degrees are
sixteen years of age and above. Even in instances where the family members
in question are capable in law of giving valid consent, it must be ascertained
whether both did in fact consent. It may be that much of the conduct presently
punished as incest should rather be included within the ambit of the crime of
rape instead - branded as non-consensual sexual intercourse, rather than as
intercourse within the forbidden degrees. This argument is of even more force
in the context of the South African Law Commission's redefinition of rape.324
but- ... the offence of incest ... the accused may be found guilty of the offence so proved." See also
SvB 1996 2 SACR 543 (C).
323 See for instance S v M 19992 SACR 548 (SCA), where it was assumed that a man could be found
guilty of incest, rather than rape, where he had sexual intercourse with his daughter over a period of 4
years when she was aged 14 to 17 years old. Although the accused's conviction was overturned for
lack of evidence, the Court clearly does not view it as incongruous in the slightest to convict a person
of incest where de iure, if not de facto, consent is in all likelihood lacking. Melunsky AJA states at
§ 3: "As I understand the complainant's evidence, she was shocked and upset by the appellant's
sexual demands. Although she did not resist, she was never a completely willing participant"
[emphasis added]. See also Sv D 1972 3 SA 202 (0) (sexual intercourse between a man and his 14-
year-old daughter) for another instance of dubious consent to incestuous conduct.
324 See § 4 3 4 2 2 infra for more on the impact of the new definition of rape. For instance, in S v S
1995 1 SACR 267 (A), the court found (at 273) that there was, if not a total absence of consent, at the
very least both "abuse of power" and "betrayal of trust" by a father who was found guilty of
committing incest with his 17-year-old daughter. Acquittal on a charge of rape would not have been
so easy had the proposed Sexual Offences Bill been in force.
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424/ntent
Intention is an element of the crime of common law incest. Not only
must both parties intend to have sexual intercourse, but they must also be
aware of the fact that they are related within the forbidden degrees of blood,
marriage or adoptive relationship.325 Ignorance or mistake about the
relationship giving rise to the prohibition, even if unreasonable, excludes
criminal liability.326
4 3 Originl history of South African incest prohibition
The South African common law crime of incest is of Roman-Dutch origin,
uninfluenced by English law.
4 3 1Roman law
It appears that sexual relations or intermarriage between close relatives
were disapprpved of from earliest times.327 A distinction was made between
incest punished as a crime and incest in the context of religion.328 Early
statutory provisions such as the lex lulia de Adulteris (18 BC) were merely
aimed at preventing marriage between blood relations. Roman law
distinguished between incestus iuris gentium,329 prohibited on the grounds
that such conduct was in conflict with feelings of morality, and incestus iuris
civilis,330 which was merely forbidden by the ius civilium.331 As in modern
South African law, incestus consisted of sexual intercourse between persons
who were not permitted to marry due to their close degree of relationship.
Marriages between ascendants and descendants, irrespective of whether they
325 R v Pieterse 1923 ELD 232.
326 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 244; Snyman Criminal Law 358;
LAWSA VI § 223.
327 Even the ancient Greeks viewed incest as undesirable. Euripides (480-406 BC) viewed the lack of a
law prohibiting incest as a feature of barbarian societies. This view was echoed by Lacantius (+-250-
317 AD), who denounced incestuous sexual practices as being characteristic of pagan societies.
(Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (1987) 14; 63).
328 See discussion at § 4 3 2 infra.
329 This form of incest included sexual intercourse between parents and children, step-parents and step-
children, parents-in-law and children-in-law and brothers and sisters.
330 Sexual intercourse between adoptive parent and adopted child was punished as incestus iuris civilis.
331 See Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 435435-437 and the authorities quoted there.
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were blood relations (cognatio) or related by adoption (agnatio) were
prohibited. Collaterales who were related within four degrees of one another
where each was removed from a common ancestor by two degrees or less,
were not allowed to marry.332 These rules applied to blood relations, those
related by adoption and relations by marriage (adfinitas).
As regards other elements of the crime, intent was required, which
included knowledge that the other party was related within the forbidden
degrees.333 Only persons over the age of puberty (which was twelve years for
girls and fourteen years for boys) could be convicted of incest.334
Incest was a serious crime. Initially, it was punished by death. Both
parties could be charged, and if the incest concerned was punishable by the
ius gentium, the woman was punished as severely as the man. Punishment
was less harsh where incest was committed within an unlawful marriage,
since the crime of extra-marital sexual intercourse (adulterium or stuprum)
was not also committed. In addition, incest had prejudicial private law
consequences, both for the parties to incest and children born as a result of
incest. 335
4 3 21nfluence of the Church: Medieval Europe
As mentioned above in § 4 3 1, it is necessary to distinguish between
incest punished as a crime and incest committed in contravention of the law of
the Church, canon law. The Old Testamenr'" forbade certain
consanguineous sexual relations, as well as some forms of sexual intercourse
between affines. When developing its concept of marriage, the Christian
Church used these prohibitions as a starting point, but also extended the
332 Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 436.
333 See also Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 237 and the Roman-Dutch
authorities quoted there.
334 Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 437.
335 See Labuschagne supra for more details.
336 Leviticus 18: 6-18. The following incestuous unions were prohibited: those of son and mother; ofa
man with the wife of his father (Lev. 28:8; Deut. 27:20); with the mother of his wife (Deut. 27:23);
with his granddaughter or his wife's daughter or granddaughter (Lev. 28: 10, 17); with his sister or
half-sister (Lev. 28:9; Deut. 17:22, but see Gen. 20:12); of a nephew with his aunt (Lev. 18:12-14;
Exod. 6:20); and of a man with his daughter-in-law or his sister-in-law (Lev. 18:15-16; 20:21).
Penalties for incest were death (Lev. 20: 11-17), excommunication (Lev. 18:29) and being cursed
(Deut. 27:20; 22-23), eg by being childless.
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category of relationships prohibited as incest constderably.?" The incest
prohibition enforced by the Roman emperors from the fourth century AD and
thereafter was partly a reaction against the attachment to pagan customs, as
there was a perception that pagans were more inclined to forms of sexual
perversion and licentiousness such as incest.338 Brundage also speculatesê"
that laws against incest were designed to benefit the Church financially. The
incest prohibition made it less probable that wealthy persons would use
intrafamilial marriage alliances to keep control of familial estates within the
kinship group, thus increasing the likelihood that the Church would inherit
property from them.
By the eighth century AD, the Responsa Gregorii written by Pope
Gregory the Great defined new criteria for consanguinity and affinity,
prohibiting marriage between blood kin within seven degrees of
relationshlp."? In addition, since Christian marriage was viewed as a
"oneness" of the spouses, this led to the idea that blood relatives of the
respective spouses were considered to be related to each other by
consanguinity and were thus subject to the prohibition against marrying.341
The ban extended to marriage between godparents and godchildren, as well
as between godparents and all adult members of the godchild's family and
between godparents of the same child.342 Interestingly, even unwitting incest,
where the parties were unaware that they were related within the forbidden
degrees, was forbidden.343 Once the parties were married, however, the
clerically imposed doctrine of dissolubility of marriage meant that divorce on
grounds of consanguinity or affinity was rarely authorised by the Church.
By the eleventh century, the ecclesiastical emphasis on exogamous
marriage (and correspondingly the view that marriage between related groups
337 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 238.
338 Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 88. This idea was echoed in the 14th and is" centuries,
when there was a widespread belief that loose sexual habits, including incest, were habits peculiar to
heretics, who did not consider incest a sin, but natural enjoyment of the pleasures of paradise"
(Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 493).
339 Law, Sex and Christian Society 88.
340 Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 141. It was only in 1215 after the Fourth Lateran Council
that the forbidden degrees were reduced to four (Brundage supra 356).
341 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 238.
342 Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 140.
343 Decided by the Council of Verberie (750-756) - see Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 140.
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of families should be eliminated) became even more pronounced.!" Church
reformers felt strongly that it was necessary to take vigorous steps towards
preventing endogamous unions and nullifying marriages between close
relatives. The contravention of divine law resulting from consanguineous
unions was punished by ecclesiastical penalties such as excommunication,
infamia and penances.?" However, Brundage is of the view that worldly
interests also played a role in prohibiting such marriages. Marriage
prohibitions restricted the capacity of families to create extensive webs of
interrelations through marriage. Thus bequests of land to the Church were
safeguarded against the legal elaims of numerous relatives to residual
interests in the donor's estate. The ecclesiastical ban on intermarriage
between members of the same clan was aimed at breaking up the
concentrations of landholdings that supported the economic and political
power of the feudal nobility. By demanding that families marry outside their
own elan, the Church attempted to free itself from the power of the grand
noble clans, and thus to increase its own authority.346
By the late twelfth century, the Church courts had secured jurisdiction
over marriage and related matters both in England and on the Continent.
Secular judges were considered to lack competence to determine issues such
as who had committed incest by marrying within the forbidden degrees, and
what an appropriate punishment would be.347 It would be 1908 before the
criminal courts obtained jurisdiction over those committing incest in
England.348
344 This position was reinforced by Gratian's Decretum in +-1140 AD (Brundage Law, Sex and
Christian Society 183 and 238).
345 Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 192.
346 This was probably why canonistic prohibitions on marriage were extended to include not only
unions between those closely related by blood, marriage or adoptive relationship, but also
relationships between godparent and godchild or between godparents - the godparent bond was a
"significant social linkage" (Brundage supra 194).
347 Brundage Law, Sex and Christian Society 319.
348 See discussion of English law position § 4 4 2 infra.
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4 3 3Roman-Dutch law
Incest remained an ecclesiastical offence in Holland until the Political
Ordinance 1 of April 1580 came into operation. This Ordinance and the
Elucidatie of 21 May 1664 form the basis of the common law crime of incest
recognised today349- the prohibited degrees corresponded to a large extent
with what is presently criminalised as incest. Incest was defined as sexual
intercourse between two persons who were prohibited from intermarrying due
to consanguinity or affinity.35o Intermarriage between blood relatives in the
direct line was prohibited ad infinitum, while marriage between collateral
consanguines related to a common ancestor within the first degree of descent
was forbidden.351 Relations by affinity were not allowed to marry the relatives
that their spouse would have been prohibited from marrying, had such spouse
been of the opposite sex.352
It appears that sexual intercourse was an element of the crime, although
some writers viewed mere marriage as sufficient.353 It is uncertain whether
knowledge of the prohibited relationship was a requirement - some aver that
a person who lacked such knowledge due to iustus error would not be held
liable.354 The punishment for committing incest varied according to the
degree and nature of the relationship, and ranged from death to corporal
punishment and banishment.355
349 See LA WSA XVI § 25 and the authorities quoted there in n 2-4.
350 Note that unlike under Roman law, adoptive relationship did not seem to be a ground for marriage
prohibition or the commission of incest - Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law
Crimes 238 n 44.
351 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 238-239. Also see in this regard
Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 437-439.
352 S 9 of the Political Ordinance of 1580 prohibited marriage between a man and his stepdaughter or
her descendants or a woman and her stepson or his descendants, conduct that is not prohibited as
incest today (Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 439). The only other notable amendment of this original
position is as regards relations by affinity in the collateral line, where the position is regulated at
present by s 28 of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. In addition, the Roman law position regarding a
prohibition on sexual relations between adopted parents and adopted children has been revived by s
20(4) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. See also § 422 supra and § 4 3 4 infra.
353 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 238, especially the authorities quoted
in n 45 and n 46.
354 See Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 439, especially the authorities referred to in n 42 of that article, as
well as Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 238.
355 Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 438.
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4 3 4 South African law: modifications
4341 Changes from original Roman-Dutch law position
The South African law definition of incest received from Roman-Dutch
Law, the source of which was the Political Ordinance 1 of April 1580, has
been modified only slightly over the years. The categories of persons for
whom it is incest to have sexual intercourse with each other have been both
added to and diminished.
While the prohibited degrees of consanguinity have remained the
same,356 the prohibition on sexual intercourse between affines has been
slightly narrowed by the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. Although sexual intercourse
between relations by marriage in the direct line ad infinitum is still prohibited,
section 28 of the Marriage Act357 stipulates that a widower may marry the
sister of his deceased wife and vice versa, which was not the position in terms
of common law.358 There is still uncertainty as to whether intercourse
between a person and a person of the opposite sex related to them by
collateral affinity during the subsistence of the marriage creating the affinity,
amounts to incest. The weight of judicial authority seems to support the view
356 See § 4 2 2 1 supra.
357 S 28 provides as follows:
"Marriage between person and relatives of his or her deceased or divorced spouse
Any legal provision to the contrary notwithstanding it shall be lawful for -
(a) any widower to marry the sister of his deceased wife or any female related to him through his
deceased wife in any more remote degree of affinity than the sister of his deceased wife, other
than an ancestor or descendant of such deceased wife;
(b) any widow to marry the brother of her deceased husband or any male related to her through
her deceased husband in any more remote degree of affinity than the brother of her deceased
husband, other than an ancestor or descendant of such deceased husband;
(c) any man to marry the sister of a person from whom he has been divorced or any female related
to him through the said person in any more remote degree of affinity than the sister of such
person, other than an ancestor or descendant of such person; and
(d) any woman to marry the brother of a person from whom she has been divorced or any male
related to her through the said person in any more remote degree of affinity than the brother of
such person, other than an ancestor or descendant of such person."
358 See discussion § 4 3 3 supra.
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that it is,359but it is submitted that, at most, such conduct should amount to
adultery, which is not a crime.36o
An example of an extension of the crime of incest is the prohibition on
marriage (and sexual intercourse) between adoptive parents and their
adopted children. The first modification was in terms of section 79(a) the
Children's Act 31 of 1937, which provided that an adoptive parent was not
allowed to marry their adopted child, if such child was under the age of 21
years. Section 82 of the Children's Act 33 of 1960 substituted an absolute
prohibition for the qualified one in the 1937 Act, as well as expressly indicating
that sexual intercourse between adoptive parent and adopted child is a crime.
This provision was re-enacted as section 20(4) of the Child Care Act 74 of
1983.361
4342 Proposed amendments to the crime: SA Law Commission
recommendations
4 3 4 2 1 Evaluation of SA Law Commission proposals concerning
incest
For a number of years the South African Law Commission has been
engaged in the process of investigating the present sexual offences with a
view to codification. This process involved a number of discussion papers362
and culminated in a Sexual Offences Report, which was published in
December 2002. This latest Sexual Offences Report contains the most recent
proposed legal developments relating to sexual offences, including incest.
359 R v Hattingh 1899 ECD 141; R v Van Wyk 1931 TPD 41; R Chavendera 1939 SR 218; R v Bates
and Botha 1945 NPD 43; R v Mulder 1954 I SA 228 (E); S v Shasha 19962 SACR 73 (Tk). Contra
R v Abraham Mentoor 1897 Il EDC 125; R v Delport 1901 18 SC 355.
360 See also Snyman Criminal Law 357-358; Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law
Crimes 242-243.
361 S 20(4) reads: "An order of adoption shall not have the effect of permitting or prohibiting any
marriage or carnal intercourse (other than a marriage or carnal intercourse between the adoptive
parent and the adopted child) which, but for the adoption, would have been prohibited or permitted."
See also Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 243.
362 Sexual Offences: The Substantive Law Project 107 Discussion Paper 85 published 1999-08-12;
Sexual Offences: The Substantive Law Project 107 Discussion Paper 102, published in December
2001, closing date for comment 2002-02-28.
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From the outset, it was clear that the South African Law Commission
envisaged no material changes to the crime of incest. The latest proposal
recommends that incest should remain a common law crime. The only
suggested amendment to the common law crime is that the present
requirement of sexual intercourse should be replaced by a wider range of
penetrative sexual conduct.363 The main thrust of this change is that incest
would become a gender neutral crime.
The reluctance of the South African Law Commission to engage in a
complete overhaul of the crime of incest is to be regretted. Making the crime
gender neutral merely addresses some of the criticisms levelled against the
crime.364 The proposed amendments fall woefully short of isolating
incestuous conduct deserving of criminalisation, since harmful and non-
harmful conduct alike is punished.
First, only penetrative sexual acts are punishable as incest per se, not
other forms of sexual molestation that may be non-penetrative in nature.365
Non-consensual, non-penetrative sexual acts with a family member may be
just as harmful and traumatic to the victim as penetrative ones.366
363 S 14 of the proposed Sexual Offences Bill provides for the "[e]xtension of common law incest",
stating that "[fjrorn the date of the promulgation of this Act an act which causes penetration as
contemplated in sections 3, 4, and 50fthis Act applies to the common law offence of incest."
S 3 of the Bill ["Act"] prohibits as rape the conduct of "[a]ny person who unlawfully and
intentionally causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by the genital organs of that person into or
beyond the anus or genital organs of another person" or who "causes penetration to any extent
whatsoever by the genital organs of another person into or beyond the anus or genital organs of the
person committing the act".
S 4 defines a new crime, sexual violation, stating: "Any person who unlawfully and intentionally
commits any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by any object, including any part
of the body of an animal, or part of the body of that person, other than the genital organs, into or
beyond the anus or genital organs of another person, is guilty of the offence of sexual violation."
S 5 defines a crime called oral genital sexual violation, criminalising the conduct of "[a]ny person
who unlawfully and intentionally commits any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever
by the genital organs of that person, or the genital organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of
another person".
364 Such as the criticism that the common law crime punishes neither homosexual incestuous conduct
nor sexual penetration other than vaginal intercourse. See for instance Snyman Criminal Law 356 at
n 4. It must, however, be kept in mind that same-sex penetrative incestuous conduct as well as all
non-penetrative incestuous conduct is still punishable in terms of the common law as indecent
assault, where it is non-consensual.
365 Non-penetrative non-consensual incest is still punishable as indecent assault - see n 364 supra.
366 See, for instance, Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 1982 7-20 for an account of a woman who was
sexually abused by her father over a long period of time. The fact that the abuse was never
penetrative did not diminish the victim's distress.
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Second, if the Law Commission's ostensible aim in retaining incest as a
separate crime was to protect children from sexual harm in the family context,
why not merely criminalise such conduct, while leaving other incestuous
conduct unpunished? It seems odd that, while recognising "that what adults
and adult family members do in the privacy of their bedrooms is their business
and their business only" and that the criminal law has no role to play in such
clrcumstances.ê" the Law Commission still supports the retention of the
present overbroad (but simultaneously under-Incluslver''" incest prohibition
that punishes incestuous conduct irrespective of the age of the participants.
Third, even if the common law crime of incest is amended as proposed,
it still dismally fails to serve its purported purpose of preventing family
members from abusing children sexually. There are already other crimes
proposed in the Bill that criminalise such sexual abuse of children more than
adequately. It has been mentioned in §4 2 3 that incestuous sexual relations
with children under twelve amount to the more serious crime of rape, rather
than incest, in any event. In addition, consensual sexual offences with
children under sixteen are criminalised separately in the Sexual Offences Bill,
where the overlap between such offence and incest is explicitly recognised.36g
Last, where intra-familial sexual relations are not consensual, it will be
shown that the new definition of rape proposed by the Law Commission in the
Sexual Offences Bill overlaps with incest to so great an extent that incest's
reason for existence as a separate crime must be seriously in doubt. It will
become even more apparent in chapter five below that the only conduct that is
punished by the crime incest alone, is precisely that which the Law
367 Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 85 § 3 6 1 2 5.
368 See the criticism that non-penetrative acts are not included supra as well as § 5 3 2 4, where it is
argued that the incest prohibition is also under-inclusive in that only sexual relations between blood,
marriage and adoptive relations are prohibited, instead of criminal ising sexual relations between all
members of the same household unit.
369 See s 10 of the Bill. In s 10(1) provision is made for the crime of sexual penetration with a
consenting child between the ages of 12 and 16. In terms of s 10(2), an accused can rely on the
defence that the child deceived them into thinking that such child was over 16, or that the accused
reasonably believed that this was the case. However, according to s 10(3), where "the accused is
related to such child within the prohibited incest degrees of blood or affinity", the s 10(2) defences do
not apply. Thus it is clear that those who commit incestuous sexual penetration with children under
16 may be charged in terms of sID, and the additional protection of the incest prohibition is
superfluous in these cases.
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Commission said it would decline to interfere with - consensual sex between
adult family members!
4 3 4 2 2 Incest v rape
One of the most positive aspects of the South African Law Commission's
recommendations is, it appears, an inadvertent one. As explained above, the
Law Commission intended to increase the types of conduct criminalised as
incest by employing a broad definition of sexual penetration. However, it will
be shown that, while not dispensing with the requirement that the prosecution
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the Sexual Offences Bill has
actually made it considerably easier for the state to secure rape convictions in
situations where the state would presently be hard pressed to prove lack of
consent and thus ensure a conviction of common law rape. Since a guilty
finding on a charge of rape is facilitated by the Bill, persons formerly convicted
of incest due to the state's inability to prove lack of consent beyond
reasonable doubt, may now be convicted of rape instead. In situations of
sexual conduct between relatives related within the forbidden degrees, a
conviction on the more serious charge, rape, would be preferred to the lesser
charge of incest. 370 It will become apparent, then, that in practice this
development would lead to a simultaneous limitation of the exclusive scope of
application of the incest prohibition.
As has already been argued, it would in any event be preferable to
punish sexual intercourse (or gender neutral sexual penetration) between an
adult and a child under the age of sixteen not as incest, but as rape, statutory
rape or penetration of a child with their consent, as the case may be.
However, the uncertainty about "consensual" incestuous sexual relations
between an adult and a child of sixteen years and older has not adequately
been addressed. According to common law, both parties would be guilty of
incest. This would be the case even if there was uncertainty as to the validity
370 See, also, § 4 2 3 for more on the submission that it is preferable for a person committing incestuous
rape to be found guilty of rape rather than incest.
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of the more vulnerable family member's consent, but where absence of
consent could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.371
The Law Commission's proposals regarding rape have effectively ended
such debate. A statutory presumption of unlawfulness where sexual conduct
takes place in certain situations means that sexual intercourse between
parents and children, that was formerly unquestioningly punished as incest by
the courts regardless of the age of the child or whether it was consensual or
not,372may in terms of the Bill much more readily be found to be unlawful and
punished as rape.
Rape is defined in section 3(1)373as intentional and unlawful sexual
penetration. Section 3(2) outlines circumstances where sexual penetration
would be presumed to be unlawful ("prima facie unlawful"). Included is sexual
penetration that takes place "in any coercive circumstance". Section 3(3)(c) of
the Sexual Offences Bill defines "coercive circumstances" as incorporating
"any circumstances where ... there is an abuse of power or authority to the
extent that the person in respect of whom the act which causes penetration is
committed is inhibited from indicating his or her resistance to such an act, or his
or her unwillingness to participate in such an act".374
It appears that section 3(3)(c) contains an implicit legislative indication
that, where it has been established that power was used in a sexual
relationship to obtain consent to sexual penetration, a court should presume
that intentional sexual relations under such circumstances are unlawful,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.?" If the accused remains passive,
371 See, eg, S v S 1995 1 SACR 267 (A) also discussed at n 324 supra and n 385 infra.
372 See eg S vM 1999 2 SACR 548 (SCA); S v S 1995 1 SACR 267 (A) and S v D 1972 3 SA 202 (0)
for instances of dubious or non-existent consent to incestuous conduct.
373 S 3(1) of the Bill reads: "Any person who intentionally and unlawfully commits an act of sexual
penetration as defined in section 1with another person, or who intentionally and unlawfully compels,
induces or causes another person to commit such an act, is guilty of the offence ofrape."
374 According to s 6 of the Bill, the circumstances of prima facie unlawfulness outlined in s 3 also apply
to s 4 and s 5 of the Bill (the crimes sexual violation and oral genital sexual violation - see n 363 for
the complete text of s 4 and s 5).
375 In S v Steenberg 19793 SA 513 (B) 517-518 the court held that accused persons have an evidentiary
burden ("weerleggingslas") in situations where the state has presented evidence that would
necessarily lead to such persons being found guilty in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. In
such circumstances, accused persons merely have to adduce evidence that is reasonably possibly true
and that raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt for the court to be obliged to acquit them. In the
present context, there would be an evidentiary burden on the accused to raise reasonable doubt as to
the unlawfulness of their conduct where sexual penetration had taken place in the circumstances
outlined in s 3(2) of the Bill. See also Van der Merwe "Re-defining Rape: Does the Law
Commission Really Wish to Introduce a Reverse Onus?" 2001 SA Journal of Criminal Justice 60-70,
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doing nothing to raise reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of the sexual
penetration, the prima facie proof may become proof beyond reasonable
doubt. However, it should be kept in mind that the court must still be satisfied
that the prosecution has proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt, since the
burden of proof remains with the prosecution.!"
Thus to avoid running the risk of being convicted, the accused person
who has committed a sexual act in coercive circumstances cannot merely
remain silent.377 Such party has an evidentiary burden to adduce evidence or
establish through cross-examination that it is reasonably possibly true that the
sexual penetration was lawful, notwithstanding the fact that the parties were in
an unequal power relationship that might have inhibited the more vulnerable
partner from indicating resistance. For instance a person accused of
incestuous rape may bring evidence or establish through cross-examination
that it is reasonably possibly true that the sexual act was consensual, or that it
took place in a situation of necessity,"! and so discharge the evidentiary
burden.
The conclusion that the accused is compelled by the evidentiary burden
to raise reasonable doubt as to unlawfulness once the presumption of
unlawfulness has been activated by sexual penetration taking place in
coercive circumstances, is in no way undermined by section 3(9) of the Bill.
Section 3(9) reads:
"Nothing in [section 3] may be construed as precluding any person charged with
the offence of rape from raising any defence at common law to such charge, nor
does it adjust the standard of proof required for adducing evidence in rebuttal."
This section makes it clear that the state is still required to disprove
beyond reasonable doubt any defence raised by the accused.
an article commenting on the Law Commission's first draft of the Sexual Offences Bill and
suggesting that an evidentiary onus on the accused, as opposed to an onus of proof, must be what is
intended by this provision.
376 For more on the distinction between a burden of proof and an evidentiary burden, see Schwikkard
Presumption of Innocence (1999) 19.
377 In S vManamela and Another (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC); 2000 5
BCLR 491 (CC), the majority held (at §§ 23; 37; 38 and 49) that on the facts, an evidentiary burden's
infringement of the constitutional right to remain silent may indeed be a reasonable and justifiable
one. It is submitted that the same reasoning applies in the context of s 3(2) of the Bill.
378 For instance, where the accused was forced by a third party to engage in the sexual conduct on pain
of death.
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It is submitted that the operation of the presumption of unlawfulness in
section 3(2) means that it is possible to effectively exclude from the exclusive
definition of incest, a large number of the categories of sexual penetration
occurring between family members in an unequal power relatlonship."? For
instance, if a seventeen-year-old daughter agreed to have sexual intercourse
with her father due to respect for his authority, such intercourse would fall
within the scope of coercive circumstances as defined in the Bill, and would
be prima facie unlawful.380 Since the conditions under which intercourse
between parent and child takes place are inherently exploitative.P" it should
be a relatively straightforward task for the state to show that the sexual
penetration was prima facie unlawful, thus making it necessary for the
accused to respond by raising reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of
sexual penetration to avoid the presumption of unlawfulness becoming proof
of unlawfulness beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that a father
accused of incestuous rape in coercive circumstances would be hard-pressed
to raise reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of his conduct by relying on
a defence such as consent.382 As is well established in our law, mere
submission is not consent.383 Especially in cases where the child is still
economically and emotionally dependent on a parent, such child would be
inclined to agree to sexual relations without overt intimidation being
necessary, but such agreement would not necessarily amount to de iure
379 It is suggested that in a large number of cases, sexual relations between parent and child would
amount to rape as defined above, rather than incest, regardless of the age of the child. Not only
sexual penetration between parents and children, but also, depending on the circumstances, other
intra-familial sexual relations - between (adult) siblings, uncle and niece, step-father and step-
daughter, for instance, especially when there is a considerable age difference - could well fall into
this category where sex is primafacie unlawful.
380 The recognition of the need to punish incestuous conduct only where abuse of power is an issue is
not a new one. Labuschagne (1985 THRHR 454-455; 1990 TSAR 425; "Strafbaarheid van Seksuele
Uitbuiting van 'n Gesagsverhouding" 1993 De Jure 443-446) has long advocated that, while incest
between affines and siblings should be decriminalised, older family members who exploit
descendants under their authority or control for sexual purposes should be guilty of a new crime,
namely sexual exploitation. The rationale for criminalisation, then, is not the fact that the parties are
related within the forbidden degrees, but rather the exploitive nature of the relationship.
381 See, eg, Labuschagne "Seksuele Misbruik van Kinders en die Vraagstuk van Verjaring van
Misdade" 1997 TRW 98 107 where it is stated that: "In gevalle van 'n groot ouderdomsverskil sal dit
egter selde gebeur dat misbruik en benadeling nie plaasvind nie." See also the authorities quoted in n
66 of the above article and Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 760.
382 See also Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 145 quoted at n 470 infra for more about why children
cannot truly consent to sexual acts initiated by their parents.
383 See, for instance, S v S 1971 2 SA 591, where the court held that a white policeman who used his
"oorheersende gesag" to obtain a black woman's submission to sexual intercourse, had indeed
committed rape.
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consent.384 If the father were unable to show that it was reasonably possibly
true that the daughter, as the more vulnerable party to the sexual act,
nevertheless gave real consent, or that the conduct was lawful for some other
reason, he would run the risk of being convicted of rape. As our law presently
stands, such a father could also be found guilty of rape, but without a statutory
presumption assisting the prosecution in establishing the prima facie
unlawfulness of the conduct, it would in many instances be considerably more
difficult for the state to prove unlawfulness beyond reasonable doubt, in
addition to the other elements of the crime.385 Thus by facilitating prima facie
proof of unlawfulness where sexual penetration occurs in coercive situations,
and consequently requiring the accused's active participation in rebutting the
presumption of unlawfulness, section 3(2) of the Bill effectively facilitates rape,
as opposed to incest, convictions in cases of sexual relations between family
members in an unequal power relationship.
The operation of the statutory presumption in section 3(2) has several
benefits. On the one hand, the likelihood of the "victim" of incest being
charged with the crime as an equal partner is considerably decreased. On the
other, the right of consenting adults to freely choose their sexual partners is
also not infringed to an unacceptable degree. This is because where the
intra-familial sexual relationship is truly consensual, it should be a fairly
straightforward task for the accused to indicate to the court that no rape has
taken place by raising reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of the sexual
penetration.
Temkin386 expresses the fear that "[m]any coercive and exploitative
incestuous acts will not fall within the narrow legal definition of rape" and that
it is therefore vital to retain incest as a separate crime. Should the Sexual
Offences Bill come into operation, it is submitted that this argument would be
less than convincing in a South African context.
384 See, further, the sources referred to in n 381 supra.
385 See for instance S v S 1995 1 SACR 267 (A), referred to in n 324 and n 371, for an instance where
an accused was acquitted of common law rape due to lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
intercourse was non-consensual and found guilty of incest instead, but where he would in all
likelihood have been able to be convicted of rape as defined in the Sexual Offences Bill.
3861991 Current Legal Problems 193.
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4 3 4 2 3 "Affinity" incest?
Another indication that South African law may be moving towards
making the crime of incest obsolete is to be found in the South African law
Commission's Report on the Review of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (Project
109), published in May 2001. Inter alia, it recommends the amendment of
section 28(1) of the Marriage Act to make specific provision for a list of the
forbidden degrees of blood and affinity relationship that would lead to a
marriage between such parties being void.387 However, where intermarriage
between affines is concerned, it is interesting to note that the marriage
prohibition is not an absolute one. According to the proposed amendment of
section 28(2) of the Marriage Act,
"[w]here both parties have reached the age of 18 years they may apply to the
Minister [of Home Affairs] for his or her consent to their marriage if they are not
within the degrees of consanguinity (relationships between blood relatives) but
are within the degrees of affinity (relationships created by marriage) prohibited
by section 28A(1).,,388
The proposed Marriage Amendment Bill contained in the same report
states the matter somewhat differently, although the crux is the same:
"A Provincial or Local Division of the High Court shall have jurisdiction to
consent to a marriage between a man or a woman and the direct descendant of
his or her deceased spouse if both parties have reached the age of 18 years
and they are not related to each other by blood.,,389
The above proposals indicate that it may in future be possible for a man
to obtain consent to marry a relation by marriage such as a stepdaughter or
daughter-in-law. Since, as has already been noted."? the category of
relationships where sexual relations are prohibited as incest is identical to the
conduct prohibited in terms of the private law rules regarding capacity to
marry, the implication of the implementation of the Law Commission's
387 The SA Law Commission recommends that s 28(1) be amended as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of section 28(2) and (3) a marriage between the following parties shall be
void-
(a) a man and - his grandmother; grandfather's wife; wife's grandmother; father's sister;
mother's sister; mother; stepmother; wife's mother; daughter; wife's daughter; son's wife;
sister; son's daughter; daughter's daughter; son's son's wife; daughter's son's wife; wife's
son's daughter; wife's daughter's daughter; brother's daughter; or sister's daughter"
(§ 2 21 30). This provision would also apply mutatis mutandis to a woman.
388 See SA Law Commission Report on the Review a/the Marriage Act § 221 30.
389 At 216.
390 At § 4 1supra.
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suggestions would probably be that "affinity" incest would cease to be a crime
for all purposes, even if the parties did not wish to marry.391
While this point is not explicitly mentioned in the Law Commission's
report, the only way of retaining "affinity" incest as a crime would be for the
law to distinguish between forbidden degrees for marriage purposes and
those applicable where the crime of incest is concerned. Although this would
be a departure from the present position in South Africa, the prohibited
degrees applicable for marriage and criminal purposes are by no means
necessarily co-extensive. There are many jurisdictions where they do not
overlap.392 However, where the incest prohibition does not coincide with the
marriage prohibition, the prohibited degrees applicable to the crime of incest
tend to be stricter, not more extensive, than those applicable to marriage. It is
submitted that it would be indefensible (not to mention nonsensical) to charge
affines who had not obtained the required consent to marry with incest, while
not prosecuting those who had such consent. If South Africa were to retain
"affinity" incest as a crime subsequent to the coming into operation of the
proposed Marriage Amendment Bill, our law on this point would be anomalous
and irrational.
391 See Nel 2002 Steil LR 331 for more on the decriminalisation of "affinity" incest.
392 Eg, although sexual intercourse between an uncle and niece, or an adoptive parent and an adopted
child, is not a crime in England, such parties may not marry each other. In Scotland, too, the
forbidden degrees for the purposes of criminal law and marriage law do not overlap completely. For
example, although certain affines may not marry, sexual intercourse between them is not prohibited
as incest. For more details see Norrie "Incest and the Forbidden Degrees of Marriage in Scots law"
1991 Journal of the Law Society ofScotland216 217.
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44 Comparative law perspective
4 4 1 Introduction
As has already been noted, the content of the incest prohibition is far
from static. What is regarded as incest is dynamic, differing not only from
culture to culture, but also within academic disciplines, and even within
various branches of the same discipline. As regards incest as crime, its
definition varies from legal system to legal system, as well as changing over
time.393 The aim of critically evaluating the legal position in other countries will
be to determine the underlying rationale of the incest prohibition in modern
society. As will be shown below, the types of conduct punished as incest are
extraordinarily disparate, even within a single country. Similarly, the
rationales for criminalisation range from the sensible prevention of harm to
children to the outmoded condemnation of immorality. By comparing the
South African crime of incest with its foreign counterparts, it will not only be
possible to establish whether the South African common law position is in line
with current trends, but also to propose an amendment of the common law
position that would avoid the pitfalls encountered in foreign jurisdictions.
Numerous examples of the way in which other countries criminalise
incest (or not) will be discussed below. The English law prohibition on incest
will be discussed in rather more detail than the other jurisdictions referred to.
This is because English law is a good illustration of the shift away from incest
as crime against morality to being a prohibition focusing on protecting children
against the harmful consequences of a broadly-defined category of intra-
familial sexual contact. Aspects of the English approach could well be
emulated in South Africa.
393 See Labuschagne "Die Insestaboe in 'n Regstaat: Regsantropologiese Kantaantekeninge" 1999
SA/rJ Ethno/60.
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4 4 2 English law
4421 History
Prior to 1908, all relatives in or within the third degree of consanguinity
or affinity were forbidden to marry, and sexual intercourse between them was
regarded as incest.394 From 1835, according to common law such marriages
were void ab initio, but the Church of England had jurisdiction to punish incest
until the Matrimonial Causes Act came into operation in 1857. This Act
provided that a woman could divorce her husband on the grounds of
"incestuous adultery", which was adultery within the prohibited degrees of
consanguinity and affinity. In 1907 marriage with a deceased's wife's sister
was legalised in terms of the Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister Act,
although intercourse with a living wife's sister was still included as a ground
based on which a woman might divorce her husband.
Incest was not a criminal offence in England until the inception of the
Punishment of Incest Act 1908, which criminalised sexual intercourse
between parents and children, siblings, and a man and his granddaughter.
The punishment was between three and seven years' penal servitude or a
maximum of two years' imprisonment with or without hard labour.395
The rationale for criminal ising incest, and in particular the limited number
of blood relatives included in this prohibition, is somewhat obscure.
Interestingly, it is doubtful whether the generally-accepted assumption that the
basis of punishing incest is eugenic396 played a role at all in the decision to
make incest a crime.397 Not only were the possible genetic effects of
inbreeding disputed, affording "no very convincing justification for imposing a
harsh new penalty", but incest as a possible cause of physical degeneration or
weak-mindedness was scarcely mentioned in the Parliamentary Debates on
394 Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 312.
395 Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 308.
396 Ie, concerned with the (harmful) genetic effects of inbreeding, deriving from the Greek meaning
''well-born'' - see Bratt 1984 Family LQ 267 n 58.
397 See Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 308; Bailey & Blackburn "The Punishment ofIncest Act 1908: A Case
Study of Law Creation" (1979) Crim LR 708 716. Contra Hogan Reshaping the Criminal Law 188-
189.
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the Punishment of Incest Bil1.398 In addition, if the primary reason for
criminalising incest was the possible harmful effects for the offspring of an
incestuous union, why were sexual relations between an uncle and niece, or
aunt and nephew, not included in the prohibition?
So what was the true raison d'être for resorting to the criminal sanction in
the case of incest? Bailey and Blackburn399 speculate that the principal
reason for subjecting incest to criminal punishment was a moral one, since the
National Vigilance Association, which led a campaign to "repress all criminal
vice and public immorality", was instrumental in securing the passing of the
Act. Thus, according to them, incest was criminalised in England as "a public
affirmation of the moral values associated with reactionary vigilance work on
behalf of social purity" - the symbolic significance of legal prohibition was
paramount, rather than its practical or instrumental effect.40o
According to Wolfram, there is no single convincing reason for punishing
incest, although various theories explaining its prohibition have been mooted
over the years. The biological justification that is often mentioned as being an
overwhelmingly convincing basis for punishing consanguineous incest, is an
ostensible reason. It is merely one of a "category of myths, which are not
uncommonly employed by societies ... to supply a rationale for problematic
customs.v'"
4422 Present prohibition
A very limited category of consanguineous forms of incest is presently
prohibited in England in terms of the Sexual Offences Act of 1956. Section 10
of this Act prohibits intentional sexual mtercourse?" between a man and his
granddaughter, daughter, sister or mother.403 Section 11 is very similar in that
it punishes incestuous conduct by a woman who intentionally consents to
398 Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 308,310; Bailey & Blackburn 1979 Crim LR 716.
3991983 CrimLR711-713.
400 Bailey & Blackburn 1979 Crim LR 717-718.
401 1983 Crim LR 316.
402 Vaginal sexual intercourse is required.
403 It is irrelevant whether the relationship is in the full or half blood, and whether it is traced through
lawful marriage.
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sexual intercourse with her grandfather, father, brother or son. Additionally,
section 54 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 criminalises inciting a girl under the
age of sixteen to have incestuous intercourse.
4 4 2 3 Future developments
Significantly, there is presently an attempt to increase the forms of
sexual abuse within the family context that are deemed punishable. It was
recently decided to criminalise family sexual abuse separately from other
forms of abuse due to the additional element of abuse of trust inherent in such
behaviour. The chief concern was thus to prevent harm to children, rather
than to condemn immoral or taboo conduct because of the incestuous nature
of the relafionship.t'" The Sexual Offences Bill [HL], introduced into the
House of Lords on 28 January 2003, creates a range of new familial sexual
offences with the child as victim.405 Although it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to discuss the Bill in detail, it is interesting to note that a wide range of
sexual activitl06 with a child407 family member is criminalised, and that the
interpretation of "family member" is particularly extensive. It includes not only
the blood relations referred to in the 1956 Act, but also uncles, aunts, step-
parents, adoptive parents and foster parents. In addition, a second category
of offenders includes those who live or have lived with the child in the same
household or where the offender has been "regularly involved in caring for,
training, supervising or being in sole charge of the child", as well as instances
404 See for more on the history of the Sexual Offences Bill, eh 5 of "Setting the Boundaries Volume I:
Reforming the law on sex offences", a July 2000 Home Office discussion document on this issue
available at
http://search2.openobiects.comlkbroker/hoffice/kbsearch ?qt=incestandsr=Oandha=6andnh= IOandcs=i
so-8859-1 andsc=hoandmt= landgo.x=6andgo.y=1 0 (2003-05-12)
405 S 28-32 of the Bill. The complete Bill is available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/palld200203/ldbills/026/2003026.htm (2003-05-12).
406 The punishable conduct referred to in the Bill is sexual touching. "Touching" includes touching
with any part of the body, with anything else, through anything, and in particular includes touching
amounting to penetration (s 81 of the Bill). Touching is "sexual" if, "from its nature, a reasonable
person would consider that it may (at least) be sexual, and a reasonable person would consider that it
is sexual because of its nature, its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it, or all or
some of those considerations" (s 80 of the Bill).
407 Under 18 years.
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where such person is also the past or present partner of the child's parent,
partner of the child's aunt or uncle, or cousin of the child.408
The Bill envisages substituting these crimes for the present statutory
crime of incest, since provision is made for the repeal of sections 10 and 11 of
the 1956 Sexual Offences Act. The new offence is not called incest, but
"sexual activity with a child family member".
Interestingly, sexual abuse in the family context is criminalised
separately from offences related to sexual abuse by those in a position of
trust, despite the rationale for punishing family members separately ostensibly
being because of the aggravating abuse of trust element present in intra-
familial casee.?" This apparently reflects the view of the framers of the Bill
that incestuous-type relationships should be distinguished from other forms of
sexual abuse of children where abuse of trust is at issue. The only possible
reason for such a distinction must be because abuse within the family is
regarded as inherently more worthy of condemnation.
On the one hand, then, there is a praiseworthy shift away from punishing
incest as taboo, immoral conduct, to focusing instead on criminalising only
those forms of incest that cause harm to others, especially where consent of
one of the participants is less than voluntary or lacking due to youth. To this
extent the British approach is to be supported. On the other hand, it is
submitted that there is no compelling reason to criminalise "incestuous"
conduct separately from other forms of sexual abuse or rape involving abuse
of trust. The distinction between incestuous and other child abuse can only
be explained in terms of a perspective that regards sexual relations between
close family members as intrinsically immoral. It is clearly objectionable to
use the criminal sanction to enforce such a view. All sexual abuse of children
should be treated on an equal footing, regardless of whether the abuse was
(technically speaking) incestuous. The circumstances of the particular case,
including such factors as whether there was abuse of trust or authority, should
be relevant in determining the blameworthiness of the conduct in each
instance, possibly by being taken into account in aggravation of sentence. It
408 See s 30 of the Bill.
409 In ss 18-27 of the Bill.
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is unnecessary to resort to referring to the formalistic classification of the
relationship between the parties to establish the seriousness of the offence."?
4 4 3 Other countries: criminalisation of incest
4431 Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Portugal, Turkey,
Japan, Argentina, Brazil
Incest is not criminalised as such in any of the above countries, whose
criminal law is based on the French Code Pénal.411
4432 Scotland
Scotland's incest prohibition is contained in the Criminal Law
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (C 39).412 In section 1, provision is made
for criminalisation of sexual intercourse between a fairly extensive category of
blood relatives413 and between adoptive parents and (former) adopted
children. Defences to a charge of incest include reasonable ignorance of the
degree of relationship, lack of consent and lawful marriage that is recognised
in Scotland although entered into in another jurisdiction. The maximum
punishment is anything from three months (in cases where proceedings are
brought on summary complaint before the sheriff) to life imprisonment, if the
accused is convicted on tndlctrnent.?" No other reason than moral
disapproval of the conduct in question can justify the prohibition, since the age
of the parties is irrelevant and consent is an element of the crime. In addition,
protection of the family must at most be a secondary consideration, since it is
410 See also the discussion of the Sexual Offences Bill proposed by the SA Law Commission at
§ 4 3 4 2 2 supra, where it is suggested that harmful sexual conduct could be punished as rape, etc,
while leaving non-harmful forms of sexual expression, including that between close relations,
uncriminalised. See also § 5 3 3 infra for more on the alternatives to he incest prohibition in its
present form.
411 Labuschagne 1999 SAfrJ Ethnol. 60, quoting Klopper Das Verhaltnis von Art J 73 StGB zu Art 6 Abs
J GG (1995) 13-15. See also Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 442.
412 http://www.worldlii.org/uk/legis/numactlcla1995342/s1.html(2003-05-14).
4l3Inciuding between a person and their mother, father, daughter, son, grandmother, grandfather, grand-
daughter, grandson, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great grandmother, great grandfather,
great grand-daughter and great grandson.
414 S 4 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act supra.
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not only sexual conduct between members of a nuclear family that is
prohlbited.?" That adoptive relationships are included within the prohibition is
indicative that eugenic concerns did not playa decisive role in the decision to
criminalise incest. Another motivation for the argument that the purpose of
criminalising incest in Scotland is chiefly to punish immorality, is that separate
provision is made for declaring intercourse between step-parents and (former)
step-children to be a crime.t" The rationale in this instance appears to be
prevention of sexual exploitation of step-children, since such conduct is only a
crime where the step-child is under 21, or where the accused and the step-
child had lived in the same household as parent and child before the step-
child was eighteen. It is also a crime for a person in a position of trust in
relation to a child under sixteen to have sexual intercourse with such chlld.""
The reason for criminalising this conduct would once again be to prevent
sexual abuse of authority.
Norrie"" is of the view that:
"[Scots] rules on incest and the forbidden degrees of marriage are unnecessary
and distasteful nonsenses, which do not stand up to rational analysis, which are
not needed to achieve the proper policies of the law, and which deal with
situations that, in the criminal law, are dealt with by other means and, in
matrimonial law, do not need to be dealt with at all."
4433 Germany
Section 173 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) concerns
sexual relations between relatives, and states the following:
"(1) Whoever completes an act of sexual intercourse with a consanguine
descendant shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three
years or a fine.
(2) Whoever completes an act of sexual intercourse with a consanguine
relative in an ascending line shall be punished with imprisonment for not
more than two years or a fine; this shall also apply if the relationship as a
relative has ceased to exist. Consanguine siblings who complete an act of
sexual intercourse with each other shall be similarly punished.
(3) Descendants and siblings shall not be punished pursuant to this provision
if they were not yet eighteen years of age at the time of the act."
415 See n 413 supra.
416 S 2 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act supra. The crime is not incest, but
intercourse with a step-child.
417 S 3 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act supra.
4181992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 216.
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The forms of incest prohibited are restricted to sexual intercourse
between consanguine ascendants and descendants, and siblings. The
ascendant is punished more severely than the descendant, and conduct
criminalised is limited to persons over the age of eighteen. The crime does
not appear to be a particularly serious one, since the maximum punishment is
a mere three years' imprisonment or a fine. Although incest is officially
classified as a "crime against personal status, marriage [or] the family",419 it
may be speculated that the rationale for the crime is primarily to punish
immorality, since intra-familial child abuse is punished separately and attracts
more severe penalties."?
It is claimed by Klopper421 that the prohibition on incest is contrary to
section 6(1) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), which provides that
"marriage and the family shall enjoy the equal protection of the state." This
right is not so much a right to equality as a right to autonomy. Section 6(1)
protects individuals from state intervention in the private family sphere, which,
it is argued, includes the right to choose a marriage and sexual partner
without interference by the state.
4434 Canada
Incest is criminalised in terms of Part V of the Canadian Criminal Code,
which concerns "sexual offences, public morals and disorderly conduct". The
relevant provision reads:
"Every one commits incest who, knowing that another person is by blood
relationship his or her parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent or grandchild,
as the case may be, has sexual intercourse with that person."422
419 See heading to eh 12 of the StGB. See also discussion at § 5 2 2 4 infra, where it is suggested that
characterising a crime as being necessary to protect the family unit or marriage as institution is veiled
legal moralism - alternative definitions of "family" are rejected and such "family" members
punished.
420 S 174 and s 176 of the StGB provide for punishments for sexual abuse of children ranging from a
maximum of 5 years (sexual acts with wards, including with natural or adopted children under 18) to
a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 10 years (serious sexual abuse of children under 14).
421 199555-57; 71-90, referred to in Labuschagne 1999 SAfrJ EthnoI61-62.
422 S 155(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code found at http://laws.iustice.gc.calen/C-46/40930.html
(2002-05-01)
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Incest is punishable with imprisonment of up to fourteen years,423
suggesting that the crime is viewed as a serious one. Restraint, duress and
fear are regarded as defences, indicating that the crime's aim is to punish
consensual conduct.f" The rationale for criminalising incest is not to penalise
sexual abuse of children, which is criminalised elsewhere in Part V.425
Interestingly, the maximum punishment for incest exceeds that imposed for
child abuse! The criminal sanction's purpose may be construed as a purely
eugenic one, since only sexual relations between consanguines are
criminalised. However, it is more likell26 that the Canadian incest prohibition
can be characterised primarily as a crime against morality, as is also alluded
to in the heading to Part V.427
4435 USA
According to l.abuschaqne.f" the incest prohibition in the USA generally
overlaps with the marriage prohibition, although the conduct criminalised as
incest in the USA varies from state to state.?" That the decision to criminalise
incest is often arbitrary is well illustrated if the various statutes in the USA
punishing incest are examined. In some states430only consanguines are
included within the scope of the forbidden degrees, whereas others431include
423 S 155(2) supra.
424 S 155(3) supra.
425 See s 150-s 153 ofthe Canadian Criminal Code.
426 See § 5 3 2 3 infra for more on the (unconvincing) eugenic rationale for criminalising incest.
427 See supra.
428 1985 THRHR 440.
429 See also Grossman "Should The Law Be Kinder To 'Kissin' Cousins'?: A Genetic Report Should
Cause A Rethink Of Incest Laws" 2002 Findlaw at
http://writ.comorate.findlaw.com/grossman/20020408.html (2003-05-01). Grossman states that
"[c]riminallaws prohibit marriage and sexual relationships based on the same ties (with the necessary
consanguinity and affinity usually defined the same way as in the marriage laws) [emphasis in
original]."
430 Eg Alaska (Alaska Statutes Title Il Ch 41 S 450) found at
http://www.touchngo.comllglcntr/akstats/Statutes/Titlell/Chapter41/Section450.htm , California
(California Penal Code Title 9 Ch 5 Sec 285) at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=penandgroup=O0001-01 000andfile=281-294
(2003-05-01); Arizona (Arizona Revised Statutes Title 13 Ch 36 S 3608) at
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/13/03608.htm (2003-05-01), Idaho (Title 18 Ch 66 Sec 6602 of the
Idaho Statutes) at http://www3.state.id.us/cgi-bin/newidst?sctid=180660002.K (2003-05-01) and
Kansas (Kansas Statutes Vol2A Art 36 3602 and 3603) at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2269/kansas.html# Incest (2003-05-01).
431 Eg Alabama (Code of Alabama s 3A-13-3) at
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/CodeofAlabama/1975/13A-13-3.htm (2003-05-01); Georgia (Title
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non-blood relations, such as step-children and adopted children, although few
jurisdictions were identified where sexual intercourse between parents-in-law
and children-in-Iaw was crirninalised.v" Unlike in many other jurisdictions,433
including England at present.?" incest prohibitions in the USA normally
extend beyond the close family circle of parents, grandparents and siblings to
include aunts and uncles and even cousins.t" The conduct criminalised
ranges from sexual intercourse in the conventional sense436to sexual conduct
in the widest sense of the word, including indecent exposure.f" Some states
place an age limit on those who can be convicted of incest,438while many
make no mention of age.439
In general, incest appears to be regarded as a fairly serious crime. In all
jurisdictions investigated, incest is a felony, and many states make specific
reference to imprisonment as punishment; where prison terms are referred to,
they are fairly harsh,"? implying that the commission of incest is not taken
lightly. The rationale for punishing incest is by no means always apparent, but
there are indications that eugenic considerations playa role in at least some
16Ch 6 S 22), at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2269/georgia.html#Incest (2003-05-01);
Missouri (Missouri Revised Statutes Ch 568 S 568.020 at
http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/C500-599/5680020.HTM (2003-05-01); Nebraska's Sex Laws
(s 28-702) at http://www.geocities.comlCapitolHiI1/2269/nebraska.html (2003-05-01) and Utah (Utah
Criminal Code Title 76 Ch 7 S 102) at
http://www.livepublish.le.state.ut.us/lpBin20/lpext.dll?f=templatesandfn=main-hit-h.htmand2.0
(2003-05-01 ).
432 See Bratt 1984 Family LQ 298-308 for a complete exposition of the legal position of each of the
states of the USA as regards criminal and civil sanctions for incest.
433 See for instance the discussion of the Australian incest prohibitions at § 4 4 3 6 infra.
434 See § 4 4 2 2 infra for the extent of the present English law incest prohibition.
435 See n 441 infra as well as also Grossman 2002 Findlaw, who cites other examples of prohibitions on
marriages between first cousins (which appear to be for eugenic reasons) and notes that marriages
between cousins are prohibited in 24 states, while only 19 states permit such marriages without
restriction.
436 Eg Alabama (n 431 supra).
437 See, for instance, the Kansas incest prohibition (n 430 supra), which includes as incest marriage,
sexual intercourse, sodomy and unlawful sexual acts, for example "the exposure of a sex organ in a
public place, or in the presence of a person who is not the spouse of the offender and who has not
consented thereto, with the intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires of the offender or another."
438 For example, both Alaska and Kansas criminalise incest only where the offender and other party are
18 years or older.
439 Eg California (n 430 supra) and Georgia (n 431 supra).
440 In Georgia the punishment for incest ranges from a year to 20 years imprisonment, while in Idaho a
maximum prison term of 10 years is stipulated.
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mstances.t" while incest is generally characterised as a sexual offence442 or
a crime against the family.443
4436 Australia
In the Australian Capital Territory incest is classified as a sexual offence
and is punishable in terms of section 62 of the Crimes Act 1900.444 It appears
to be regarded as a serious offence, with punishments ranging from ten years
to 20 years, depending on the age of the "victim".
The conduct criminalised in terms of the Victoria incest prohlbttion?" is
similar to that in ACr.446 Punishment varies from 25 years for incest between
a person and their lineal descendants under eighteen, to five years
imprisonment for sibling incest or incest with a lineal ascendant where the
"victim" is above eighteen years old.
The rationale for criminalisation in both ACT and Victoria is uncertain.
Since incest between adults (over the age of sixteen and eighteen
respectively) is also punishable, preventing child abuse is not a central
consideration. Prohibited relationships include not only blood relations (for
instance lineal descendants, (half-) sisters and (half-) brothers, but also
stepchildren, which indicates that eugenic motivations are likewise not a
primary concern.
Sections 78A and 78B of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900447
crimina lise only incest between close blood relations, where both parties are
above sixteen years old. The maximum punishment is seven years'
441See, eg, the Arizona incest prohibition (Title 25 Ch 1 Art 1 s 101 at
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/25/00101.htm (2003-05-01)), which allows for marriage (and sexual
relations without criminal prosecution - see n 430 supra) between "first cousins ... if both are sixty-
five years of age or older or if one or both first cousins are under sixty-five years of age, upon
approval of any superior court judge in the state if proof has been presented to the judge that one of
the cousins is unable to reproduce."
442See Idaho and Alaska n 430 supra.
443See Missouri and Arizona n 431 supra.
444At http://www.legislation.act.gov.aula/1900-40/currentlpdf/1900-40.pdf (2003-05-0 1).
445S 44 of the Crimes Act of 1958, at
http://www.austlii.edu.aulcgi-binldisp.pl/aullegis/vic/del/consol%5 fact/ca 195882/s44 .html?query=% 7e+incest
(2003-05-15).
446See infra.
447http://www.austlii.edu.aulcgi-binldisp.pl/aullegis/vic/del/consol%5factlcaI95882/s44.html?query=%7e+incest
(2003-05-12).
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imprisonment. As child abuse is not of significance in such cases, the aim of
the crime must be either eugenic or to condemn immorality.
In Queensland incest is criminalised in terms of section 222 of chapter
22 of the Criminal Code contained in the Criminal Code Act 1899.448 Conduct
criminalised is consensual carnal knowledge between closely-related
consanguines, as well as between step-parents and step-children, foster-
parents and foster children and adoptive parents and adopted children. Incest
is characterised as a crime against morality and is regarded as a very serious
offence, evidenced by the fact that it is punishable with life imprisonment. The
rationale for this prohibition is unashamedly the enforcement of morality, since
harm considerations such as eugenics or child abuse are not convincing (or
applicable) reasons for punishing such a wide range of conduct so severely.
In the Northern Territory incest between close blood relatives is a crime
punishable with fourteen years imprisonment if the accused is male, and
seven years if the accused is female.449 Once again, the punishment is harsh
enough for the crime to be characterised as a serious one. In this case the
purpose for punishment may be eugenic. However, if this is so, there is no
clear reason why a man who commits incest should be punished more
severely than his female counterpart.
448 http://www.austlii.edu.auJau/legis/gld/consolact/ccI89994/s222.html(2003-05-12).
449 See s 134 and s 135 of the Criminal Code of the Northern Territory of Australia at
http://www.austlii.edu.aulcgi-binldisp.pllaullegis/ntlconsol%5factlccotntoa498/s134.html?guery=%7e+incest
and http://www.austlii.edu.aulcgi-
binldisp.ollaullegis/ntlconsol%5factlccotntoa498/s 135.html?guery=% 7e+incest (2003-05-12).
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4 4 4 Conclusion
As is no doubt apparent from this comparative overview, it is impossible
to generalise about the use of the incest prohibition in other jurisdictions. The
conduct punished as incest is extremely disparate. Although a considerable
number of countries criminalise only sexual relations between close
consanguineous family members, many also define as incest sexual relations
between a much more extensive group of relatives, including distant blood
relations, affines such as step-parents and step-children and relatives by
adoption. The specific conduct criminalised also ranges from heterosexual
sexual intercourse to gender neutral sexual touching which falls far short of
penetration.
There are some similarities between the incest prohibitions in various
countries. All the jurisdictions investigated where incest is criminalised,
regard sexual relations between close blood relations as incest. Even
countries where incest is not a crime prohibit marriage between consanguines
such as parent and child and brother and sister."? In general, in countries
where it is criminalised incest seems to be viewed as a serious offence, as is
evident from the relatively severe maximum punishments prescribed in most
jurisdtcnons.t" However, it is uncertain to what extent such penalties are
merely symbolic of the moral condemnation of incest, as opposed to being a
true reflection of punishments imposed regularly by the courts in practice.
The universally accepted rationale for punishing incest, if indeed there is
one, remains obscure. The incest prohibitions of other countries assist very
little in establishing a persuasive reason for subjecting incest to criminal
prohibition. Most often, legislators prefer to characterise incest as a sexual
crime or a crime against the family, neither motivation being entirely
convincing. Consent is no defence to a charge of incest, which undermines
the argument that incest is aimed at punishing the infringement of sexual
450 For instance, according to Labuschagne "Bestaan daar 'n Behoefte aan Strafregtelike Beskerming
van die Gesin en van Intieme Assosiasies?" 2002 Obiter 233 245-246, incest is not criminalised in
the Netherlands, although the traditional prohibition on incestuous marriages is maintained by private
law.
451 According to Packer (The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 314), the differential penalties often
prescribed for incest, whereby father-daughter incest would be punished more severely than aunt-
nephew incest, reflect the "relative heinousness" of the various varieties of incest.
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integrity in a similar manner to rape. As for the incest prohibition protecting
the family unit, this line of reasoning does not have persuasive force unless
the only conduct punished as incest is sexual contact between nuclear family
members living together, which is not the case.452 An argument based on the
genetic risk of inbreeding may explain punishment of incest in a handful of
mstances.t'" but incest prohibitions tend to include within the forbidden
degrees, sexual intercourse between non-blood relations such as step-
children or adopted children as well as consanguines. Many laws
criminalising incest contain wide definitions of penetration or punish non-
penetrative conduct, which also weakens the eugenic argument. Although
occasionally the legal moralist argument for criminalising incest is overtly
referred to, it appears that legislators in other jurisdictions are squeamish to
admit there is only one rationale for the criminalisation of incest that applies in
all cases, namely the enforcement of morals.
452 See also § 5 224 infra for objections to protection of the family unit as rationale for criminalisation.
453 Although, as will be elaborated on in § 5 323 infra, there is no satisfactory proof that inbreeding is
necessarily dysgenic.
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5 ASSESSING INCEST IN TERMS OF CRITERIA PROPOSED IN
CHAPTER THREE
5 1 Introduction
If incest is first and foremost a crime against morality, this would have
far-reaching consequences for the legitimacy of incest as a crime. This
chapter will focus on the rationale for criminalising incest in a South African
context. An attempt will be made to establish whether there are relevant and
important reasons for prohibiting incest on pain of punishment that are
convincingly justifiable, or whether the criminalisation of incest is aimed
merely at punishing those who violate a societal taboo by exhibiting sexual
preferences disapproved of by the moral majority. Any worthy reasons for
punishing incest identified will then be examined further, to establish whether
criminalising incest per se is an effectual and reasonable means of achieving
legitimate state goals. By applying to incest the test proposed in chapter three
for determining when the criminal sanction should be resorted to, it is hoped to
formulate a decisive answer to the question of whether it is both justifiable and
reasonable to retain incest as a crime.
5 2 First stage: justifiability
5 2 1Rights limited by criminalising incest
As has already been explained above at §§ 3 2 2 and 3 3 3 1, all criminal
prohibitions necessarily limit, to a not insignificant degree, human rights such
as human dignity and freedom. Compared to most other crimes the
infringement of the right to human dignity is even more pronounced in the
case of incest, since the stigma attached to incest, and consequently to an
incest conviction, is considerable.t'"
454 A large proportion of society views incest as the ultimate taboo. Milton SA Criminal Law &
Procedure: Common Law Crimes 236 states that "our society has an intense moral abhorrence for
sexual relations between close relatives."
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However, the limitation of rights where incest is at issue extends more
widely than the mere negative consequences of criminal punishment in
general. According to Klëpper,455the right to choose one's marriage or sexual
partner is also infringed by criminalising incest. He argues that the state has a
duty to protect the private sphere456of the family and not to interfere with the
personal choices of consenting adults457 regarding selection of marriage
partners. Although the right to family life and to choose a marriage or sexual
partner is not explicitly recognised in the South African Constitution, the
Constitutional Court has held458that these rights are included as part of the
right to human dignity. An analogous argument is that the incest prohibition
prevents persons from being a party to the sexual relationship of their choice
without state intervention, whether or not the parties wish to marry or have a
family. This issue was dealt with by the Constitutional Court in the context of
the decriminalisation of consensual sodomy, where Ackermann J emphasised
the degradation and devaluation of those who "are at risk of arrest,
prosecution and conviction ... simply because they seek to engage in sexual
conduct which is part of their experience of being human."459 In other words,
the criminalisation of incest denies people the right to exercise certain
constitutionally-protected rights on pain of punishment. In Feinberg's
terms."? prohibiting incest not only directly closes the limited option of
,
455 1995 Das Verhaltnis von Art 173 StGB zu Art 6 Abs 1 GG Franz Vahlen: MUnchen, as quoted by
Labuschagne 1999 SAfrJ Ethno161-63 and mentioned at § 4433 supra.
456 For more on the right to privacy and its role in protecting adults from state intervention in the sphere
of sexual behaviour generally, see Coleman "Who's Been Sleeping in My Bed? You, Me and the
State Makes Three" 19911ndiana LR 399-416.
457 This argument only refers to incest between two persons legally capable of consenting, who have
given real, informed and voluntary consent. Where a particular incestuous act is also criminalised as
rape, etc, this reasoning would naturally not apply.
458 See Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA
936 (CC) § 36-37.
459 See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality vMinister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) § 28.
The idea that laws prohibiting certain forms of sexual expression place a burden on (potential)
offenders that is more severe than other prohibitions is echoed by Hart Law, Liberty and Morality 22:
"[Laws enforcing sexual morality] may create a misery of quite a special degree. For both the
difficulties involved in the suppression of sexual impulses and the consequences of repression are
quite different from those involved in the abstention from an "ordinary" crime. Unlike sexual
impulses, the impulse to steal or to wound or even kill is not, except in a minority of mentally
abnormal cases, a recurrent and persistent part of daily life. Resistance to the temptation to commit
these crimes is not often, as the suppression of sexual impulses generally is, something which affects
the development or balance of the individual's emotional life, happiness and personality" [emphasis
added].
460 See also § 3 3 3 1 supra.
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engaging in sexual intercourse with close relatives, but also has indirect
repercussions for the free exercise of other more "fecund" options of the
individuals concerned, such as the right to choose a marriage partner, to
exercise the rights to private family life without state intrusion and to "establish
and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside
community".461 For this reason alone, the incest prohibition should be viewed
with suspicion.
However, there is at least one other way in which the crime of incest
infringes on fundamental rights. Not only does criminalising and punishing the
particular conduct concerned necessarily entail the limitation of human rights,
but enforcement of the prohibition may also have negative human rights
implications. Especially where incest is committed between two consenting
parties in private, there will be no victim to complain by laying a charge.
Sexual intercourse needs to be proved before a person may be found guilty of
incest. Should police wish to obtain such evidence for a conviction, it would
often be required of them to resort to unsavoury and invasive law enforcement
methods that would very likely involve an unconstitutional invasion of the
incest suspect's privacy.462 A strong possibility of arbitrary, discriminatory or
sporadic enforcement can also not be ruled out in incest cases.463
There is sufficient reason for calling the incest prohibition into question,
since it infringes on various fundamental rights that are worthy of protection.
This prima facie violation of rights is unconstitutional unless it can be
established that there are good grounds for retaining incest as a crime.
461 See National Coalition vMinister of Justice supra § 32.
462 Where a child is born of the incestuous union, incest may be proved by DNA evidence that parties
related within prohibited degrees were the parents of the child. Even this is invasive of the privacy of
the parties involved, though perhaps not as invasive as some other means of obtaining evidence.
463 See also n 178 supra, which mentions an example of the extreme privacy-invading methods used to
enforce the Immorality Act 23 of 1957, an Act which also criminalised (private) consensual sexual
behaviour.
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5 2 2 Justification stage: rationale for criminalising incest
Various rationales for punishing incest may be identified, and it has
generally been taken for granted that there is a need to prohibit incest as a
separate crime in order to protect certain important state goals. But is this
conclusion correct? A critical examination of the purported reasons for
criminalising sexual relations between close family members is necessary to
determine whether there are indeed sufficiently worthy reasons to justify the
continued existence of the crime - what is the importance of the purpose of
limiting the incest suspect's rights to, inter alia, human dignity, freedom and
security of the person, privacy and family life? It has already been submitted
in § 3 3 2 1 above that, should the overriding justification for use of the
criminal sanction in the case of incest be shown to be to prevent harm or
serious offence to others, the state will have met its burden of proof with
regard to justifiability - it will have shown that, in principle, suppression of the
conduct concerned is a suitably weighty consideration to warrant the
imposition of the criminal sanction. However, if the chief reason for
criminalising incest appears to be to protect actors themselves from the
consequences of their informed choices (paternalism) or to enforce private
morality, these would be inadequate reasons for imposing the criminal
sanction.
Before examining the incest rationale in detail, it is necessary to
distinguish between two forms of incest, namely that which is non-consensual
and that which occurs with consent. The former category includes all
incestuous sexual conduct which takes place between an adult and a child
under sixteen464 where, although there may be de facto consent, de iure
consent is absent, as well as all non-consensual sexual penetration between
parties related within the forbidden degrees. The latter category includes only
incest between two persons who are capable of giving valid consent to sexual
intercourse, and who do, indeed, give real, informed and voluntary consent to
464 In accordance with the common law rule that girls under 12 are irrebuttably presumed to be
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse, sexual intercourse with a girl below the age of 12 is
common law rape. Where a child is between the age of 12 and 16, consent will not exclude the
criminal liability of their (opposite sex) sexual partner, who may be charged with an offence in terms
of s 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. See also § 4 2 3 supra and n 469 infra for more on
age limits.
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sexual relations. Parties must therefore be at least sixteen years old and the
intercourse must not take place under coercive circumstances and/or without
consent.465 The practical implications of this distinction will be discussed in
§§ 5 2 2 1 1 and 5 2 2 1 2 below.
5 2 2 1 Good reasons: harm to others
5 2 2 1 1 Harm to others: where sexual relations are de facto and de
iure non-consensual
Justifying the criminalisation of non-consensual intra-familial sexual
intercourse is a fairly straightforward task. Where such conduct amounts to
rape (defined as non-consensual sexual intercourse either between adults or
between an adult and a child), there is a clearly identifiable victim to which
harm - sexual violation - is done. Preventing and punishing sexual violence,
whether the victim is an adult or a child, is of course an important and
legitimate government objective. However, the harm caused by incest that is
indistinguishable from rape between non-family members will not be
discussed in detail, as it has already been noted that it would be preferable in
such cases to charge with and convict the offender of rape instead of
incest. 466
465 A detailed discussion of (at least defacto) consensual incestuous conduct between children under 16
(usually brothers and sisters) is beyond the scope of this work. It is certainly a contentious issue.
There are those who argue that it tends merely to amount to sexual experimentation at a young age,
and, as such, it is unjustifiable and nonsensical to label such children as criminals (eg Labuschagne
1985 THRHR 454); adolescent sexual conduct would be "best dealt with by other means than the
criminal law" (Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 764). However, there are also those who are of the
view that sibling incest should not be decriminalised as being relatively harmless. Temkin (1991
Current Legal Problems 194-198) submits that, especially where there is a substantial age gap
between siblings, the elder may be using the younger as a "sexual guinea pig" and cites studies
showing that harm may indeed result. See also Labuschagne "Bestraffing van Geslagsomgang tussen
Kinders" 1992 SALJ 584-587. Although this is a fascinating topic, and well worth further research, it
has been decided to limit the scope of investigation to cases of incest that are either non-consensual
(irrespective of the age of the parties) or where at least one of the parties is 16 years or older.
466 See also discussion at §§ 423 and 4 3 422 supra as well as § 5 3 2 1 infra.
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5 2 2 1 2 Harm to others: where sexual relations are only de facto
consensual
Only non-consensual sexual relations, which may legitimately be
criminalised since harm (or potential harm) is caused to the non-consenting
victim, have been mentioned thus far. A related issue is whether the "harm to
others" rationale may be relied upon where there is de facto consent, but
where one of the parties to incestuous sexual relations is in a relatively
vulnerable position due to such party being a child (under sixteen years of
age).
This matter is somewhat more complicated. It may be asked whether it
is correct to assume that the rationale for criminalising underage sex is to
prevent harm to the child "victim", or whether the criminal prohibition should
rather be classified as one relying on legal paternalism. According to Selfe
and Burke467
"the key rationale would appear to be that society regards sexual intercourse
with girls of a certain age as socially, morally and possibly medically
undesirable, and that the age of 16 represents the arbitrary age at which the
limit has been set."
Thus it initially appears as if criminalising (consensual) sexual intercourse
between adults and children may be included under what Feinberg labels
"presumptively non-blameable paternalism.t'" This is where the criminal
sanction is used to protect relatively helpless or vulnerable persons from
consented-to danger, including harm caused by other people. Although de
facto consent is given, the state refuses to recognise it on policy grounds -
the law presumes that immaturity deprives the child of the capacity to truly
comprehend the nature and consequences of the "harm" consented to.469 In
the words of the Canadian Law Commission:
467 Perspectives of Sex, Crime and Society (1998) 117.
468 See discussion at § 2 3 4 supra.
469 The question whether the (arbitrary) policy decision to make the age of 16 the age of consent for
sexual intercourse is a correct and appropriate one will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that I
am of the view that if it were to be shown that a girl younger than 16 was in fact capable of
understanding the nature and consequences of her decision to engage in sexual relations, and she had
done so, it would seem to serve no legitimate state purpose to punish her sexual partner. It is
submitted that a more nuanced and individualistic approach to the age of consent problem would be
preferable - although, it is admitted, impractical. See too in this regard Labuschagne
"Ouderdomsgrense en Strafregtelike Aanspreeklikheid weens Seksuele Misbruik van Kinders" 1998
Obiter 340 343 and "Strafregtelike Aanspreeklikheid van Kinders: Geestelike of Chronologiese
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"Our society believes, and justly so, that the law must protect those who have
not yet attained full sexual autonomy or who have not yet achieved [the]
equilibrium [between body and mind and between biological development and
mental and emotional maturity]. Children must therefore be protected from
sexual exploitation and corruption until they have arrived at a degree of maturity
which will enable them to foresee the consequences of their acts and take
important personal decisions with full and clear appreciation of the facts, or at
least until they come to the age at which that degree of maturity should be
presumed.'?"?
Although criminalisation of sexual acts with young persons is sometimes
labelled as a form of legal paternalism, it is submitted that it is probably more
accurate to describe the motivation for criminalisation as being to prevent
harm to the child concerned.t" While children of fourteen or fifteen may not
regard themselves as "victims", the risk of exploitation is high. The sexual
conduct is never truly consensual in the strict sense of the word, since it is
recognised that adult-child sexual relationships are intrinsically abusive, with
the adult exploiting the dependence of the child.472 The adult party may be
charged with rape or statutory rape, as the case may be.473
Thus there are legitimate reasons justifying the state's resorting to the
criminal sanction in cases where intra-familial sexual intercourse takes place
without consent or with a young person incapable of giving legally recognised
consent. The matter of whether it is necessary to criminalise this conduct as
incest has been briefly touched upon, and will be elaborated on below at
§§ 5 3 2 and 5 3 3.
Ouderdom?" 1993 SALJ 148-152, where he supports a more flexible approach to the issue of age
limits. West "Thoughts on Sex Law Reform" in Hood (ed) Crime, Criminology and Public Policy:
Essays in Honour of Sir Leon Radzinowicz (1974) 469 476-477 advocates complete abolition of the
concept of an age of consent, arguing that non-consenting behaviour is in any event criminalised.
470 Law Reform Commission of Canada Sexual Offences (1978) 7 referred to by Labuschagne 1990
SACJ 14. See also Renvioze Incest: A Family Pattern at 145, where it is stated that:
"sex is only legitimate when it is between two freely consenting people, and children are incapable of
giving their true consent to an incestuous relationship because: (a) they have no means of knowing
what sex is really about; (b) they have no conception of what their feelings will be about any
incestuous childhood experiences when they are grown up; (c) they cannot as yet begin to
comprehend the importance of social pressures, and (d) it is almost impossible for them to deny their
fathers, even if the request is made gently and without any obvious coercion ... And there is no way
in which a young child can be said to have truly consented to a sexual act initiated by an adult."
471 There is much well-documented evidence of the harm that child abuse causes its victims. See for
instance Smith "Incest and Intrafamilial Child Abuse: Fatal Attractions or Forced and Dangerous
Liaisons?" 1991 Journal of Family Law 833 857-858; Cook & Millsaps "Redressing Wrongs of the
Blamelessly Ignorant Survivor ofIncest" 1991 URich L Rev 1-40.
472 Bratt 1984 Family LQ 258. See also Labuschagne 1990 SACJ23.
473 See also §§ 423,43 42 I and 43 422 supra.
119
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 2 2 1 3 Incest-specific harm to others
Regardless of whether the incestuous conduct in question also amounts
to rape or is consensual, it is often argued that incest is criminalised to
prevent various forms of harm that apply to intra-familial sexual relations only.
5 2 2 1 3 1 Eugenic reasons
One of the most common (and more recent)474 reasons advanced for
punishing incest is that there is a greater likelihood that children born of
incestuous unions will suffer from mental and physical defects than the
general populatlon.?" Thus incest should be criminalised to prevent harm to
potential offspring of an incestuous union. This argument is not entirely
persuasive for a number of reasons that will be outlined in § 5 3 2 3 below.
However, even if it were conceded that the risk of genetic damage may
be considerable in cases where close blood relatives have children, it is still
possible to maintain, as Bailey and McCabe do, that "it is no business of the
criminal law to seek to prevent injury to the children of individual liaisons".476
It will be argued at § 5 3 3 below that there are more effective measures of
preventing such harm than resorting to the criminal sanction.
474 Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 315. See also Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 33, where she points out
that, since primitive man had little understanding of how a child was conceived in the first place, it is
doubtful whether genetic problems had much effect on forming the taboo. This view is supported in
Hughes "The Crime of Incest" 1964 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 322 at
327, where he refers to White's view that the biological degeneration theory "would certainly have
been beyond the comprehension of primitive peoples who held to strong incest taboos." See also
Labuschagne 1990 TSAR 415.
475 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 235; Temkin 1991 Current Legal
Problems 190-193; Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 308; Bailey & Blackburn 1979 Crim LR 715-717; Bailey
& McCabe 1979 Crim LR 757-758; Labuschagne 1999 SAfrJ Ethnol 60-61; Labuschagne 1985
THRHR 452; Labuschagne 1990 TSAR 424-425; Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 149-150; 33;
Smith 1991 Journal of Family Law 858-860; Zellick "Incest" 1971 The New Law Journal 715;
Hughes 1964 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 328; Sexual Offences: The
Substantive Law (1999) 134 at § 36 1 27.
476 1979 Crim LR 758.
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5 2 2 1 3 2 Protection of individual family members
According to the South African Law Commission,
"[ijt is clearly vital to the actual security of all members of the family unit that
certain boundaries are set and preserved within such family. Of these
boundaries the sexual one is the most fundamental. If criminal law has indeed a
role to play in regulating incestuous behaviour, it must seek to protect ... the
individual within the family from the family. In a changing society with confused
and often exploitative attitudes towards sexuality and sexual relationships, it
could be argued that the prohibition of the practice of sexual relations within the
family unit more than ever needs the force of law behind it."m
Temkin states the matter as follows:
"The home can be a dangerous place and the family an oppressive institution.
Within both, parents and some other relatives may enjoy a power which they do
not have in the outside world. The temptation to abuse it is always there. The
unique opportunity for abuse which the family affords and the devastating
consequences for victims which this may entail argue the case for a separate
incest offence. Such a crime sets the seal of disapproval on such conduct and
signals to society the restraints on power within the family that the state will
impose.,,478
A second aspect of family security may be destabilised by incest.
tabuschaqnef" mentions the idea that the incest prohibition creates order
and solidarity within the family in that it prevents the undermining of the
structure of family authority. In the same vein, Wolfram480notes that one of
the reasons advanced for criminalising incest is to prevent the disruption of
the family caused by sexual rivalries, a view echoed by Milton,481who
observes that peace and trust is promoted by "preventing sexual jealousy and
rivalry between members of the family competing for the sexual
companionship of other members." Renvoize asks: "Has not parental
authority already so declined that an acceptance of incest would ... perhaps
... lead to the breakdown of all authority?,,482 Interestingly, however, this
family rivalry, if it exists, does not appear to result in the break-up of the family
unit - quite the contrary. There is strong evidence that incest has the effect of
making the family exceptionally tight-knit. Incest serves to keep the family
477 Sexual Offences: The Substantive Law (1999) 141 § 3 6 7 2, paraphrased from Temkin 1991 Current
Legal Problems 187-188 and 190.
478 1991 Current Legal Problems 199.
479 1990 TSAR 422; 1985 THRHR 453, where it is argued that the structure of family authority is
irreconcilable with sexuality, since, for instance, a mother would be unable to maintain authority over
her daughter if they were competing for the father's sexual favour.
480 1983 Crim LR 316.
481 SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 236.
482 Incest: A Family Pattern 3 and 33-34.
121
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
"[bound] together with ropes of mutual, dependence fear of separation, and
secrecy, and if anyone member tries to break away the bonds are ruthlessly
tightened.,,483 Family rules are strict and there tends to be extreme
dependence on the rest of the family unit.
Hughes484suggests that incestuous activities "pervert the individual's
capacity for ordinary social relationships" as well as disorganising the family
relationships themselves. Incest produces a confusion of roles within the
family, with, for instance, the father or brother becoming husband or lover.
The argument is that this produces confusion and tension, which makes
control of rebellious children more difficult and changes the natural protective
relationship between parents and children.
Renvoize?" also notes that
"[p]arents in incestuous family seem incapable of treating their children in a way
that produces a secure and healthy unit, and all the members, young and old,
are typically short of affection. Often the wrong kind of touching is used in an
attempt to satisfy this need."
Another argument supporting the contention that incest may harm
individual family members, regardless of whether they are directly involved in
incestuous conduct, is that it may be extremely distressing and painful for
family members who unwittingly stumble across the evidence that incest is
occurring. Hughes486cites as an example of the traumatic effects of incest,
the "suffering caused to the wife who discovers an incestuous relationship
between her husband and her daughter".
The state has a legitimate interest in preventing harm to individuals,
including where harm or disruption occurs in the family context, and the incest
prohibition may prima facie be justified as being a means of doing so.
Whether it is a particularly appropriate or effective means, remains to be
seen.487
483 Renvioze Incest: A Family Pattern 100-103.
484 1964 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 327.
485 Incest: A Family Pattern 104.
486 1964 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 328-329.
487 See § 5 3 2 4 infra.
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5222 Good reasons: offence to others
If it could be shown that incest causes sufficient offence to identifiable
victims that it needs to be punished as a crime, this would be a persuasive
reason for the retention of the criminal sanction. May it be argued that, due to
the powerful cultural taboo against incest - the so-called "ick" factor488 - the
mere knowledge that, for instance, a brother and sister are living together as
man and wife, is sufficiently distasteful to justify criminalisation to protect the
feelings and sensibilities of those affronted by such knowledge? Such
reasoning is unpersuasive. According to Feinberg,489 affront caused by the
mere knowledge that offensive conduct such as incest is taking place behind
closed doors is an insufficient reason for invoking the offence principle, and
thus the criminal sanction. There is no identifiable victim who can claim to be
wronged. Naturally, as is the case with any overtly sexual conduct, if
incestuous sexual intercourse occurs in a public place, the offence principle
may indeed be relied upon to punish the conduct on the basis that it amounts
to public tndecency."?
It may be asked whether behaviour such as an adult brother and sister
blatantly kissing in public, or flagrantly boasting about their incestuous
relationship to others, is offensive in Feinberg's sense. It is submitted that
whether the conduct is sufficiently offensive to be criminalised depends largely
on the reasonableness of the offending parties' conduct, including the motive
of the accused. If the aim is to shock or affront others, or to impair their
dignity, the use of the criminal sanction may be necessary or appropriate,
while in other cases it should not be resorted to. In any event, such behaviour
is able to be criminalised not as incest, since sexual intercourse will not have
occurred, but rather as crimen iniuria491 or public indecency.
488 Grossman 2002 Findlaw 3.
489 Discussed at § 2 3 3 supra.
490 According to Snyman Criminal Law 358, public indecency "consists in unlawfully, intentionally
and publicly engaging in conduct which tends to deprave the morals of others, or which outrages the
public's sense of decency." See also Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 316, where he
speculates that a "notorious incest relationship" where there is "exceptionally open flaunting of the
sexual character of the relationship" may be punishable as a nuisance.
491 According to Snyman Criminal Law 453, crimen iniuria is the "unlawful, intentional and serious
violation of the dignity or privacy of another."
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5 2 2 3 Bad reasons: legal paternalism
In the case of private consensual sexual relations between adults related
within the forbidden degrees, arguments based on legal paternalism are
occasionally proffered to justify criminalisation. By making certain choices of
sexual or marriage partner illegal, the state professes to protect the individuals
concerned from choices resulting in self-inflicted harm, such as becoming the
parents of a mentally or physically handicapped child. Another indication that
incest prohibition may be motivated by a degree of paternalism is that incest is
a crime regardless of whether the sexual intercourse is consensual or not.
Feinberg would argue that since volenti non fit iniuria does not apply,
preventing harm to others cannot be the overriding concern of the
prohibition.492
But is the state's aim truly benevolent paternalism? The incest
prohibition is a "direct, substantial and intentional intrusion into an individual's
decision to marry",493to have sexual relations, to procreate and to form a
family. As such, it may only properly be justified in instances where the
danger of imminent bodily harm is readily demonstrable, or where the risk is
extreme or manifestly unreasonable.t'" But what harm inevitably results from
incest between consenting adults? As will be shown at § 5 3 2 3 below, even
if the couple are blood relations who decide to procreate, which is certainly not
necessarily the case, the risk of a genetically defective child being born of
such a union is minimal.495 There is little or no empirical evidence on the
effect of adult consensual incest on the participants, whether positive or
negative - certainly insufficient proof of an immediate risk of great harm. And
even if the injury envisaged by the state is psychological damage to the
parties, "it may be answered that that is more likely to be ameliorated by the
absence of a punitive law which only augments feelings of guilt. ,,496
Thus paternalistic considerations do not appear to be an overriding
rationale in the case of the incest prohibition. It is clear that apparent
492 See discussion of Feinberg's definition oflegal paternalism at § 2 3 4 supra.
493 Bratt 1984 Family LQ 266.
494 Bratt 1984 Family LQ 288.
495 According to Bratt 1984 Family LQ 278, there is at most a 0.125 - ie, 1 in 8 - risk of defective
offspring.
496 Zellick 1971 New LJ715.
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paternalistic justifications are merely society's way of trying to save the
individual not from harm, but from conduct that society deems repulsive. In
any event, since it has been argued that legal paternalism alone is not a
sufficient ground for crimlnalleation.?" no more will be said about this
ostensible rationale for criminalising incest.
5224 Bad reasons: legal moralism
5 2 2 4 1 General reliance on moralism
Authors are often reluctant to admit that the primary reason for
criminalising incest is to enforce certain moral or religious beliefs. They prefer
to hide behind ostensible reasons such as eugenics or prevention of harm to
children. However, moral grounds for criminalising incest have long been
recognised, and it seems apparent that, particularly in England and USA, the
legal prohibition of incest originated as an example of the "secular
enforcement of a particular religious tenet".498
Packer499 underlines this, mentioning the assertion that "criminal
punishment is required to place a secular sanction behind a widely held
religious or moral tenet" and that "the community regards incest with such
intense hostility that failure to condemn it will result in loss of respect for the
criminal law generally."
Milton speculates that incest may be penalised "simply because our
society has an intense moral abhorrence for sexual relations between close
relatives"50o and concedes that, insofar as sexual relations between
consenting adults are concerned, "the crime exists only as a reflection of a
moralistic disapproval of the choice of a sexual partner.,,501 Snyman agrees,
by classifying incest as a crime against morality and stating that incest's
existence
497 See § 2 3 4 supra.
498 For more on the religious function of incest in England and America, see Bratt 1984 Family LQ
281-285.
499 The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 315.
500 SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 236.
501 SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 237.
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"is based not so much on biological considerations ... as on the protection of
certain moral sentiments in the community regarding sexual relationships
between members of a family.,,502
This conclusion is underscored by the fact that mens rea is required for
an incest conviction, a clear indication that "the law is trying to punish the
inherent badness, rather than trying to punish the genetic deterioration of the
human race or to prevent the birth of biologically 'inferior' human beings."503
The idea of incest as being morally wrong is underpinned by a powerful social
taboo against incest.504
Thus legal moralism is clearly an important reason justifying the
existence of the crime of incest - indeed, as was emphasised in § 4 4 4
above, it appears as if there is only one rationale for the criminalisation of
incest that applies across the board, namely the enforcement of morals. The
questionable legitimacy of this rationale with be considered in more detail
below at §§ 5 2 3 and 532.
5 2 2 4 2 Protection of the family unit
Another rationale for criminalising incest separately is the ideological
contention that engaging in incestuous conduct harms the family unit itself,
quite apart from its individual members. It has been argued that "widespread
incest would be socially disruptive - ... result[ing] in the decline of the family
[and] upsetting morals and order".505 According to the British Home Office
discussion document on whether incest should be retained as a crime, "[i]t is
quite proper to argue that, [in the case of adult incestuous sexual
relationships], an adult's right to exercise sexual autonomy in their private life
is not absolute, and that society may properly apply standards through the
criminal law that are intended to protect the family as an institution".506
Similarly, Temkin avers that "[f]or those who are dedicated to the institution of
the family and the maintenance of family life, incest must remain an
502 Criminal Law 356.
503 Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 218.
504 For more on the role of the incest taboo, see § 5338 infra.
505 Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 2.
506 Setting the Boundaries Vall § 5 8 2 available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/vollmain.pdf
(2003-09-25).
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anathema.'?" Norrie50B also mentions the argument that, if family stability is
disturbed, this may lead to the disturbance of the stability of society itself,
since families are the basis on which society rests. Hughes509 states that
"[t]he very kernel of the social complex, the family unit from which outgoing
relationships are developed with others in society, is thus gravely threatened
by the incest situation". In the context of parent-child and sibling incest,
Smith510 goes so far as to say that
"to condone or accept an abolition or relaxation of the social or legal prohibitions
against incest is to invite the slow but sure dissolution of the family as the
foundation of the social fiber [sic] of America, the nation's élan vital ... [I]f incest
were allowed, not only would the family unit collapse, but so too would the
kinship system and thereafter the entire social order."
Although at first glance this reason for criminalisation may appear to be
based on the consideration of preventing harm, as was the case when the
value of security of family members was discussed above at § 5 2 2 1 3,
protecting the family itself is a fundamentally different concern from protection
of the individual members of the family.
It is submitted that characterising incest as a "crime against the family" is
merely an attempt to disguise the true motivation for criminal punishment,
namely the desire to maintain a certain moralistic notion of what a family
ought to be like, and punishing persons in intimate relationships who fail to
conform to this view.511 The underlying fear that necessitates criminal
intervention seems to be that the recognition and acceptance of alternative
manifestations of "family" would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the
family as we know it.512 Taking this into account, it must first be considered
5071991 Current Legal Problems 187.
508 Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 218.
509 1964 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 327.
510 1991 Journal of Family Law 835 and 853; see also 874.
511 This argument is akin to what Feinberg calls "moral conservatism", which advocates the use of the
criminal sanction to prevent social change - see § 2 3 5 supra as well as Feinberg Harmless
Wrongdoing 39-80, especially 39, where he describes legal conservatism as a viewpoint regarding
drastic social change as "an evil in itself, whatever its effect on personal interests and sensibilities ...
of such magnitude that it is morally legitimate to use criminal penalties to prevent it." See also
Johnson 2003 Seattle University LR 41-74 for a interesting moral conservatism-based argument for
retaining the incest prohibition. He argues (at 48-52) that a broad incest prohibition, punishing even
non-harmful conduct, serves the socially useful purpose of preserving the traditional aversion to
incest.
512 This argument is also similar to Lord Devlin's argument in favour of legislating against immorality,
where he argues that society would be in danger of disintegration, were it not for the legal
enforcement of its common moral code (Blom-Cooper and Drewry (eds) Law and Morality 22).
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whether the incestuous family does indeed cause a serious risk of disturbance
to the notion of family, and thus also to the social fabric itself. Second, it may
legitimately be asked whether it is at all appropriate to use the criminal law to
preserve the "fundamental integrity,,513 of the family as institution - is the
"demolition of the family structure as we know it" an evil so unacceptable that
the criminal sanction must be made use of to prevent it?
The first question has already been addressed to an extent at §4 3 4 2 1
above, where it is noted that, even under the amended definition of incest in
terms of proposed Sexual Offences Bill, incest consists only of sexual
penetration, leaving sexual behaviour short of this unpunished as incest per
se.514 Non-penetrative sexual behaviour may be as disruptive of the family
relationship as any other, but does not amount to incest. 515 Thus the incest
prohibition does not cover all cases of serious risk to the family unit due to
sexual molestation and is to this extent under-inclusive, if protection of the
family is the true rationale for the prohibition. Conversely, in instances of
incest where no real danger of disruption to family exists, for instance where a
forty-year-old bachelor has sexual intercourse with his forty-five-year-old
spinster slster.!" the criminal sanction applies in an over-inclusive manner.
Norrie517 also points out that the number of individuals wishing to have sexual
relations with or to marry relations within the forbidden degrees is likely to be
tiny, and would hardly be as disruptive of families as is divorce, which is
legally permitted. It must also be mentioned that empirical studies concerned
with parent-child incest conclude that incest is a symptom or result of family
disorder, not its cause.?"
As regards the second question, whether the family unit as such is
worthy of protection by means of the criminal law, the answer must be "no".
Although "[f]amily roles will of course be altered by developing and changing
sexual relations and marital desires,,519 by permitting incestuous sexual
513 Smith 1991 Journal of Family Law 582.
514 See, however, n 365 supra.
515 Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 218.
516 Norrie supra 218.
517 Supra.
518 Bratt 1984 Family LQ 288.
519 Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 218.
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relations, it is submitted that a new interpretation of "family" is both desirable
and inevitable. Labuschagne520 points out that the law increasingly
recognises alternative intimate associations and family combinations: "Sede-
en waarde-voorskriftelikheid is vervang deur 'n beskermende en
akkommoderende regs- en staatsbetrokkenheld.v"
There has been a shift away from the state moralistically prescribing
certain ideal relationships and (especially religiously-based) "relationship
models" ("verhoudingsmodelle"). This is because of an increased emphasis
on human rights such as the right to equality,522especially equality between
the sexes, the right to privacy, and the right to human dignity.523 Due to
individual autonomy being acknowledged as an important value to a far
greater degree than in the past, there is growing recognition that the state has
no right to intervene in personal choices such as the decision to engage in a
relationship, to live together or to form a family - such choices fall within the
private sphere.
In the light of the increasing pluralisation of types of intimate
relationships.t'" there is no longer only one type of "normal" or "acceptable"
520 2002 Obiter 241.
521 2002 Obiter 239. "Prescriptiveness concerning morals and values has been replaced by a protective
and accommodating legal and state involvement" [my translation].
522 See, eg, Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others
(Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as amicus curiae) 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); 2002 10 BCLR 1006
(CC) §§ 18-19 and §§ 23-26.
523 See Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA
936 (CC) § 36-37.
524 See Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others (Lesbian
and Gay Equality Project as amicus curiae) 2003 2 SA 198 (CC), where it is stated (at § 19) in the
context of a judgment giving lesbian same sex life partners the right to adopt a child jointly:
"The institutions of marriage and family are important social pillars that provide for security, support
and companionship between members of our society and playa pivotal role in the rearing of children.
However, we must approach the issues in the present matter on the basis that family life as
contemplated by the Constitution can be provided in different ways and that legal conceptions of the
family and what constitutes family life should change as social practices and traditions change"
[emphasis added].
See also Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); 2002
9 BCLR 986 (CC) §§ 11-13; 22 and 25; Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others;
Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of
Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) § 31; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); 2000 1 BCLR 39
§§ 47-48; and Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199619964 SA 744 (CC); 1996 10 BCLR 1253 § 99.
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family.525 It should thus be possible to recognise unconventional (even
incestuous!) intimate or family relationships too, provided that the parties
involved are consenting adults. According to Labuschagne,526 no legitimate or
rational state purpose is served by criminal ising as incest, sexual relations
between consenting adults. Instead of subjecting members of families not
conforming to the established definition of "family" to the wrath of criminal
punishment, what is defined as "family" should be extended to include such
relationships.f" Punishment, in the guise of protecting the family (or
marriage) as institution against those who defy moral conventions, is uncalled
for and ineffective.528 The right to the family life of one's choice far outweighs
the need to maintain prescriptive and narrow classifications of family.
To sum up, it would be preferable to be tolerant and accommodating of
different kinds of family relationships, focusing instead on protecting the
individuals involved in a particular intimate association or family from abuse by
other individuals, whether the source of abuse is from within the family or from
an outsider.
5 2 3 Conclusion
It appears from the above discussion that there are a considerable
number of reasons advanced for criminalising incest. Justifications range
from preventing harm to others, both born and unborn, and preventing offence
to others, on the one hand, to protecting persons from the harmful
consequences of their own decisions and reinforcing society's taboo against
sexual relations within the forbidden degrees, on the other. As has been
argued above in § 3 3 2, where the state's rationale for criminalisation can be
shown to be grounded on preventing harm or offence to others, the state has
525 This is also recognised by Labuschagne 2002 Obiter 240, where he states:
"Aangesien die begrippe 'huwelik' en 'gesin' ... regskonstruksies is, het hulle 'n dinamiese onderbou
wat met die koms van nuwe kennis (en insigte) en waarde-veranderinge in 'n betrokke gemeenskap
gewysig en aangepas kan en behoort te word."
526 2002 Obiter 246.
527 Grossman (2002 Findlaw) even speculates that perhaps the term incest could be "replaced with
more palatable terms like 'kinship marriage' or 'distant consanguineous relationships'."
528 Even if preservation of the family unit were regarded as a worthwhile aim of criminal punishment,
the restoration of a functional family unit can hardly be regarded as realistic, since the effect of
punishment is to remove the offender(s) from the family, thus breaking up the nuclear family. See
Smith 1991 Journal of Family Law 870.
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discharged its onus of showing that the use of the criminal sanction is
justifiable in theory. Conversely, if only paternalistic or moralistic arguments
were relied on, the use of the criminal sanction would seldom if ever be
convincingly justified. It has already been posited529that the justification for
the incest prohibition does not appear to be based to any great extent on legal
paternalism, but that even if it were, this would be unpersuasive. It is further
submitted that moral condemnation alone, without underlying justifications that
amount to more than mere "prejudice, ignorance and irrationality",530is an
insufficient reason for imposing the criminal sanction. "[G]eneral repugnance
is nowhere near sufficient to justify a criminal prohibition ... Something more is
required than a mere gut reaction.,,531Thus in the discussion of whether the
incest prohibition is a reasonable one, no further mention will be made of legal
paternalism or legal moralism as convincing justifications for criminalising
incest.
It has been noted that it appears as if the enforcement of morality is
incest's only rationale that is valid in all instances. This casts doubt on
whether other legitimate considerations for supporting criminalisation are
indeed of overriding importance. Be that as it may, there are a number of
other seemingly weighty grounds advanced for resorting to the criminal
sanction. Justification contentions based on prevention of harm or offence to
others are arguably of such sufficient substance that it can be said that incest
is prohibited on pain of criminal punishment at least in part due to the desire to
advance certain legitimate and important state goals, such as preventing
identifiable harm or offence to others. Indeed, if criminalising incest truly does
prevent intra-familial child abuse or harm to individual family members, if it
decreases the number of children being born with genetic defects or if it puts a
529 At § 5 2 2 3 supra.
SlO Bratt 1984 Family LQ 287.
531 Norrie supra 217. See also Zellick 1971 New LJ 715, where he states that criminalising incest
"because society finds the practice so odious and repulsive even among consenting adults that it is not
to be tolerated ... is a most questionable base for the criminal law." Packer The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction 316 goes further, stating that criminalising incest because it is viewed with
hostility is "simply a stark claim for the enforcement of morals through the criminal law [that] must
be rejected on the ground that in the absence of any claim that the conduct ... is injurious ... people
should be free of the peculiar condemnatory restraint of the criminal law."
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stop to the offence caused by the public flaunting of an incestuous sexual
relationship, then criminal punishment may indeed be appropriate.
However, it is insufficient merely to conclude that certain forms of incest
may be criminalised and that criminal punishment is deserved and justifiable
in principle. It is further necessary to establish whether incest in particular
should be criminalised. State punishment of incest must be both practically
desirable and feasible on policy grounds. What must be investigated next is,
inter alia, the efficacy of the existing incest prohibition in inhibiting the
undesirable manifestations of harm or offence to others identified earlier in
§§ 5 2 2 1 and 5 2 2 2.
53 Second stage: reasonableness
5 3 1Nature and extent of limitation
In determining the nature and extent of the limitation of the rights of
those accused or convicted of incest, it is firstly necessary to characterise the
particular limitation, and secondly to establish whether criminal punishment
has a significantly severe negative effect on the fundamental rights of such
persons, or whether the impact is a relatively minor and benign one. As has
been explained above at § 3 3 3 1, the greater the degree of impairment of
human rights inherent in the use of criminal punishment, the less reasonable
such punishment will be. It is submitted that, where incest is concerned, the
degree of impairment of fundamental rights is considerable and wide-ranging.
531 1 Nature
In respect of the nature of the violation, it has been shown at § 5 2 1
that, by prohibiting incest, law-abiding citizens are dissuaded from engaging in
socially desirable and constitutionally protected conduct. The arguments
outlined there and in this regard at § 3 3 3 1 will not be repeated here. Suffice
it to say that a consequence of criminalising incest is that adult persons are
not allowed to engage freely in consensual sexual or marriage relationships of
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their choice. Thus the prohibition itself infringes, inter alia, the rights to human
dignity and privacy.
In addition, due to the fact that incest most often takes place within the
confines of the nuclear family and that in cases of consensual incest there is
no "victim" as such, there is no complainant to lay a charge. As was noted by
Packer,532where consensual crimes are at issue the chance of prosecution is
slight and enforcement of the prohibition must, at best, be extremely sporadic.
Because of the difficulty of obtaining sufficient evidence for conviction, the
police would be far more inclined to resort to underhand detection methods,
and there would thus be a greater risk that the incest suspect's right to privacy
and human dignity would be limited in an unconstitutionally-acceptable
manner during the criminal investigation process. Particularly in a case of
consensual adult incest, which would likely be included among Packer's
crimes that are "just barely taken seriously",533the danger of a discriminatory
abuse of the exercise of the discretion to prosecute can also not be ruled out.
Lastly, due to a general revulsion of incest and the considerable stigma
attached to it, the mere fact that a person is suspected of incest, much less
convicted thereof, entails a considerable impairment of human dignity. An
adult convicted of consensual incest, who is an otherwise law-abiding person,
may be saddled with the burden of societal rejection and disapproval that is
completely disproportionate to the deed committed. Thus even if the
punishment imposed by a court is relatively light, the negative ramifications of
an incest conviction are substantial.
531 2 Extent
As mentioned above in § 3 3 3 1, the extent of prejudice resulting from
subjecting an individual to a criminal sanction may only be determined in
relation to the good sought to be achieved by criminalisation. This requires a
weighing up of the benefits to society of an incest conviction against the harm
caused to the individual accused. In this regard, a distinction must be drawn
532 See discussion at §§ 3 3 3 I and 5 2 I supra.
533 The Limits a/the Criminal Sanction 290.
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between consensual and non-consensual incest. In the latter situation, the
state's rationale for criminal punishment is far more convincing, and a
correspondingly severe infringement of the accused's rights would be
permissible. Where incest is consensual, however, it is hard to conceive of an
instance where the detrimental consequences of the imposition of the criminal
sanction would not far outweigh its benefits. It is submitted that there is a
gross disproportionality between the beneficial purpose that the incest
prohibition aims to achieve and the potential infringement of rights resulting
from its unnecessary over-inclusiveness.
5 3 2Relation between limitation and purpose: effectiveness
It must not be forgotten that it is by no means certain that the main aims
of the incest proscription are indeed to prevent harm and serious offence - on
the contrary. There is a strong likelihood that the fact that the ambit of the
crime is extensive enough to include non-consensual or offensive conduct is
merely coincidental; the core of the offence was and still is to "[enforce] the
private moral views of a section of the community, which are based to a large
extent on nothing more than prejudice".534 The original reason for
criminalising incest was not to prevent harm to its victims, but to enforce a
societal taboo that was incapable of rational explanation. Although it is an
improper reason for crirninalisation.F" enforcement of morality is still the chief
underlying motivation for the retention of the offence in its present extensive
form.
Despite this, in the discussion that follows it is assumed that the primary
raison d'être for a prohibition need not be the only one, and that other (even
ostensible!) grounds for criminalisation that are acceptable justifications for
criminalisation must not be rejected out of hand. Instead, they should be
534 National Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equality andAnother v Minister of Justice and Others 1999
1 SA 6 (CC) § 37.
535 See National Coalition supra §§ 37-37 and § 69, where it was stated in the context of sodomy that
justifications of a criminal sanction based on enforcement of private morality only are "motives and
objectives [that are] flagrantly inconsistent with the Constitution." This argument would apply with
equal force to the incest prohibition.
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carefully scrutinised with the aim of establishing whether the criminal sanction
is effective in preventing and punishing harmful or offensive conduct too.
There are indeed several manifestations of extremely undesirable
conduct that fall within the scope of the offence of incest. The most
convincing reason for retention of the prohibition is that incest, like all
violations of sexual integrity, is harmful to non-consenting victims, especially
where the injured party is a child. In the case of parent-child incest,
particularly, the danger of abuse of trust and authority is ample reason to
justify prohibiting incest so as to protect the child. Additional incest-specific
grounds for criminalisation examined above that may be regarded as
sufficiently weighty, are that progeny of incestuous matings may be slightly
more inclined to suffer from mental or physical defects, and that the members
of a family within which incest occurs are harmed due to the breakdown of the
structure of family authority and sexual jealousy caused by incest. It was also
noted that overt public displays of incest might be prohibited on the grounds
that they could offend observers.
However, even if it is conceded that the crime of incest may be utilised to
protect certain legitimate state interests, it must still be established that the
incest prohibition is indeed closely enough tailored to achieve these purposes
and these purposes only. It will be argued that the crime of incest, even if it
were to be amended as proposed in the Sexual Offences Bill, fails to achieve
its ostensible goals of preventing harm or offence to others with any degree of
effectiveness, while simultaneously prohibiting conduct that is in no way
harmful or offensive to others. It will be shown that justifications based on
harm-to-others or offence-to-others arguments do not apply across the board
or are less than convincing in certain instances. It will become apparent that
the incest prohibition's infringement of constitutionally-protected interests is
unreasonable, as there is not a sufficiently rational connection between the
benefits to society of criminalising incest and the impairment of individual
rights that the criminal sanction entails.
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5321 Non-consensual incest between adults
If prevention of intra-familial rape were a central aim of criminal ising
incest, it would be a laudable one, but this is clearly not the case. That
preventing coerced sexual violation is a secondary consideration is evidenced
by the many other far more effective and appropriate legal mechanisms that
are available for dealing with sexual assault, as well as the fact that the incest
prohibition applies to both consensual and non-consensual sexual
intercourse. Indeed, the state's legitimate and permissible interest in
combating sexual violence would be misleadingly disguised if non-consensual
sexual relations between adult persons related within the forbidden degrees,
were punished as incest. Where a family member coerces another to obtain
sexual favours, it is the evil of non-consensual sex, not of sex with a family
member, that should be emphasised and punished. Depending on the
specific nature and extent of the sexual assault, its perpetrator could be
convicted of rape or indecent assault (or, in future, their equivalents contained
in the Sexual Offences Bill, in addition to indecent assault).536 A conviction of
rape rather than incest would rightly highlight the true nature and heinousness
of the crime - what is being punished is non-consensual sexual violation, and
not the mere contravention of a social taboo.?"
5322 Incest between adult and child - irrespective of whether there was
de facto consent or not
A common reason advanced for retaining incest as a crime is that
criminalising incest between adults and children "prevents a particular and
abhorrent form of sexual abuse against children".538 Sexual exploitation of
536 See the Bill at s 3-7, as well as §§ 423 and 43422 supra. The common law offence of indecent
assault will remain in force, even if the Sexual Offences Bill comes into operation (§ 3 10 5 1 of SA
Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 85).
53
7 It would be appropriate to convict a perpetrator of non-consensual incest between adults of rape, for
which the sentencing options are generally considerably more severe. See Milton SA Criminal Law
& Procedure: Common Law Crimes 245-247 for indications on how courts might exercise their
discretion in punishing incest.
538 Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 236. See also, for instance, the July
2002 British report on reforming the law on sex offences, "Setting the Boundaries" vol 1 eh 5 § 5 1 4,
where it was made clear that the overriding rationale for punishing incest was to protect children
within the family, and Temkin 1991 Current Legal Problems 187-188.
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children consisting of breach of trust and abuse of power within the family
context are certainly deserving of criminal punishment.
Although it is not disputed that child abuse should be criminalised, incest
is not a particularly appropriate means to do SO.539It is clear that the incest
prohibition provides grossly inadequate protection against child abuse. Not
only does the common law crime of incest not apply to all adults in positions of
family trust or care who may abuse children sexually, but it prohibits only
vaginal sexual intercourse, while not covering homosexual abuse of children
and other forms of sexual activity not amounting to penetration. It has been
shown above at § 4 3 4 2 1 that even the proposed amendments to the crime
of incest in the Sexual Offences Bill fail to address this problem adequately.
The Bill does not recognise that sexual abuse of a relationship of trust is not
dependent on blood or family ties - especially with the diversification of
groups defined as "family", there is a good chance that sexual abuse of
authority within the family may be committed by somebody not necessarily
related to their victim within the prohibited degrees. In addition, although the
proposed definition of penetration is wider than mere sexual intercourse, it is
still not comprehensive enough to include non-penetrative sexual activity
within its ambit.
Conversely, if the state objective of the incest prohibition is to prevent
sexual abuse of children and to punish its perpetrators, criminalising incest is
a hopelessly over-reaching means to attain these worthy goals. The crime
fails to differentiate between manifestations of incest as disparate as the rape
of an eight-year-old daughter by her trusted and beloved father and the
consensual adult sexual relations between a father-in-law and daughter-in-law
after the death of both their spouses, where the parties have never even lived
in the same household before - in both instances, the conduct is equally
stigmatised by the law as incest. Also, if child abuse is the evil to be
combated, why is the prohibition on sexual intercourse a life-long one, instead
of being terminated when the child is grown?540And if the danger of abuse of
539 See further Norrie 1992 Journa/ of the Law Society of Scot/and 218.
540 Presumably when the child reaches 16 years of age - but see n 469 for sources where objections to
standardising the age of consent are raised.
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trust within the family is the reason for the prohibition, why is the conduct
criminalised not reserved for sexual relations between caregivers and their
charges, regardless of whether such caregiver is also a family member?
It is clear that the link between the evil of child sexual abuse and
criminalising incest is an extremely tenuous one. It can hardly be said with
conviction that that there is a sufficiently close connection between one of the
ostensible objectives of this criminal sanction - to combat child sexual abuse
- and the manner in which it attempts to achieve such objective, ie, by
criminalising sexual penetration between persons related within the forbidden
degrees, regardless of the age of either party.?"
5323 Eugenics
As was noted in § 5 2 2 1 3 above, prohibiting sexual relations between
close relatives will prevent them from procreating, and thus possibly passing
genetically-linked disorders to their offspring. However, eugenic
considerations for criminalising incest are far from persuasive.
First, it is clear that in cases of incest where the parties do not share a
common genetic makeup, but are related within the forbidden degrees of
marriage or adoption, any biological argument falls flat. Similarly, any
incestuous conduct other than sexual intercourse between a man and a
woman capable of reproducing would not be able to be motivated by referring
to the increased danger of genetically-transmitted defects. If the range of
conduct punishable as incest is extended as proposed by the South African
Law Commission,542 this would narrow still further the field of application of
the eugenic argument in favour of prohibiting incest. At most, then, a rationale
relying on the prevention of the negative consequences of in-breeding is
relevant only where a certain restricted category of conduct punishable as
incest is at issue. Since it applies only to blood relatives who procreate as a
consequence of sexual intercourse with one another, the eugenic argument is
541 It will be seen at § 5 3 3 infra that there are far more effective ways of preventing and punishing the
intra-familial sexual abuse of children than making use of the incest prohibition.
542 See § 4 3 4 2, where it is explained that proposed conduct defined as incest in the Sexual Offences
Bill is gender neutral, including forms of sexual penetration that cannot have procreation as a result,
for example oral and anal sex.
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an unconvincing justification for retaining the much wider incest prohibition in
its present (and future) form.
Second, the claim that children born of incestuous unions are more
inclined to suffer from genetically perpetuated mental or physical defects is a
hotly debated and often disputed one.543 There is scientific evidence that the
probability of defective births is not significantly increased where the parents
are related within the prohibited degrees of consanquinity.P" At most,
scientific evidence suggests that there is an increase in risk of genetically
transmitted disabilities, which is very different from claiming that a disabled
child will be born.545 It has also been argued that endogamous mating may
perpetuate desirable recessive genetic traits as well as undesirable ones.546
Third, it is to be remembered that not all consanguineous heterosexual
sexual unions result in the birth of a child. Bailey and McCabe rightly point out
that "people rarely indulge in incest to produce chlldren'?" and that the
development in contraceptive methods may also undermine the importance of
the eugenic argument. Eugenic arguments hold no water if blood relatives
engage in sexual intercourse, but do not plan to have children or are unable to
do so.
Fourth, it may also be noted that it is not incest for a woman to artificially
inseminate herself with the semen of a close male blood relative - it is clearly
the act of penile penetration, and not the act of fecundation, that is the focus
of the prohibition.P" This once again undermines the idea that concern for the
543 See, for example, Bratt 1984 Family LQ 267-276; Labuschagne 1999 SAfrJ Ethno160-61 and the
authorities quoted there; Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 757-258 and the studies quoted in n 38-39;
Labuschagne 1990 TSAR 424-425 and the authorities quoted there.
544 See Milton SA Criminal Law & Procedure: Common Law Crimes 235 as well as the authorities and
studies referred to by the authors quoted in n 543 supra and the Bratt quote at n 551 infra.
545 See further Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 217-218. See also n 495, where
Bratt is quoted as saying that there is at most a 1 in 8 chance of a genetically abnormal child being
born.
546 Labuschagne 1985 THRHR 452; Wolfram 1983 Crim LR 315; Hughes 1964 Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology and Police Science 328; Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 315.
547 Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 758. See also Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 315.
548 See Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 217. As far as could be ascertained, the
Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 does not criminalise artificial fertilisation of a woman by a close blood
relative. Neither do the regulations concerning artificial insemination issued in terms of the Act make
any reference to the prohibition of artificial insemination between closely related eonsanguines (ON
R1182 in GG 10283 of 1986-06-20; ON R1354 in GG 18362 of 1997-10-17).
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genetic quality of the offspring of incestuous couplings is a convincing
overriding rationale for prohibiting incest.
Fifth, the criminal law is inconsistent in that incestuous relationships are
ostensibly proscribed on genetic grounds, while in situations where the parties
are unrelated, but there is a greater statistical risk of transmission of negative
recessive genetic traits, neither marriage nor procreation is prohibited on pain
of criminal punlsbment.?" Although Temkin argues that requiring a person "to
seek a sexual partner from amongst the many million individuals in the world
who do not constitute family"550 imposes no hardship on individuals wishing to
engage in consensual incestuous sexual relations, it is submitted that this
argument is flawed. It was argued above at § 5 2 1 that the right to freely
choose a sexual partner is indeed substantially impaired by the incest
prohibition - a convincing justification for such infringement is required, which
the eugenic argument fails to provide.
As has been shown, although the state could argue that it has a
legitimate interest in preventing an increase in genetically defective births, the
method chosen to achieve that goal, namely criminalising incest, is particularly
inappropriate. Eugenic arguments apply only to an extremely limited category
of incestuous conduct: heterosexual intercourse between parties able to
procreate and whose mating does indeed produce offspring. Eugenic
concerns are irrelevant to affines or relatives by adoption, or where parties are
unable or unwilling to procreate, or where they engage in forms of sexual
penetration where ejaculation into the vagina does not occur, as well as where
parties are of the same sex. To this extent, if genetic considerations were
paramount, the incest prohibition would be overbroad. Simultaneously, the
failure to include as incest cases where there would be a high probability of
549 Labuschagne 1999 SAfrJ Ethnol61; Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 217; Bratt
1984 Family LQ 275; Temkin 1991 Current Legal Problems 191, where reference is made to
Huntington's disease or cases where the mother is a carrier of muscular dystrophy. Parents are also
not prohibited from transferring non-genetic diseases to their children. For instance, there is no ban
on procreation by HIV positive mothers, who have a good chance of giving birth to HIV-positive
babies.
550 1991 Current Legal Problems 192.
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genetic disorders despite the parties being unrelated, also makes the crime
under-inclusive from a eugenic perspective.F"
5324 Family strife
At first glance, the argument that incestuous relationships within families
are a recipe for strife and conflict seems a powerful one. If incestuous
conduct does indeed have such serious consequences, harming family
members by breaking down intrafamily trust in a sufficiently grave manner to
distinguish it from the harm suffered by other victims of sexual abuse, should
it not be criminalised separately? And are family jealousy and rivalry not evils
worth combating by employing all possible means in the state's arsenal,
including the criminal sanction?
Even if the above arguments are accepted, there is little rational
connection between the incest prohibition in its present form and the
perceived need to discourage sexual exploitation of young family members.
Similarly, it is unclear how criminalising incest is effective in preventing the
disruption of family tranquillity caused by competition for sexual
companionship.
Bratt552 points out that if incest statutes are to be justifiable as a means
of "protecting the family ... so that it can perform its essential function as the
primary agency for the socialization [sic] of the personality of the young", the
conduct proscribed should be sexual relationships between members of the
same household unit, regardless of whether or not such members are related
SS 1 See especially Bratt 1984 Family LQ 296, where she states:
"Because the purported genetic justification for incest statutes rests on inaccurate understanding of
genetic inheritance, incest statutes are both overinclusive and underinclusive. Matings between
consanguineous relatives do not cause genetic defects in the offspring. Such matings merely increase
the probability of homozygosity for a recessive gene trait in the offspring. Only if the recessive gene
trait is 'bad' will the homozygous offspring suffer deleterious effects. Moreover, the increased
genetic dangers in consanguineous matings are fairly minimal and are exceeded by the genetic
dangers involved in the matings of other social populations. The failure to prohibit these matings
with the same or higher genetic risks as consanguineous ones makes incest statutes fatally
underinclusive. On the other hand, incest statutes are overbroad as a mechanism to protect offspring
from increased risks of genetic disorders because all that is needed to accomplish that goal is a
prohibition on reproduction by at-risk mates and not a marriage prohibition. In terms of the genetic
rationale, the inclusion of affineous relationships in some ... incest statutes also makes them
impermissibly overinclusive."
SS2 1984 Family LQ 290.
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within the forbidden degrees of blood, marriage or adoption. The detrimental
effects of intra-familial sexual relationships are the same, irrespective of "the
precise legal nomenclature describing the relationships".553 The changes in
the modern family structure mean that there are an increasing number of
households containing members to which others in the same "family unit" are
unrelated, such as where the adult couple is unmarried and each has children
who are the product of a previous sexual liaison. The current incest
prohibition is inadequate to protect such children from sexual exploitation by
other family members. Thus if laws against incest are to achieve the
purported objective of protecting individual family members from the harm
caused by intrafamilial sexual relations, they must be applicable to all adults
and all children who live in the same household. To this extent, therefore,
incest prohibitions are under-inclusive.
Conversely, since the crime of common law incest extends beyond
criminalising sexual relations between members of the same household -
contemporary households tend not to include uncles, grandfathers, fathers-in-
law, etc, - the crime can hardly be said to have the primary aim of diminishing
significantly the danger of sexual rivalries and sexually induced discord and
tension within the (nuclear) family. Even in cases where older relatives not
living with the family attempt to take advantage of their power to dominate
younger, more vulnerable family members, there is no rational reason for
distinguishing between sexual exploitation by an older relative and that by a
trusted neighbour. In either case, it is submitted that there are better ways of
dealing with the situation than by using the law against incest.
5 3 2 5 Offence to others
The state has a legitimate interest in preventing its citizens from being
exposed to offensive conduct, and may, in instances of serious offence, be
justified in using the criminal sanction to enforce this interest. Since most
people would profess to regard incest as offensive in the sense that they find
553 Bratt 1984 Family LQ 290.
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it repugnant and feel affronted by its commission, is it not then reasonable for
the state to prohibit incest as an offence to others?
However, this argument is flawed because, as explained in § 5 2 2 2
above, the mere knowledge that incestuous practices are being engaged in in
private is not sufficient for the use of the criminal sanction to be justifiable -
the punishment of unwitnessed incest could hardly be defensible in terms of
the offence principle.554 And while public engaging in incestuous conduct
could indeed be offensive in Feinberg's sense, the offence would generally be
due to its sexual nature, since most observers would in all likelihood be
unaware of the fact that the parties were related within the forbidden degrees.
Given that the incest prohibition makes no distinction between publicly
and privately committed incest, there is little evidence of a rational connection
between the punishment of incest and the prevention of offence. Although the
punishment of isolated instances of incest may be able to be explained in
terms of the offence principle, this is clearly not the decisive reason for
criminalisation.
5 3 2 6 Enforceability
Another problem with the incest prohibition is its low degree of practical
enforceability. If the factors outlined in § 3 3 3 2 are taken into account, it is
clear that the incest prohibition's deterrent effect is negligible.555 Not only is
enforcement sporadic, but in cases of consensual incest it has already been
noted that there is a considerable risk of discriminatory enforcement and of
over-intrusive detection methods being used. Consensual incest could
certainly be characterised as a trivial offence, yet effective enforcement would
require disproportionate resource allocation.
Even if the prohibition were effectively enforced, which it is not, it is in
any event doubtful whether the criminal sanction is successful in deterring
people from committing incest. If incest is committed despite strong societal
554 See the discussion of Feinberg's analysis of offence § 2 3 3 supra.
555 This notion is supported by Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 756, where they refer to Andenaes'
argument that "the criminal sanction is least effective in producing lawfulness when it comes to more
irrational offences like incest."
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disapproval of interfamilial sexual relations, this indicates that it is doubtful
whether the mere knowledge of possible criminal punishment will inhibit those
desiring to commit incest from doing SO.556Arguably, strong societal pressure
to refrain from committing incest serves the same purpose as criminalisation
and prevents incest at least as successfully as punishment. 557
5327 Summary
The above analysis seriously questions the effectiveness of the incest
prohibition in combating harmful and offensive conduct - even the harmful
and offensive conduct identified as incest-specific! The crime is certainly not
specifically concerned with eugenics or directed towards preventing harm to
family members, being simultaneously over-broad and under-inclusive to
serve these purposes adequately. And only a small proportion of cases of
incest could possibly be defined as offensive, the offensiveness lying largely
in the fact that the parties are engaging in sexual intercourse, regardless of
their blood, marriage or adoptive relationship.558 I would agree with Hughes
that the "unreflecting vestiges of primitive taboo attitudes" retained in the
incest prohibition make it too clumsy to be able to focus its prohibition with
"sufficient precision [on] the evils that ought to be suppressed."559 In addition,
the incest prohibition is relatively unsuccessful in deterring or preventing
incestuous behaviour. Its application in practice does not achieve its stated
goals because the (perceived) risk of detection, apprehension and conviction
is comparatively low. The relation between the limitation and its purpose is
thus too questionable to be regarded as reasonable. Lack of effective
enforcement is a strong indication that decriminalisation is an option that
should be taken seriously. The extremely tenuous relationship between the
(few) worthy aims of the incest prohibition and the definition of the crime itself
556 Contra Smith 1991 Journal of Family Law 875, where reference is made to a study that showed that
the "greater the likelihood that incest offenders will be brought to trial, the greater the deterrent effect
on potential violation."
557 See § 5 3 3 8 infra for more on the role of the societal taboo.
558 Due to its inefficacy and inadequacy in combating the evils it professes to be aimed at preventing,
Packer calls incest an "imaginary offence" (The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 312).
559 1964 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 329-330.
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undermines the validity of retaining incest as a crime in its present form, or
indeed, at all. The cost of criminalising incest far outweighs the benefit.
5 3 3 Less restrictive means: alternatives to the incest criminal sanction
- recommendations
5 3 3 1 General remarks
It is not reasonable for the state to make use of the criminal sanction if
the crime in question is over-broad, including both objectionable and
unobjectionable conduct within its ambit. Where there is not a sufficiently
close connection between the operation of a particular criminal sanction and
its (legitimate) objectives, such offence must be carefully scrutinised. It must
be determined whether the crime may be saved by limiting (and/or extending)
its scope of application, and if so, whether it should be saved. It is necessary
to consider whether the better alternative would not be to reject it completely,
while relying on be other criminal sanctions in existence to proscribe only the
conduct deserving of punishment.
As has already been mentioned, the incest prohibition criminalises both
conduct where criminalisation is desirable (such as non-consensual sex or
sex between an adult and a child) and conduct that is both constitutionally
protected and unobjectionable (such as sexual relations between consenting
adults). The only conclusion, then, is that the incest prohibition cannot be
retained in its present form without being subject to serious constitutional
challenge. To quote Ackermann J's remarks made in the context of sodomy,
"neither the coherence of the common law, nor judicial policy, requires the
continued existence of a severely truncated form of the common-law
offence".56o Our criminal law would not be left with a lacuna if the decision
were made to decriminalise incest - there are sufficient alternatives available
that would subject harmful incestuous conduct to punishment, without
560 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999
1 SA 6 (CC) § 71.
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unreasonably limiting the rights of consenting adults to freely choose their
sexual (or marriage) partner.
5332 Option one: alternative definition of the crime
Even if it were correct to conclude that incest is constitutionally suspect,
it must be considered whether it would be an acceptable alternative for the
incest prohibition to be retained, while being sufficiently adapted so as to
make it comply with constitutional requirements. A number of substantive
changes to the crime would be required. First, it would be necessary to use
remedies similar to severance or "reading down" in order to narrow the ambit
of the prohibition so as to include only harmful or offensive conduct, while
leaving all other conduct presently criminalised as incest, beyond the reach of
the criminal law. This would mean that incest between consenting adults
would have to be decriminalised, since there is no victim to be harmed. The
rationale for criminalising incest between affines may also be called into
question;561however, since there is evidence that one of the most prevalent
forms of incest is that between step-parents and minor stepchildren,562this
prohibition should probably be retained where adult-child incest is concerned.
Second, it is clear that extensive "reading in" would also be essential so
as to ensure that the crime does not fall foul of the constitutional imperative
that there be a rational connection between the prohibited conduct and any
justifiable aim of the prohibition. If it is acknowledged that the most weighty
permissible rationale for the crime's continued existence is the prevention of
sexual abuse of authority within the family context, the ambit of the crime
would need to be extended to make it comprehensive enough to cover all
forms of intra-familial sexual abuse of this nature. At the very least, non-
penetrative conduct and sexual abuse perpetrated by a trusted caregiver who
is not related to the victim within the forbidden degrees, would need to be
included within the definition of the crime.
561 See Nel2002 Stell LR 331-351 as well as § 4 3423 supra.
562 Temkin 1991 Current Legal Problems 207-208.
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Incest as currently defined is both too wide and too narrow to serve any
legitimate state purpose effectively. It is clear that only considerable cosmetic
surgery could save the incest prohibition - would the effort involved in such a
face-lift be worth it?
5333 Option two: use of other existing criminal sanctions
It is submitted that there are no sensible reasons based on legal
principle or public policy for retaining the incest prohibition as a crime
separate from existing crimes against sexual integrity. As already
mentioned,563it is strongly suggested that it would be preferable to punish
non-consensual incest as rape.564 This would emphasise what is being
punished is heinous non-consensual sexual violation, rather than the mere
contravention of a societal taboo. The fact that the abuser is a caretaker or
relative living in the same household as the victim could be a factor to be
taken into account in aggravation of sentence.P" rather than criminalising the
conduct separately.
Although at first glance it may appear odd to describe as "less
restrictive", convicting of rape rather than incest, persons who engage in
sexual relations with close relatives. Rape is, after all, the more serious
crime. However, it should be kept in mind that the single aim of the rape
prohibition is to punish and prevent harm - sexual violation - and it is narrowly
tailored to do just that. Its purpose, which is a legitimate and overridingly
important state objective, is achieved without simultaneously unnecessarily
subjecting those whose incest does not harm others, to criminal punishment.
563 Inter alia at § 4 2 3 supra.
564 Rape is used broadly in this context to refer not only to common law rape, but also to indecent
assault and crimes in terms of s 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, as well as the crimes
proposed in s 3, s 4, s 5, s 7 and s lGof the proposed Sexual Offences Bill.
565 See, for instance, Labuschagne "Intieme Menslike Verhoudinge, Seksuele Misbruik van 'n Kind en
'n Eggenote en die Strafregtelike Effek van 'n Lang Tydsverloop tussen Misdaadpleging en
Aanmelding" 2001 De Jure 136 137, where he quotes a Canadian case that mentions that abuse of a
position of trust or authority by the offender is a factor that should be taken into account when
deciding on appropriate punishment for sex offenders.
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5334 Option three: the criminal sanction as back-up
Diversion is another option to be considered - it may be possible to
avoid the criminal process initially and utilise it only indirectly, as a sanction of
last resort where less coercive methods fail.
Especially where a party is suspected of non-violent incest with a
younger family member it may be better not to involve the criminal law at all.
The legal process may be much more traumatic to the victim than the actual
molestation itself.566 In such instances it might be preferable for the family to
stay together, and for the offender to undergo treatment while the rest of the
family attends therapy.567 However, experience shows that there is a high
drop-out rate where treatment is undertaken voluntarily or where it is merely
suggested.568 It is submitted that in appropriate cases569 a simple procedure
could be developed whereby social workers or other interested parties could
obtain a court order requiring suspected incest "offenders" to attend suitable
treatment or therapy programs. Only if the treatment order is disregarded
need criminal prosecution - possibly resulting in imprisonment - be an option,
and even then, those who fail to comply would be found guilty of contempt of
court, rather than be saddled with the stigma of an incest conviction. This
would have the benefit of giving perpetrators a strong incentive to persist with
treatment without the negative consequences for the whole family of
premature and inappropriate resort to the criminal sanction.
566 See Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 166-187; Nelson Incest: Fact and Myth (l987) 48-50. West
"Thoughts on Sex Law Reform" in Crime, Criminology and Public Policy 480 states:
"Everyone agrees that the effects of a prosecution for incest can be disastrous to the [victim]
involved. If the father is imprisoned, she suffers the guilt of being in part responsible, she loses his
protection and economic support, her parental home is broken up, and she herself may be taken into a
children's home."
567 See S v D 19894 SA 709 (T), where Kriegler J state at 716 D-E: "Die straftoemeter moet himself
afvra of daar, beide wat betref die besondere indiwidu voor hom asook wat betref die
gemeenskapsbelange, hervormend, dit wil sê rekontruktief, gehandel kan of moet word. Veral in die
geval van vader-dogter bloedskande ... tree die gesin sterk op die voorgrond. Summiere
gevangesetting van die vaderlbroodwinner, met gepaardgaande verbrokkeling van die gesin en
vernietiging van sy sosio-ekonomiese onderbou, kan die jong klaagstertjie onberekenbare verdere
benadeling toebring. Die tussenkoms van die strafreg in so 'n bloedskandelike verhouding skep vir
die dogter 'n dilemma waarvan die straftoemeter kennis moet neem."
568 Renvoize Incest: A Family Pattern 170.
569 Renvoize (Incest: A Family Pattern 173) suggests that perpetrators should have no previous history
of incestuous offences; that they must not have used violence, including intimidation implying bodily
harm; and that they admit that they need help and voluntarily agree to follow treatment programs,
including family counselling, for up to two years.
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5335 Option four: voluntary treatment or therapy
Where incest consists simply of consensual sexual relations between
adults who are related within the forbidden degrees, even the slightest degree
of state coercion is uncalled for. It is submitted that use of the criminal
sanction is superfluous and even counter-productive in such instances.
According to Bailey and McCabe,57othe intervention of the criminal law in the
personal sphere of consenting adults "augments rather than relieves" the adult
offender's existing sense of guilt and psychological damage that a knowing
violation of a social taboo tends to engender. They suggest that, rather than
imposing punishment, a better option would be to provide therapeutic help on
a voluntary basis. This approach is to be recommended.
5336 Option five: marriage prohibition
An alternative to the criminal sanction would be merely to retain the
prohibition on incestuous marriages, which is presumed to be less
burdensome than criminalisation. Social disapproval of incest, it is argued,571
is registered effectively through making marriage between parties related
within the prohibited degrees of blood, marriage or adoptive relationship, null
and void. It is unnecessary to back this sanction up with criminal punishment.
There are examples of other countries572where the criminal law incest
prohibition does not overlap with the civil law one, so it would not be
anomalous for the legislature to refuse to allow parties to enter into a valid
marriage, while not subjecting sexual relations between them to criminal
penalties.
This argument is not entirely convincing, however. It is submitted that
not allowing individuals related within the forbidden degrees to marry each
other may be considered a limitation on rights at least as severe as the
criminal sanction. Just as in the case of the criminal prohibition, the marriage
prohibition considerably undermines the strong desire of such parties to
commit themselves to an enduring relationship by freely choosing their
5701979 Crim LR 758.
571 Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 756-757.
572 See n 450 supra.
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marriage partners without the state interfering in their private decisions to form
the family units of their preference. It may well be imagined that in some
instances, the civil sanction of being unable to marry may be yet more
devastating than any criminal punishment that could be imposed. Indeed,
there may be an even greater impairment of human dignity here than in
instances where parties are punished by the criminal law for merely engaging
in a casual or once-off incestuous sexual act. Thus any conclusion that the
crime of incest is constitutionally impermissible and should be abolished,
applies equally to the civil marriage prohibition. It would therefore be
preferable that incest not only be decriminalised, but that incestuous
marriages between consenting adults also be legally recognised.
5337 Option six: delictual damages
Where incest causes harm to identifiable victims, injured parties should
be entitled to recover damages, even if no criminal prosecution is undertaken.
According to Labuschagne,573 it should be possible for victims to bring the
actio iniuriarum against persons who have sexually exploited a relationship of
dependence, such as perpetrators of incest. It is often the case that
incestuous abuse takes place over a long period of time, and the fact may
only come to the attention of authorities many years later. That the abuse
occurred a considerable time ago does not mean it should be condoned.F"
Recovery of compensation after a long period has elapsed could be facilitated
by relaxing the rules of proscription so as to allow victims to institute claims
573 "Deliktuele Aanspreeklikheid vir Seksuele Bedrog en Seksuele Uitbuiting van 'n Afhanklikheids-
verhouding" 1995 TRW32 41-42; 50.
574 Labuschagne 2001 De Jure 140-141.
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within a reasonable periods7s after they have attained majority, or after they
become aware of the harm that they have suffered, whichever occurs later.s76
According to Smith, greater ease in recovery of civil damages would
"act as a reinforcing social benefit to both present and potential victimized [sic]
plaintiffs by inviting a public reconsideration, and thus a heightened awareness
of the real plight and horror of the victims and also of where the real blame is to
be fixed in tragic cases of this nature.'?"
5338 Option seven: social taboo57B
The social taboo associated with incest is strong, and incest has been
prohibited from the earliest days of civilisation.s79 Societal opposition to incest
is arguably more effective at discouraging incest than any criminal
proscriptton.P" If the aim of criminal punishment is to deter potential
offenders and to prevent crimes being committed in future, it is submitted that
this purpose is equally well served by the social stigma attached to incest as
by any criminal punishment. Removing the criminal sanction for non-harmful
incest is hardly likely to result in a proliferation of incest, since even if the
threat of criminal punishment were absent, most people would choose not to
575 See the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, where provision is presently made in s 13(I)(a) for the delaying
of the completion of the prescription period until a year has elapsed after the minor has attained
majority in circumstances where the prescription period would otherwise have been completed within
a year of the minor's attaining majority. For more details on the operation and application of this
provision, see Road Accident Fund v Smith NO 1999 1 SA 92 (SCA) 98 (obiter) and Santam
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Roux 19782 SA 856 (A). In addition, s 3(1)(a) read with s 3(1)(c) of
the Prescription Act provides for postponement of completion of prescription in the case of a minor
until 3 years after the minor has attained majority, where the prescription period would have been
completed within 3 years of attainment of majority.
576 See in the criminal law context Labuschagne 1997 TRW 101-102 and 109-110, where he advocates
that prescription periods not be too strictly adhered to, at the expense of general considerations of
justice and common sense. See also Labuschagne "Tydsverloop, Omstandigheidsverjaring en
Seksuele Misbruik van Kinders" 1996 Obiter 228 331, where he argues that prescription periods are
arbitrary and should bow before interests of justice: "Verjaringstermyne kan ... wei as riglyne gestel
word, maar dit moet wyk indien geregtigheid dit in 'n gegewe geval vereis."
577 1991 Journal of Family Law 875.
578 For more general information on the incest taboo, see Arens The Original Sin: Incest and its
Meaning (1986). For a wider anthropological perspective on taboos, see Douglas Purity and Danger:
an Analysis of Concepts of Pol/uti on and Taboo (1966).
579 Norrie 1992 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 216.
580 Bailey & McCabe 1979 Crim LR 756. Contra Temkin 1991 Current Legal Problems 188-190, who
suggests at 190 that "the law itself plays a crucial role in reaffirming the incest taboo. In a changing
society with confused and often exploitative attitudes towards sexuality and sexual relationships, the
taboo needs more than ever the force of law behind it." In response it might well be asked, if Temkin
is correct in her view that the social disapproval of incest is weakening, why it would be necessary for
the criminal law to continue to enforce an outmoded and irrational taboo at all! See also Smith 1991
Journal of Family Law 834-845 for a general discussion of the incest taboo, and particularly the
"continued public fascination with vicariously exploring social and legal taboos such as incest" (845).
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engage in incestuous practices anyway, either due to natural inclination or to
social pressure. Thus even if the argument were accepted that it is justifiable
to subject consensual adult incest to criminalisation, which it is not, it may be
asked whether it is really necessary for the state to waste its resources and
time policing conduct that an existing social taboo is more than capable of
keeping under control.
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6 CONCLUSION
6 1 Aim of the study
This study commenced with a question - how should the decision
concerning whether conduct should be criminalised, be made? It was hoped
that the criteria identified and test developed could serve as a starting point for
answering this question. Another goal was to evaluate the test's efficacy by
assessing an existing crime in terms of its criteria. The ultimate objective was
the establishment of test that might be more widely applicable and useful in
ascertaining the optimal use of the criminal sanction.
6 2 Approach followed
After arguing that the use of criminal punishment inevitably limits certain
human rights, it was contended that the state has the task of justifying criminal
punishment with reference to the crime's underlying rationale. If the reason
for the existence of the crime is to prevent harm or serious offence to others,
criminalisation is acceptable in principle, whereas a crime's existence is
unjustifiable if it merely enforces paternalistic state attitudes or certain moral
viewpoints. However, even if the purpose of criminalisation is a legitimate and
worthy one, the reasonableness of the means chosen to achieve the state
goal must still be established. The state needs to show that there is a rational
connection between criminal punishment and the effective prevention and
deterrence of the objectionable conduct identified. Where criminalisation
achieves state aims only to a minor degree, or where there are other ways to
achieve the same aim at less cost to the individual perpetrator, use of the
criminal sanction will be unreasonable and therefore undesirable.
This study applied the approach developed above to the common law
crime of incest. First, it was found that although the primary reason for
criminalising sexual relations between close relatives is to punish immorality,
the rationale for incest based on prevention of harm to non-consenting or child
victims is sufficient for the criminal sanction to be prima facie justifiable.
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However, as to the second question of whether the use of the incest
prohibition in its present form was reasonable, it was concluded that there was
an extremely tenuous link between conduct criminalised as incest and the
actual harm that the prohibition seeks to prevent. The crime of incest is
simultaneously under-inclusive and over-inclusive, on the one hand failing to
punish obviously harmful manifestations of intra-familial sexual behaviour,
while on the other, criminalising utterly innocuous conduct. As a
consequence, it was recommended that the incest prohibition be abolished. It
was submitted that our criminal law makes adequate provision for the
criminalisation of harmful forms of incest, both in terms of common law and
statute. The only conduct remaining that is exclusively punishable as incest,
is consensual sexual relations between adults related within the forbidden
degrees of blood, marriage or adoptive relationship. Incestuous preferences
of consenting adults are, to put it bluntly, none of the state's business.
Subjecting such conduct to the criminal sanction is likely to cause far more
harm than good.
6 3 Recommendations for further study
There is considerable scope for further research in this field.
First, it is necessary to make an extensive study of the problem of the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system being undermined, including the
related question of vigilantism.581 The manifestations and consequences of
these phenomena need to be investigated, but most importantly, an attempt
must be made to arrive at possible solutions, the more carefully considered
utilisation of the criminal sanction proposed in the present study being just one
of many.
Second, a more extensive inquiry into alternatives to criminalisation
should be undertaken.582 Before it can be said with confidence that criminal
punishment ought not to be resorted to, because there are less restrictive
means of achieving the same aims, there should be clarity as to what these
SSI Mentioned in § 12 supra in the context of the problem of over-criminalisation,
SS2 See n 19 as well as § 5 3 3 supra.
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alternative means are, the circumstances under which they may be utilised
and the cost of such utilisation for all parties involved.
Third, another general criminal law problem highlighted in this study that
deserves more attention is the issue of the age of consent to sexual
activities.583 It needs to be asked whether a move away from arbitrary age
limits currently recognised by law towards a more nuanced approach would
be desirable, and if so, whether it would be feasible.
Fourth, one of the incest-specific matters not addressed in this study is
the criminalisation of incest in customary law.584 Especially in the light of the
recommendations made in this study as regards the decriminalisation of
incest, it must be determined whether such recommendations also imply the
demise of incest as customary law offence, and if not, the constitutional
implications of any conclusion reached in this regard.
Fifth, this study also fails to address the question of whether incest (or,
for that matter, other sexual behaviour) between children should be regulated
in any way, and if so, how and under what circurnstances.?" This important
matter urgently needs further attention.
Last, and perhaps most important, it is necessary to apply the test
outlined for determining the optimal use of the criminal sanction, to other
crimes suspected of having outlived their usefulness, as well as evaluating
proposed future crimes according to its criteria. Only if this is done may it be
established whether the test developed is indeed a truly valuable one.
6 4 Concluding remarks
It is hoped that this study will emphasise the need to be critically aware
of the state's current and future utilisation of the criminal sanction. Too often
there is the tendency simply to let irrational instincts prevail and to
unthinkingly label behaviour as criminal if it evokes revulsion or distaste. It is
forgotten that the fundamental rights of potential offenders, as well as the
583 See n 469 supra for more sources on age limits.
584 See n 292 supra.
585 For more on this debate, see n 465 supra.
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financial resources of the state, are at stake if criminal punishment is resorted
to without careful consideration. Measuring common law incest against
rational criminalisation criteria plainly reveals the dangers of indiscriminate
use of the criminal sanction. Abhorrent conduct should not inevitably be
criminal conduct, and merely because conduct is presently a crime does not
mean that it should continue to be criminalised. Constant re-evaluation of
existing criminal sanctions is required to determine whether criminalisation is
still necessary, or whether the crime in question has outlived its usefulness.
Similarly, before the legislature decides to subject additional conduct to
criminal punishment, there must be certainty that such a step is really
appropriate. The supremacy of the Constitution makes it possible to subject
the state's criminalisation decisions to more careful scrutiny than in the past
and to hold the state accountable for choices made in this regard. Constant
and critical evaluation of existing and proposed criminal prohibitions is a duty
that should be taken seriously. Criminalisation decisions matter. Not only
would potential violations of human rights be avoided, but the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system as a whole would be considerably enhanced if the
criminal sanction were reserved for conduct truly deserving of punishment.
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